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1. Introduction 
1.1 About the Book  
Moral theories are concerned with normative reality, with what we should do 
and why we should do it. Scientific theories, on the other hand, are concerned 
with non-normative reality, with questions of what the world is like and why 
it is like that. Just as we can ask the non-normative questions “Will Tom do-
nate to Amnesty?” and “Why will Tom donate?”, we can ask the correspond-
ing normative questions “Should Tom donate money to Amnesty?” and “Why 
should Tom donate?”. In both cases, we expect there to be intelligible and 
reasonable answers to our questions. 
While moral theories are about normative reality, they are not about all of 
it: they are restricted to the moral part of normative reality. There are many 
normative questions that are not moral ones. For example, if you avoid check-
mate by moving your king in a chess game, then there is a sense in which it is 
true that “you should move your king.” Although this is a normative statement, 
because it is about which piece you should move in the game and not about 
which piece you did or will move, it is not a moral statement. Even if moving 
the king saves a million children from disease or death, it remains true that 
you should move it, because this normative claim is limited to what should be 
done to win a game of chess. Such “chess normativity” contrasts with “moral 
normativity,” which is my concern here. A moral theory purports to answer 
not any normative question, such as what to do to win a game of chess, but 
only normative questions about what we morally should do. Prototypical 
moral questions include whether to give to charity, whether to forego flying 
on this year’s vacation, and whether to vote for a particular political party. 
Why should we study moral theories? First, they answer fascinating and 
interesting questions about an important dimension of our lives. We believe 
of various actions that they are morally right or wrong, and we use these judg-
ments to navigate the world in our daily lives. But it is not obvious why certain 
acts are right or wrong. Why is it right to save a child from drowning, but 
wrong to let a child drown? What does murder and sexual harassment have in 
common that make such acts wrong? Is there even a common explanation for 
why such acts are wrong? And why are there so many exceptions to moral 
rules? For example, why can I harm others in self-defense, but only within 
reasonable limits? What determines those reasonable limits? Why are we ex-
pected to give special priority to our children privately, but not in the capacity 
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of government officials? These questions tickle our curiosity and moral theo-
ries promise to answer them – to explain how these aspects of morality hang 
together. 
Second, sometimes we find that two of our moral beliefs conflict, or coexist 
only uneasily, with each other. In these cases, we want to know whether these 
beliefs are compatible. If they are not compatible, we want to know which one 
to give up. For example, most of us are opposed to non-human animals being 
hurt for the purpose of entertainment, which has given rise to the common 
notice that “No animals were hurt in the making of this film.” However, we 
care surprisingly little about animals being hurt to make food, even when the 
food is neither healthy nor nutritious. Is there a morally significant difference 
between these cases? Moreover, we think that it is deeply immoral to kill an 
unconscious child, but that it is permissible to kill an unconscious fetus – alt-
hough the latter act is only permissible if we do it before a particular week in 
gestation. What could account for these different judgments? Nearly everyone 
thinks that it is best for a mortally ill and deeply suffering dog to be eu-
thanized, but the idea that a human being in the same situation should even be 
allowed to take her own life voluntarily is controversial, and we find it clearly 
wrong to kill her without her explicit permission. If we learn more about what 
principles underlie moral normative reality, then we can determine whether 
these apparent tensions can be rationally motivated or whether we need to re-
vise one or more of our moral beliefs. 
In this book, I give a partial defense of hedonistic act utilitarianism – a 
moral theory – against two kinds of objections.1 The book’s topic is therefore 
theoretical rather than practical, as it aims to contribute to the understanding 
and justification of moral theories, and not to answer particular moral ques-
tions in areas such as healthcare, engineering, food production, or aid distri-
bution. As a moral theory, hedonistic act utilitarianism says that you morally 
should perform an act if and only if, and because, the act produces more pleas-
ure minus pain than any alternative act available to you. In slogan form, you 
should maximize pleasure minus pain. Utilitarianism is a unified theory of 
morality, according to which every moral question is determined by facts 
about the pleasure and pain produced by our acts. 
On the face of it, utilitarianism gives us satisfying answers to the first set 
of questions that I mentioned earlier. Saving a child from drowning lets her 
experience more pleasure in the future, so utilitarianism tells you to save the 
child. Murder causes immediate pain and prevents future pleasure, while sex-
ual harassment leads to pain in the form of future trauma: in typical such cases, 
                               
1 Hedonistic act utilitarianism is defended by Blake (1926) and Tännsjö (1998). For general 
introductions to utilitarian and consequentialist theories, see Quinton ([1973] 1989), Scarre 
(1996), Shaw (1999), Mulgan (2007), Bykvist (2010), Driver (2012), and Lazari-Radek and 
Singer (2017). For more in-depth discussions, see Smart (1973), Carlson (1995), Goodin 
(1995), Bergström (1996), Feldman (1997), and Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014). 
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actions are available that will produce more pleasure minus pain. Most in-
stances of violence are for similar reasons wrong according to utilitarianism, 
because they cause unnecessary pain. But self-defense within reasonable lim-
its is an exception, because it prevents more pain than it causes. What consti-
tutes reasonable limits on self-defense is precisely whether the pain that is 
caused is outweighed by the pain that is prevented. In addition, utilitarianism 
explains at least part of the moral difference between how we may act as pri-
vate persons and as government officials. For example, if government officials 
help their families by using public funds, then few citizens will trust in the 
government. The result is that less suffering can be avoided, and less pleasure 
can be brought about – and so we can conclude that such acts are wrong ac-
cording to utilitarianism. Finally, utilitarianism has the pleasing implication 
that there are no fundamental moral differences between people of different 
nationalities, religions, races, sexual orientations, or genders. 
To other moral questions, utilitarianism gives more provocative answers. 
For example, if every episode of pleasure and pain is morally relevant, then it 
is difficult to justify treating human and non-human animals differently. So if 
we think that it is right to kill a suffering dog, then we should permit suffering 
humans to kill themselves as well. Moreover, even if utilitarianism tells public 
officials to focus on the public good, it need not tell them to focus on the good 
of their families as private persons. Instead, the theory may advocate giving 
their surplus wealth to charity. In other cases, utilitarianism is a provocative 
theory not because of which answers it gives, but because of why it gives them. 
For example, when determining whether a woman is morally permitted to per-
form an abortion, a utilitarian will find it irrelevant whether the fetus is a child 
(as pro-life activists will emphasize) or whether the woman has a right to her 
body (as pro-choice activists will emphasize) and will instead focus on what 
kind of life the fetus would have if it grew up, whether the parents would go 
on to have another child after an abortion, and how the woman would suffer 
from being forced to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term. Moreover, if util-
itarianism is true, then many of our cultural and ideological preoccupations 
become less important, including those of sexual morality, patriotism, honor, 
justice, purity, equality, freedom, cleanliness, respect, and social status. From 
the utilitarian perspective, these things are at most indirectly morally relevant, 
in virtue of being typical causes of pleasure and pain. 
However, and this is the crucial question, is hedonistic act utilitarianism 
correct? That is, is it a true moral theory? If it is not, then we need not consider 
its implications in particular cases such as those just mentioned. Over the 
chapters that follow, I discuss two kinds of objections to hedonistic act utili-
tarianism. First, that it is not action guiding. Second, that it conflicts with our 
moral intuitions. More details will follow, but allow me to give the general 
outline of these objections. 
To begin with, action guidance objections are about utilitarianism’s inabil-
ity to guide our actions in moral decision making. Although we might be able 
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to see the general implications of utilitarianism for morality, it is hard to see 
what utilitarianism recommends in any specific choice situation. For example, 
we know that global temperatures are rising and that they rise mainly because 
of human-related emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. 
We also know that the effects from shifting temperatures on our world are 
significant and destructive, resulting in extreme weather events and rising sea 
levels. These non-normative facts are known from a combination of careful 
measurements, projections from current trends, and our best scientific theo-
ries. However, when we learn these climate-related facts, there remains an 
unanswered normative question: What action should we undertake in response 
to climate change? Although there is an answer to this question according to 
utilitarianism, that answer is not – in a sense – available to us, because we do 
not know which climate-related action will maximize pleasure minus pain. For 
utilitarianism to tell us to “maximize pleasure minus pain” in response to 
global warming is analogous to a professor who tells her student to “write a 
better paper.” As advice goes, this is unhelpful. 
Similarly, when we examine more closely the questions of right and wrong 
that I brought up earlier, it is less clear what utilitarianism prescribes. When 
we consider all the consequences of an act stretching into the distant future, 
we realize that we do not actually know the full consequences of a specific act 
of giving to charity, embezzling money, sexually harassing someone, killing 
someone, or letting a child drown. What we know are only some short-term 
consequences of performing these acts – some immediate pain or pleasure re-
sulting from them. But this is not enough to determine whether these actions 
are right or wrong according to utilitarianism. 
In general, there are several reasons to think that utilitarianism cannot guide 
our actions. To begin with, the theory sets no restraints on whose pleasures 
and pains count for determining what we should do. That is, future generations 
are as morally important as the present one, and this is true even for genera-
tions living a million years into the future. Next, massive numbers of acts are 
available to an agent at any given moment – we have thousands or tens of 
thousands of different acts to choose from at any time. Of these, utilitarianism 
will only recommend one or a few optimal one(s). Finally, our acts have 
wildly unpredictable “chaotic” effects on the distant future – such that even 
the most insignificant act will affect the future in highly unexpected and im-
portant ways. I discuss these issues and especially that of chaotic effects in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I also discuss what action guidance is, or at least how 
it can be defined for the purpose of formulating action guidance objections. I 
define two notions of action guidance, and I suggest that hedonistic act utili-
tarianism is not action guiding in one of these ways (it is not “doxastically 
guiding”), but that it is action guiding in another way (it is “evidentially guid-
ing”). In Chapter 3, I evaluate a number of action guidance objections to util-
itarianism. My discussion in this chapter shows that even if it is intuitively 
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attractive to think that utilitarianism “should be action guiding” in some sense, 
it is not easy to construct a successful action guidance objection to the theory. 
The second part of the book moves from the topic of action guidance ob-
jections to that of intuitive objections to hedonistic act utilitarianism. In the 
case of intuitive objections, the concern is that the utilitarian theory conflicts 
with strong moral intuitions. For example, if utilitarianism implies that most 
instances of abortion are wrong, that it is permissible to kill suffering patients 
against their will, and that it is obligatory to give nearly all of one’s income to 
charity, then the theory seems to give the wrong results – and so, the argument 
goes, it is false. In this context, for you to have a moral intuition is for some-
thing to seem to you in a particular way. For example, to many of us, it seems 
that early-stage abortion is permissible, that no one should be killed involun-
tarily, and that we are permitted to keep most of our money for the exclusive 
benefit of ourselves and our families. These intuitions, one could argue, give 
us reason to reject utilitarianism, because their content conflicts with the the-
ory’s implications for what is right or wrong. The methodological assumption 
is that, just as we can test scientific theories against our visual perceptions, we 
can test moral theories against our moral intuitions. 
In this book, I will not attempt to fully evaluate the idea that moral intui-
tions can be used to test moral theories – although I do consider some argu-
ments for this view in Chapter 4. In that chapter, I also evaluate three re-
sponses to intuitive objections that have been made by utilitarians, each of 
which I suggest is inadequate. In Chapters 5 and 6, I propose my own preferred 
defenses of utilitarianism against intuitive objections, both of which draw on 
assumptions about how we imagine and carry out thought experiments. 
The conclusions that I draw in this book vary in their implications for he-
donistic act utilitarianism. In my discussion of action guidance objections in 
Chapter 3, I argue that none of the objections that I consider are successful – 
although my defense of utilitarianism against these objections is still only par-
tial, because I do not discuss a certain kind of meta-ethical objections. My 
discussion of intuitive objections in Chapters 4-6 is more probative: I show 
how a number of intuitive objections can be met, or at least weakened, given 
some plausible assumptions about the role that imagination plays in thought 
experimentation. The book concludes that the action guidance and intuitive 
objections to utilitarianism are not as decisive as commonly thought. 
Although the two groups of objections that I discuss are independently in-
teresting, they are also related to each other. Action guidance objections rely 
on how utilitarianism gives us no or inadequate moral advice, and intuitive 
objections rely on how it gives the wrong moral advice. These objections 
seem, on the face of it, to require inconsistent assumptions. Surely, any diffi-
culties with applying utilitarianism should also lead to difficulties in testing 
utilitarianism against our moral intuitions? As I argue in Chapter 4, this is true 
with the appropriate qualification: we should conclude that, at least with re-
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spect to what is right, permissible, and obligatory, we need to test utilitarian-
ism by means of thought experiments about imagined cases, and not by con-
sidering real world cases. 
This book is concerned with the first-order normative project of determin-
ing which moral theory is correct, and not with the second-order meta-ethical 
project of answering fundamental questions about moral thought, language, 
and reality. For example, I will not attempt to answer questions such as: “What 
does ‘x is morally right’ mean?”; “Is there a property of moral rightness?”; 
“Do acts ever have (instantiate) this property?”; “Are moral facts independent 
of human activity?”; and “Are we necessarily motivated by our moral judg-
ments?”. But neither will stay neutral on these issues – indeed, I assume the 
philosophically controversial view that there are moral facts and that they can 
at least in principle be known.2 For example, I assume that there are true moral 
statements of the kind “you should donate a portion of your income to Am-
nesty” or “you should take care of your parents.” As a result, I will not con-
sider threats from wholesale nihilism (“there are no moral facts”) or global 
moral skepticism (“nothing whatsoever can be known about morality”). The 
picture of morality that I assume is not the least controversial one, but one 
according to which the plausibility of utilitarianism becomes a live issue. 
In what remains of this introductory chapter, I discuss how to more pre-
cisely understand hedonistic act utilitarianism. In Section 1.2, I formulate the 
theory more carefully. In Section 1.3, I discuss how to understand the moral 
explanatory “because” claim of the theory. In Section 1.4, I discuss different 
interpretations of the phrase “pleasure minus pain.” Finally, in Section 1.5, I 
explain how and why hedonistic act utilitarianism is different from act conse-
quentialism. 
1.2 Formulating Utilitarianism 
Intellectuals have accepted utilitarian and consequentialist flavored views for 
a long time. An early example is the Chinese philosopher Mo Tzu (470-391 
BC) who opposed Confucian partialism and advocated “universal love,” hold-
ing that “men should […] love the members of other families and states in the 
same way that they love the members of their own family and state.”3 Later 
proto-utilitarians include Richard Cumberland (1631-1718), Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Francis Hutcheson (1694-
1746), John Gay (1699-1745), David Hume (1711-1776), and William Paley 
                               
2 For a defense of such a view, see Huemer (2008). 
3 Watson (1963), p. 9. See also Scarre (1996), pp. 27-33. 
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(1743-1805).4 The first card-carrying hedonistic act utilitarian is Jeremy Ben-
tham (1748-1832), who is known for promoting and applying the theory to 
legal and social institutions.5 Other early hedonistic act utilitarians followed 
Bentham, most famously John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Henry Sidgwick 
(1838-1900).6 Today the theory is accompanied by numerous and often less 
radical “cousin” theories – utilitarian and consequentialist theories diverging 
from it in one or more respects. However, one can still find well-known con-
temporary hedonistic act utilitarians, such as Peter Singer and Torbjörn 
Tännsjö.7 
I will now give a full formulation of hedonistic act utilitarianism, which 
will be useful for the discussion that follows. While I earlier formulated the 
theory merely in terms of what we should do, I will here make use of a wider 
range of deontic terms, including “obligatory,” “must,” “should,” “right,” 
“permissible,” “wrong,” and “ought.” That a term is “deontic” means simply 
that it is normative or prescriptive, rather than an evaluative term such as 
“good” or “bad.” The meanings of these deontic terms are closely related: e.g., 
something is obligatory if and only if I should do it, something is wrong if and 
only if I should not do it, and something is permissible if and only if it is right. 
Nevertheless, I include all the terms in the formulation of hedonistic act utili-
tarianism for the sake of completeness. 
Consider then: 
HEDONISTIC ACT UTILITARIANISM 
An act is morally obligatory (must/should/ought to be performed) if and 
only if, and because, it produces more pleasure minus pain than any 
alternative act available to the agent. 
An act is morally right (permissible) if and only if, and because, it pro-
duces at least as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act avail-
able to the agent. 
An act is morally wrong (must not/should not/ought not to be per-
formed) if and only if, and because, it produces less pleasure minus pain 
than some alternative act available to the agent. 
I frequently refer to this theory as just “utilitarianism,” unless there is a risk 
that it will be conflated with other utilitarian theories, in which case I always 
use its full name. 
                               
4 Quinton ([1973] 1989), pp. 11-26; Driver (2014). 
5 See Bentham ([1780] 2008). 
6 Sidgwick ([1907] 1984); Mill ([1871] 2007). 
7 See Tännsjö (1998) and Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014). Notably, Singer is no longer a pref-
erence utilitarian, as he was in Singer (1993). 
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In what follows, I sometimes sacrifice precision for readability. To begin 
with, I employ only the terms “right” and “wrong” when formulating other 
moral theories than hedonistic act utilitarianism, while in other cases I switch 
between deontic terms as is convenient. I usually avoid the qualifier “morally” 
and I often use “maximize pleasure minus pain” as a shorthand for “producing 
at least as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available to the 
agent.” I also express myself imprecisely with regard to what thing utilitari-
anism is. Utilitarianism is, I assume, essentially a proposition. Propositions 
are the primary bearer of truth value and the object of propositional attitudes 
like desires and beliefs. Moreover, they are neither psychological entities like 
thoughts nor linguistic entities like sentences. For example, “Jag älskar godis” 
and “I love candy” both express the same proposition: the proposition that I 
love candy. On the standard view, propositions exist timelessly and inde-
pendently of human thought, language, and action. For this reason, I doubt 
that utilitarianism can be invented, formulated, revised, stated, put forward, 
thought, or written down – all commonly used phrases in philosophical dis-
cussions of moral theories. In addition, because utilitarianism is a proposition, 
I suspect it is not correctly described as a view, perspective, position, claim, 
or idea. For the sake of convenience, however, I employ the conventional way 
of talking about moral theories and hope that the intended meaning is clear 
enough. 
The theory that I call “hedonistic act utilitarianism” is only one of several 
hedonistic act utilitarian theories. Importantly, it is an actual utility hedonistic 
act utilitarian theory, which must be distinguished from an expected utility 
hedonistic act utilitarian theory, such as: 
 
EXPECTED UTILITY HEDONISTIC ACT UTILITARIANISM 
An act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least 
as much expected pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available 
to the agent. 
An act is morally wrong if and only if, and because, it produces less 
expected pleasure minus pain than some alternative act available to the 
agent. 
 
The expected pleasure minus pain of an act (its “expected utility”) can be cal-
culated by following five steps.8 First, list every possible outcome of the act. 
Second, assign to each outcome the amount of pleasure minus pain that you 
                               
8 Cf. Bykvist (2010), pp. 85-87. 
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believe the outcome contains.9 Third, list for every outcome your level of con-
fidence – the subjective probability – that the act, if performed, will bring 
about this outcome. Fourth, multiply the assigned value of each outcome with 
its assigned subjective probability. Fifth, sum these products together. 
 To see how expected utility hedonistic act utilitarianism compares to ac-
tual utility hedonistic act utilitarianism (i.e., to the theory that I refer to simply 
as hedonistic act utilitarianism), we may consider the following example. You 
must choose between giving candy or a toy to a young child, Fiona, on her 
birthday. The potential outcomes, together with the assigned amounts of pleas-
ure minus pain and levels of confidence, are listed in Table 1: 
Table 1. Example of calculating expected pleasure minus pain 
 GIVE HER 
THE CANDY 
 GIVE HER 
THE TOY 
 
 
 
 Outcome A1 Outcome A2 Outcome B1 Outcome B2 
 
 
Pleasure minus pain 
contained in each 
outcome 
10 – Fiona is 
happy 
 
-5 – Fiona is 
somewhat un-
happy 
15 – Fiona is 
very happy 
-30 – Fiona is 
miserable 
 
 
Subjective probabil-
ities that the act will 
result in the out-
come 
 
.5 .5 .7 .3 
Expected pleasure 
minus pain 
(.5*10) + (.5*-5) = 2.5 (.7*15) + (.3*-30) = 1.5 
 
 
 
Let us stipulate that if you give Fiona the toy, this results in outcome B1 (i.e., 
she becomes very happy) and that if you give her the candy, this results in 
outcome A2 (i.e., she becomes somewhat unhappy). It follows that to give 
Fiona the toy is right according to actual utility hedonistic act utilitarianism, 
since this will maximize actual pleasure minus pain. In contrast, giving Fiona 
the toy is wrong according to expected utility hedonistic act utilitarianism, 
since this will produce less expected pleasure minus pain than giving her the 
candy. 
Why should we go for the actual utility version rather than the expected 
utility version of hedonistic act utilitarianism? The expected utility version 
might be thought to be more practicable and plausible, so we might expect 
that accepting this view, rather than the actual utility one, will let us respond 
more effectively to action guidance and intuitive objections. However, the 
                               
9 Various alternative formulations are possible here, such as considering the amount you justi-
fiably believe it contains, or that you know it contains.  
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case for the expected view is generally overstated. To begin with, the actual 
utility version has more plausible implications in a range of cases, including 
the above one: intuitively, of course, we should make Fiona very happy rather 
than somewhat unhappy. Moreover, as has been noted in the literature, the 
expected utility version has no obvious advantages over the actual utility ver-
sion with respect to being action guiding, even though it is usually marketed 
as the more practicable approach.10 Indeed, the expected utility version is at 
least as difficult to apply as the actual utility one. For example, applying the 
expected utility version of hedonistic act utilitarianism involves listing all the 
potential outcomes of all alternative acts, a seemingly impossible task. It also 
requires us to assign to each outcome a subjective probability, something that 
we may not have access to, or fail to be in a position to correctly ascertain. 
Moreover, it tells us to assign to each outcome an associated amount of pleas-
ure minus pain, something that we may have no beliefs about. 
Apart from actual utility and expected utility act utilitarian theories, there 
are other hedonistic act utilitarian theories that we could adopt as well. For 
example, we might hold a satisficing rather than maximizing view; that is, we 
might hold that acts are right if and only if, and because, they produce at least 
up to a threshold level of pleasure minus pain, where this threshold is less than 
the maximal amount that can be produced.11 Moreover, some utilitarian theo-
ries reject either the hedonistic focus on pleasure and pain, or the focus on the 
evaluation of acts, and therefore are not hedonistic act utilitarian theories.12 I 
will not evaluate these various views in this book here, but will simply focus 
on the maximizing actual utility form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. That 
said, much of what I say should be relevant to the evaluation of other utilitar-
ian and consequentialist theories as well. 
1.3 Moral Explanation 
Hedonistic act utilitarianism tells us not only which acts are right or wrong, 
but also why they are right or wrong. That is, utilitarianism gives us a moral 
explanation of rightness and wrongness. In this section, I contrast hedonistic 
act utilitarianism with a theory that I call exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarian-
ism. These theories differ in how the moral explanatory claim is spelled out. 
While the explanatory claim of ordinary hedonistic act utilitarianism is for-
mulated merely as “because,” the explanatory claim of exclusivist hedonistic 
act utilitarianism is formulated as “because and only because.” In the course 
                               
10 For discussion of the impracticality of expected utility versions of utilitarianism, see Feldman 
(2006). 
11 See Slote and Pettit (1984). For discussion of satisficing consequentialist views, see Carlson 
(1995), pp. 13-19, and Bradley (2006). 
12 For example, see preference utilitarian views such as that advocated by Hare (1981), and rule 
utilitarian views such as those advocated by Brandt (1963), Barrow (1991), and Hooker (2000). 
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of presenting this alternative “exclusivist” theory, I will also argue that it is 
less promising than ordinary hedonistic act utilitarianism. 
At the outset, two clarifications are in order. First, the claim that pleasure 
minus pain maximization explains why an act is right is stronger than the 
claim that it implies that an act is right. The difference between implication 
and explanation is the difference between a theory telling us merely which 
acts are right or wrong, and the theory also telling us why they are right or 
wrong. For implication, it is enough that every time an act has the property of 
maximizing pleasure minus pain, then it also has the property of being right. 
For explanation, we need an additional component: that the act has the prop-
erty of maximizing pleasure minus pain must explain why the act has the prop-
erty of being right. To give some non-moral examples of the difference be-
tween implication and explanation, note that “S knows that p” implies that p 
is true, but that it does not explain why p is true. Similarly, that a creature is 
human implies that it has human DNA, but it does not explain why it has hu-
man DNA. 
Second, note that the term “because” in the formulation of a moral theory 
can refer to either of two explanatory relations.13 The first is an epistemic re-
lation, which is about what makes sense of an act being right or wrong. The 
epistemic relation is about providing us with information, giving reasons, 
making evidence available, or furthering our understanding. Moreover, the 
epistemic relation is person-relative: something always and only makes sense 
of something for a particular person. For example, that an act of becoming a 
vegan maximizes pleasure minus pain makes sense of it being right for me, 
but perhaps not for you.  
In addition to the epistemic relation, the term “because” can refer to a met-
aphysical relation. The metaphysical relation is about what makes an act right 
or wrong. The metaphysical relation is related to grounding relations, such as 
how atoms being arranged in a particular way makes it the case that there 
exists a table; and to causal relations, such as how pressing the gas pedal 
makes it the case that the car moves. Unlike the epistemic relation, the meta-
physical relation is not person-relative. For example, if it is right for you to 
become a vegan because (in the metaphysical sense) becoming a vegan max-
imizes pleasure minus pain, then this is not so only relative to me but not you: 
instead, the relation holds in an “absolute” sense. In general, the epistemic 
relation appears to be more “subjective,” focusing on our relation to the world; 
while the metaphysical relation seems to be more “objective,” focusing on 
what the world is like. 
In what follows, I choose to understand the term “because” of hedonistic 
act utilitarianism as referring solely to the metaphysical relation, and not to 
the epistemic relation. There are two reasons for this choice. To begin with, 
the metaphysical relation is more interesting than the epistemic relation, as it 
                               
13 Cf. Rydéhn (2019), pp. 16-17; Fogal and Risberg (Forthcoming), pp. 5-6. 
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is about normative reality itself rather than our understanding or access to it. 
In addition, the metaphysical relation is indirectly epistemically significant, 
since it will often be because a person believes that pleasure minus pain max-
imization makes an act right that pleasure minus pain maximization makes 
sense of it being right for her. So the metaphysical relation seems, in some 
sense, more central and fundamental than the epistemic relation.  
(At this point, you may object that explanations are always about the epis-
temic relation and never about the metaphysical one, simply because the term 
“explanation” suggests something epistemic in nature. Such a dispute appears 
merely terminological, however. If you have this complaint, I invite you to 
think of a suitable different phrase to pick out the metaphysical relation, such 
as “making relation” or “determining relation.”) 
Let me now introduce the theory that I mentioned earlier: exclusivist he-
donistic act utilitarianism. First, note that when two moral theories are formu-
lated in terms of “because,” the given explanations are sometimes compatible 
with each other. In these cases, we can have explanatory overdetermination: 
namely two compatible full explanations of the rightness or wrongness of an 
act. This is not surprising, as it is similar to how explanations work in other 
domains. We can look at, for example, overdetermination with respect to 
causal explanations. Suppose that you and I set fire to a forest, each in a dif-
ferent place but at the same time. Since it is a dry and warm summer, each of 
our acts is sufficient to cause the forest to burn down, so each of our acts fully 
causes the forest to burn down. That the explanation is full – and not merely 
partial – is evidenced by how, to give a full account of why the forest burned 
down, it suffices to tell about one of our pyromaniac acts: you do not need to 
cite both acts in the explanation. Since it is explanatorily sufficient to note that 
one of us set fire to the forest, each act explanatorily overdetermines that the 
forest burns down. Similarly, consider grounding explanations. That a tree has 
a trunk, branches, leaves, and so on fully makes it a tree: it is a tree fully in 
virtue of it having these things. But that a tree has a large number of atoms 
arranged tree-wise also fully makes it a tree: it is a tree fully in virtue of it 
having its atoms arranged tree-wise. So the fact that a tree has branches, trunk, 
and leaves and the fact that the tree has atoms arranged tree-wise each serves 
to fully make it a tree. Here, too, we have a case of explanatory overdetermi-
nation.  
Importantly for my discussion, just as there can be two full causal explana-
tions for why the forest burns down, and there can be two full grounding ex-
planations for why something is a tree, there can also be two full moral expla-
nations for why an act is right or wrong. To see this, let us briefly consider the 
following non-utilitarian moral theory: 
THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY 
An act is morally right if and only if, and because, God allows it. 
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An act is morally wrong if and only if, and because, God forbids it. 
Suppose for the sake of the argument that God exists and that She is a hedon-
istic act utilitarian. Consequently, God always and only allows us to perform 
acts that maximize pleasure minus pain. It follows that utilitarianism and the 
divine command theory have the same implications for action. The theories 
are, to use the appropriate technical terminology, necessarily extensionally 
equivalent with respect to rightness and wrongness. That two theories are nec-
essarily extensionally equivalent means that they have the same implications 
for rightness and wrongness in every metaphysically possible world (they 
have these implications by “metaphysical necessity”). As a result, necessarily, 
when and only when an act maximizes pleasure minus pain, God allows it; 
and when and only when an act does not maximize pleasure minus pain, God 
forbids it. Importantly, although hedonistic act utilitarianism and the divine 
command theory are under these assumptions extensionally equivalent, they 
will still give different explanations of rightness and wrongness. Utilitarian-
ism gives its explanation in terms of maximizing pleasure minus pain, and the 
divine command theory gives us its explanation in terms of the commands of 
God. For this reason, one of these theories could be true even if the other is 
false – because one explanation could be correct, while the other is incorrect. 
But it could also turn out that the theories are both true, because it could be 
true that acts are right both because they maximize pleasure minus pain and 
because they are allowed by God. In such a case, we have an example of moral 
explanatory overdetermination: we have two compatible and full moral expla-
nations of an act’s rightness. This point may come as a surprise to some nor-
mative ethicists, since we are accustomed to thinking that necessarily exten-
sionally equivalent moral theories will typically rule each other out by giving 
different moral explanations of rightness or wrongness. However, as the above 
case demonstrates, different full moral explanations can at least in principle 
co-exist. This possibility of moral explanatory overdetermination raises ques-
tions about how to best formulate utilitarianism, to which I now turn. 
Consider how I formulated hedonistic act utilitarianism earlier: 
An act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least 
as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available to the 
agent. 
An act is morally wrong if and only if, and because, it produces less 
pleasure minus pain than some alternative act available to the agent. 
 
As I just noted, hedonistic act utilitarianism is in principle compatible with the 
divine command theory. But if we want to, we can produce a theory that is 
even in principle incompatible with the divine command theory. We only need 
to state the explanatory claim as “because and only because” instead of as 
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“because.” This view is attractive for those who want their utilitarian view to 
stand in clear opposition to non-utilitarian moral theories, such as those who 
want to maintain that utilitarianism and the divine command theory rule each 
other out even in principle. Consider then the following moral theory: 
EXCLUSIVIST HEDONISTIC ACT UTILITARIANISM 
An act is morally right if and only if, and because and only because, it 
produces at least as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act 
available to the agent. 
An act is morally wrong if and only if, and because and only because, 
it produces less pleasure minus pain than some alternative act available 
to the agent. 
If exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism is true, then ordinary hedonistic act 
utilitarianism is true as well, as “because and only because” implies “be-
cause.” However, if exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism is true, then the 
divine command theory is false, and vice versa, as these two theories are in-
compatible. 
Should someone who is sympathetic to utilitarian views want to defend 
exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism, rather than ordinary hedonistic act 
utilitarianism? I do not think so, because even if the exclusivist theory makes 
sense of how we normally view moral theories (i.e., as clear-cut competitors 
or alternatives to each other), it is significantly less plausible than ordinary 
hedonistic act utilitarianism. The problem is that the exclusivist view excludes 
too many explanations from being true. For example, it prevents not only the 
divine command theory, but also the following two views from being true: 
(1) An act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least 
as much happiness as any alternative act available to the agent. 
(2) An act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least 
as good consequences as any alternative act available to the agent. 
Why does exclusivist utilitarianism prevent (1) and (2) from being true? Re-
call that according to exclusivist utilitarianism, acts are right because and only 
because they maximize pleasure minus pain. It follows that acts are never right 
because they produce at least as much happiness, or as good consequences, as 
any other act. But if exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism is incompatible 
with (1) and (2) it is highly implausible. Surely, if acts are right because they 
maximize pleasure minus pain, then (1) and (2) are also true. Even many non-
consequentialists will agree with this conditional claim, even as they reject the 
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antecedent.14 At the very least, the possibility of (1) and (2) being true should 
be left open by the utilitarian theory, even if it is not implied by it – but exclu-
sivist hedonistic act utilitarianism unacceptably rules them out from the start. 
Here is another problem for exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism. Let B 
refer to those brain states that give rise to pleasures and pains, whatever these 
states are. Clearly, there are some such brain states, even if we do not know 
which they are or how to individuate them. Next, consider the claim that: 
(3) An act maximizes pleasure minus pain because it maximizes the occur-
rence of B. 
It seems plausible to think that there is some interpretation of B which makes 
(3) come out as true. Let us assume this interpretation. As we have seen, both 
ordinary and exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarianism agree that: 
(4) An act is right because it maximizes pleasure minus pain. 
However, if (3) and (4) are true, then it is attractive to conclude that: 
(5) An act is right because it maximizes the occurrence of B. 
The problem is that on the exclusivist view, acts are never right because they 
maximize the occurrence of B, since acts are always and only right because 
they maximize pleasure minus pain. As a result, the exclusivist hedonistic act 
utilitarian is faced with a dilemma: she must either reject the move from claims 
(3) and (4) to claim (5), or she must reject claim (3). As claim (3) seems very 
plausible, this leaves her with rejecting the move from claims (3) and (4) to 
claim (5). 
To begin with, the exclusivist utilitarian could claim that the above argu-
ment presupposes that the because-relation is transitive, and then attempt to 
argue that this relation is not in fact transitive.15 A simple example of a transi-
tive relation is “taller than.” If Jordan is taller than Pete, and Pete is taller than 
Amanda, then Jordan must also be taller than Amanda. Similarly, if the be-
cause-relation is transitive, then if x is A because x is B, and x is B because x 
is C, it follows that x is A because x is C. Therefore, if the because-relation is 
transitive, then (5) follows from (3) and (4). But, the exclusivist utilitarian 
could argue, we should reject such a claim of transitivity. For one thing, a very 
strong kind of transitivity would be needed, since it would need to operate 
                               
14 Some would disagree. Consider, for example, Haybron (2010), pp. 63-77, who denies that 
happiness is a simple function of pleasure minus pain; and Barrow (1991), pp. 65-90, who de-
fends an account of happiness as a state of contentment, or of being at one with the world. See 
also the discussion of Haybron by Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), pp. 249-252. 
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over several different because-relations – note that the because-relation in-
volved in (3) is different than those involved in (4) and (5), with the latter (but 
not the former) being moral metaphysical because-relations. Since transitivity 
does not hold, the move from (3) and (4) to (5) fails. 
However, the above defense of the exclusivist view does not work, as noth-
ing in my argument presupposes transitivity. For sure, transitivity would be 
good news for my argument against the exclusivist. But even if transitivity 
does not hold, (5) remains plausible or reasonable in the light of (3) and (4). 
And that is all I need for my argument against the exclusivist hedonistic act 
utilitarian to go through. 
At this point in the argument, the exclusivist hedonistic act utilitarian may 
try to deny that the move from (3) and (4) to (5) is in fact reasonable. She 
could say that even if acts are right because they maximize pleasure minus 
pain, and even if they maximize pleasure minus pain because they maximize 
the occurrence of B, it is not thereby reasonable to think that they are right 
because they maximize the occurrence of B. In support of this claim, she may 
point out that it sounds odd or strange to say that an act is right because it 
maximizes the occurrence of a certain type of brain state – “what does facts 
about our frontal lobe have to do with rightness?”, she could ask. However, 
here the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic because-relations be-
comes important. I agree that acts maximizing the occurrence of B makes little 
sense, given our lack of knowledge about B, of why they are right. However, 
it seems implausible to also deny that the metaphysical relation holds – that 
the acts are made right by the occurrence of B; that they depend on the occur-
rence of B for being right. 
Finally, an important reason to favor the ordinary version of hedonistic act 
utilitarianism over the exclusivist one is that the former lets us accept non-
utilitarian “local” explanations for rightness and wrongness without having to 
give up our utilitarian theory. For example, as long as an act maximizes pleas-
ure minus pain, hedonistic act utilitarianism does not rule out that it is right 
because it is respectful, honors one’s ancestors, or exemplifies a good charac-
ter. 
1.4 Pleasure minus Pain 
Hedonistic act utilitarianism explains rightness and wrongness in terms of the 
pleasure minus pain produced by acts. This raises the issue of how to best 
understand the phrase “pleasure minus pain” when formulating hedonistic act 
utilitarianism. When answering this question, we need not give real definitions 
of “pleasure,” “pain,” and “pleasure minus pain.” It is enough to find an inter-
pretation (even if it turns out to be a partially stipulative one) on which hedon-
istic act utilitarianism becomes as plausible as possible, while it remains rec-
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ognizably hedonistic in character. Moreover, we need not discuss which the-
ory of hedonism is most plausible – be it a theory of moral value, prudential 
value, the good life, happiness, well-being, or welfare. Ultimately, what is 
valuable or what constitutes a good life need not be what our favorite hedon-
istic act utilitarian theory tells us to maximize. Accordingly, in the following 
discussion I bracket both the question of how to define pleasure and pain, and 
the question of which hedonistic theories are most plausible. 
 Consider first an interpretation of “pleasure minus pain” in terms of pleas-
ure and pain sensations: 
 
THE SIMPLE INTERPRETATION 
 
The pleasure minus pain in an episode E is equal to the duration times 
the intensity of all the pleasure sensations in E minus the duration times 
the intensity of all the pain sensations in E. 
 
Both the intensity and the duration of pleasure and pain sensations are repre-
sented in the simple interpretation. This ensures that a second of torture comes 
out as worse than a second of slight headache (the intensity matters), and that 
an hour of continuous enjoyment comes out as better than a minute of contin-
uous enjoyment (the duration matters). The term “episode” is not meant to 
carry any particular significance in this context, but is used only as a catch-all 
term applicable for a period of whatever we are interested in. 
The problem with the simple interpretation of “pleasure minus pain” is that 
some sensations are hedonically relevant, even as they fail to qualify as pleas-
ure or pain sensations.16 For example, sensations of calm and intense concen-
tration are not typically thought to be pleasure sensations, unlike sensations of 
eating good food or having sex. Similarly, sensations of anxiety and restless-
ness are not typically thought to be pain sensations, unlike sensations of being 
cut with a sharp object or of having a headache. Just as it would be strange for 
someone who is calm to say that she thereby feels pleasure, it would be strange 
for someone who is restless to say that she thereby feels pain. Nonetheless, all 
of the above sensations are still hedonically relevant in some way, and we 
clearly want to include them when formulating our theory of hedonistic act 
utilitarianism. So the simple interpretation is too restrictive with respect to 
which sensations count. 
Instead of interpreting pleasure minus pain as sensory pleasure minus pain, 
we can interpret it as attitudinal pleasure minus pain.17 Attitudinal pleasures 
and pains are not sensations, but propositional attitudes. Propositional atti-
tudes are intentional mental states that take propositions as their objects. As 
                               
16 Cf. Labukt (2012), pp. 173-174. 
17 For a discussion of attitudinal pleasures and pains, see Feldman (2004), pp. 55-78. For more 
recent work on his attitudinal hedonistic theory, see Feldman (2019). 
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such they have a built in “directedness” towards these propositions, or perhaps 
to what propositions are about. Attitudinal pleasures and pains are thereby 
similar to other propositional attitudes such as beliefs (“I believe that I own a 
car”) and desires (“I desire that I have more money”). As an example of an 
attitudinal pleasure, consider your taking pleasure in the proposition “I will 
sleep for two more hours the next morning.” Moreover, as an example of an 
attitudinal pain, consider your taking pain in the proposition “I will work dur-
ing my upcoming vacation.” In ordinary conversation, we express having at-
titudinal pleasure or pain by phrases such as “I enjoy working out” and “the 
suffering of innocent animals pains me.” As should be clear, pleasure and pain 
attitudes are different from pleasure and pain sensations in several ways. Most 
importantly, a sensation has no object or built-in directedness. Although you 
can feel the pleasure sensation of tasting chocolate, and you can feel the pain 
sensation of a headache, you do not thereby feel these sensations in something, 
and they are never directed at anything. Moreover, attitudinal and sensory 
pleasures and pains need not go together. For example, you can take attitudinal 
pleasure in your having sensory pain, like how a masochist takes attitudinal 
pleasure in his having a painful sensation. 
By referring to attitudinal instead of sensory pleasure and pain, we get the 
following interpretation of “pleasure minus pain”: 
 
THE ATTITUDINAL INTERPRETATION 
 
The pleasure minus pain in an episode E is equal to the duration times 
the strength of the attitudinal pleasures in E minus the duration times 
the strength of the attitudinal pains in E. 
 
The attitudinal interpretation has an important advantage over the simple sen-
sory interpretation: it lets us assign positive moral weight to sensations of calm 
and intense concentration, and lets us assign negative moral weight to sensa-
tions of anxiety and restlessness, as long as we take pleasure and pain in hav-
ing these sensations. However, the attitudinal interpretation is also unaccept-
ably restrictive, although in a different way: it demands too much in the way 
of advanced cognitive capacities.18 For example, suppose that we learn that 
creatures like garden snails have sensory pleasures and pains, but that they 
lack the capacity to form and sustain propositional attitudes.19 Surely, we still 
want our utilitarian theory to give moral weight to these creatures. But that is 
                               
18 Cf. Aydede (2014), pp. 125-126.  
19 According to Fred Feldman, this is impossible, because sensory pleasures are those and only 
those sensations that we take attitudinal pleasure in having. See Feldman (2004), pp. 57, 79-81. 
However, I do not think Feldman’s view can be correct: it is simply implausible that a creature 
cannot have pleasure sensations just because it cannot take pleasure in sensations. 
 27
not possible if we formulate hedonistic act utilitarianism according to the at-
titudinal interpretation of “pleasure minus pain,” as these creatures will lack 
the cognitive capacity required for attitudinal pleasure and pain. 
We face a similar problem if we try to single out sensations not by the cri-
terion of their being pleasure or pain sensations, but by the criterion of their 
being liked or disliked sensations.20 Such a view shares the advantages of the 
attitudinal interpretation, as we like having the sensations of having sex and 
feeling calm, and we dislike having the sensations of being cut by a sharp 
object and of being anxious. But again, some creatures may be unable to like 
or dislike anything, even if they can have pleasure and pain sensations, yet 
intuitively should still count for moral purposes. Moreover, while the attitudi-
nal proposal is clearly hedonistic in character, since it is about pleasure and 
pain, it is less clear that the liking/disliking proposal is so. It seems more “pref-
erentialist” than hedonistic, since it is our liking or disliking certain sensations 
that matters fundamentally for the purpose of moral evaluation. 
Pleasure and pain sensations and pleasure and pain attitudes are only two 
potential hedonic dimensions that the hedonistic act utilitarian can appeal to. 
In addition, she can also look to the degree to which sensation are pleasant 
and unpleasant.21 Consider then: 
 
THE PLEASANTNESS INTERPRETATION 
 
The pleasure minus pain in an episode E is equal to the duration times 
the intensity of the pleasantness of all sensations in E minus the duration 
times the intensity of the unpleasantness of all sensations in E. 
 
The pleasantness interpretation is superior to both the simple and attitudinal 
interpretations. First, sensations of calm and intense concentration are pleas-
ant, and sensations of anxiety and restlessness are unpleasant, so all these sen-
sations are properly counted. Second, no advanced cognitive capacities are 
required from creatures, so their sensations of pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness are counted as well. Third, the interpretation is properly hedonistic, being 
fundamentally about pleasantness and unpleasantness, rather than for example 
liking or desiring. 
Some comments are in order at this point. To begin with, consider the dif-
ference between the simple and the pleasantness interpretations of “pleasure 
minus pain.” For a sensation to be a pleasure its degree of pleasantness must 
cross a threshold level – this, I would argue, is why sensations of calm and 
intense concentration can be pleasant even if they do not count as pleasure 
sensations, and so as pleasures. That is, just like to be tall requires crossing a 
contextually defined threshold of tallness, being a pleasure requires crossing 
                               
20 Cf. Kagan (1992), pp. 173-174; Aydede (2014), pp. 128-129. 
21 Cf. Aydede (2014). 
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a contextually defined threshold of pleasantness. In contrast, for a sensation 
to be a pain, it must be paradigmatically unpleasant, rather than to cross a 
threshold level of unpleasantness. This, I would argue, is why anxiety and 
restlessness do not count as pain sensations, and so as pains, while cuts from 
sharp objects and headaches do. 
Next, note that the pleasantness interpretation of “pleasure minus pain” is 
inspired by hedonic tone views of pleasure and pain – these are views focusing 
on the degree to which sensations feel good or bad.22 However, these views 
are typically about what pleasure and pain are, while I am mainly interested 
in how to best interpret utilitarianism. And as should be clear from my above 
discussion, I do not endorse the view that pleasures and pains can be under-
stood simply as those sensations which have an overall positive or negative 
hedonic tone.23 My view is that there are at least three different hedonically 
relevant phenomena in play here, none of which are in any obvious ways re-
ducible to each other: there are pleasure and pain sensations, pleasure and pain 
attitudes, and the degree to which sensations are pleasant and unpleasant. 
Finally, one could complain that the resulting utilitarian view is strictly 
speaking no longer about “pleasure minus pain,” but rather about “pleasant-
ness minus unpleasantness.” That is true, but I suspect that most hedonistic 
act utilitarians have always had in mind something like “pleasantness minus 
unpleasantness.” Moreover, reference to “pleasure minus pain” in the formu-
lation of hedonistic act utilitarianism is so commonplace that it is easier to 
simply stipulate that “pleasure minus pain” in this context refers to pleasant-
ness minus unpleasantness, than to try to change the formulation itself. 
How does adopting the pleasantness interpretation matter for the plausibil-
ity of hedonistic act utilitarianism? First, note that hedonistic act utilitarians 
have always been faced with a stubborn group of intuitive objections: objec-
tions to the effect that their theory prescribes debauchery – enjoying an end-
less series of food, drugs, and sex. Such objections are nowadays less striking 
than in the 19th century, but even many contemporaries will feel that pleasures 
do not represent all that is good in life. When we adopt the pleasantness inter-
pretation of pleasure minus pain, we get a more nuanced and reasonable view: 
we see that many sensations besides pleasures count as well. On the pleasant-
ness interpretation of pleasure minus pain, a life of meditation and calm can 
contain as much pleasure minus pain as a life filled with good food and sex; 
and anxiety might constitute a greater problem than physical pain. Second, we 
can explain why “tiring” on certain pleasures makes these sensations less val-
uable to the utilitarian, without having to argue that the sensations are less 
                               
22 See e.g. Kagan (1992), pp. 172-173; Smuts (2011), pp. 254-256; Labukt (2012). My account 
is similar to that of Tännsjö (2007), pp. 81-87, although he focuses on the hedonic tone of a 
person’s total experiential state rather than the pleasantness and unpleasantness of her sensa-
tions. 
23 But in so far as hedonic tone views are about how to define pleasantness and unpleasantness, 
and not about how to define pleasures and pains, I have no objections against them. 
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intense. On the pleasantness view, we can simply say that when we have too 
much good food, we still have the same gastronomical pleasure sensations of 
the same intensity, but these sensations are now less pleasant to us. Third and 
finally, the resulting utilitarian theory avoids having to explain the value of 
things like liberty and equality solely in terms of their propensity to cause 
pleasures: the utilitarian can note that liberty and equality give rise to sensa-
tions of being free and of being treated as an equal – sensations that can be 
pleasant, even if they are not intense enough to count as pleasures. To sum up, 
when we adopt the pleasantness interpretation of hedonistic act utilitarianism, 
we have available to us a more extensive toolbox for defending our theory 
against intuitive objections. 
1.5 Act Consequentialism 
Several of the objections and arguments that I discuss in this book could be 
rephrased as about a different moral theory, namely: 
 
ACT CONSEQUENTIALISM 
An act is right if and only if, and because, it produces at least as good 
consequences as any alternative act available to the agent. 
An act is wrong if and only if, and because, it produces less good con-
sequences than some alternative act available to the agent. 
If you want, you can read this book as a book about act consequentialism in-
stead of hedonistic act utilitarianism, as many of the arguments that I discuss 
will be equally relevant to evaluating act consequentialism. But even if my 
choice to focus on hedonistic act utilitarianism makes only a limited practical 
difference, you might still find it unmotivated or odd. Perhaps this is because 
over the past few decades there has been a move from talking about utilitarian 
theories to talking about consequentialist ones, where all utilitarian theories 
are consequentialist ones.24 Would it not be more natural for a book of this 
kind to follow this trend and discuss act consequentialism instead of hedonis-
tic act utilitarianism? 
Let me first point out a common misconception: some believe that hedon-
istic act utilitarianism implies act consequentialism, so that whenever the for-
mer theory is true, the latter is true as well. This, one may think, gives us 
                               
24 To give some examples of this trend, note some titles of recent work in the area: The Demands 
of Consequentialism by Tim Mulgan (2001); Beyond Consequentialism by Paul Hurley (2011); 
Consequentialism by Julia Driver (2012); The Dimensions of Consequentialism by Peterson 
(2013); Commonsense Consequentialism by Douglas Portmore (2014); and The Case Against 
Consequentialism Reconsidered by Nikil Mukerji (2016).  
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reason to focus on act consequentialism instead of hedonistic act utilitarianism 
in a study of this kind. But even if hedonistic act utilitarianism did imply act 
consequentialism, that would not necessarily give us more reason to focus on 
the latter. An advantage that hedonistic act utilitarianism has over act conse-
quentialism is that it is a more informative theory: the latter view is in principle 
open to all sorts of consequences being good, beyond pleasure minus pain. 
With respect to hedonistic act utilitarianism, it is therefore especially easy to 
see why it cannot guide our actions, and how exactly it conflicts with our 
moral intuitions.  
More importantly, it is simply not true that hedonistic act utilitarianism im-
plies act consequentialism. To begin with, if there is no moral goodness or 
moral value in the world, then act consequentialism will tell us that every act 
is right, since every act produces at least as good consequences as any alter-
native available to the agent. In that case, however, the theory is clearly false, 
since at least some acts are wrong. In contrast, hedonistic act utilitarianism 
will in such a situation have different and more plausible implications than act 
consequentialism: because even if nothing is morally good or valuable, some 
acts will still produce less pleasure minus pain than others, and so be wrong. 
In addition, hedonistic act utilitarianism and act consequentialism give differ-
ent explanations of why acts are right – one appeals to the goodness of the 
consequences being produced by an act, and the other appeals to the pleasure 
minus pain being produced by an act. We might find either of these explana-
tions more plausible than the other – indeed, hedonistic act utilitarianism 
might be true (because the explanation that it gives is correct) even if act con-
sequentialism is false (because the explanation that it gives is incorrect). Of 
course, we could argue in response that goodness is identical to pleasure mi-
nus pain, and so that these two theories actually give the same explanation. 
But this reply raises the kind of worries that over the past decades have been 
directed, to devastating effect, against naturalist theories in meta-ethics, argu-
ments that I will not rehearse here. 
A consequence of the above claims is that hedonistic act utilitarianism 
might be more plausible than act consequentialism. For my own part, I think 
that hedonistic act utilitarianism is more plausible. Although I consider myself 
both a hedonistic act utilitarian and an act consequentialist, I am more certain 
that the former view is correct. Pleasure and pain are obvious candidates for 
explaining the rightness and wrongness of acts and much more so than are 
properties such as goodness and badness. For example, if I learn tomorrow 
that pleasure is bad and that pain is good, I will nevertheless be horrified to 
learn that act consequentialists want to maximize pain minus pleasure. I will 
not be consoled to learn from them that the pain is good, and that the pleasure 
is bad. If a person tries to maximize pain minus pleasure in such circum-
stances, that person needs to be stopped, and whether the pain and pleasure 
are good, bad, or neutral does not matter. For the above reasons, I hesitate to 
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attempt a defense of act consequentialism rather than of hedonistic act utili-
tarianism. Because the latter view is both more informative and more plausi-
ble, it makes sense to make it the centerpiece of the present inquiry. 
As a final remark, it is important to distinguish between theories and cate-
gories of theories. The phrase “act consequentialist theories” refers not to a 
moral theory, such as act consequentialism, but instead to a category of theo-
ries. Both hedonistic act utilitarianism and act consequentialism are act con-
sequentialist theories: they belong to this category. But they are still different 
theories, since they give different explanations and have potentially different 
implications. So what exactly do act consequentialist theories have in com-
mon, such that hedonistic act utilitarianism and act consequentialism both 
qualify as act consequentialist theories? Presumably, that they both explain 
rightness and wrongness solely in terms of the consequences of acts. What 
distinguishes them is that one theory does so in terms of the pleasure minus 
pain of the consequences, and the other theory does so in terms of the good-
ness of the consequences. Again, the phrase “consequentialist theories” refers 
to a category of theories, and categories are clearly not theories, just as the 
category of apples is not itself an apple. Indeed, a category cannot be a theory 
– since theories are either propositions or sentences, and categories are neither 
propositions nor sentences. 
1.6 The Plan of the Book 
I hope that at this point it is reasonably clear how to understand the theory of 
hedonistic act utilitarianism. In the chapters that follow, I discuss the two 
groups of objections to utilitarianism that I outlined earlier: the action guid-
ance objections and the intuitive objections. 
The first part of the book (Chapters 2 and 3) is devoted to action guidance 
objections. In Chapter 2, I examine how to define action guidance. In the first 
part of the chapter, I suggest two ways in which a moral theory can be action 
guiding: it can be evidentially action guiding and it can be doxastically action 
guiding. In the second part of the chapter, I consider in which of these two 
ways that utilitarianism is and is not action guiding: I show that utilitarianism 
is evidentially guiding, but that it is not doxastically guiding. In Chapter 3, I 
move on to discuss action guidance objections to utilitarianism. These objec-
tions differ from each other in their central premises, which draw on claims 
about our ability to gain knowledge, the principle that “ought implies can,” 
the function of moral theories, and more. The objections also differ in their 
conclusions – that utilitarianism is a bad moral theory, not a moral theory at 
all, an uninteresting or unimportant moral theory, or a false moral theory. 
The second part of the book (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) focuses on intuitive 
objections to utilitarianism. In Chapter 4, I make some introductory remarks. 
Specifically, I say more about what moral intuitions are, and I explain why 
 32 
they are potentially epistemically significant and trustworthy, both terms that 
I define more closely. I also consider three existing attempts to defend utili-
tarianism against intuitive objections, all of which I argue are problematic. In 
Chapter 5, I argue that the utilitarian can instead defend her theory by show-
ing, not that our moral intuitions fail to be epistemically trustworthy, but that 
we sometimes fail to carry out the correct thought experiment. In Chapter 6, I 
consider another approach to defending utilitarianism against intuitive objec-
tions, which depends on how sensory imagination plays an important role in 
making our moral intuitions more trustworthy. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum-
marize the book’s contents. 
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2. Action Guidance 
In this chapter, I discuss what action guidance is, how to define it, and in which 
ways that utilitarianism is action guiding. I distinguish between two types of 
action guidance, doxastic and evidential. I argue that utilitarianism is not dox-
astically guiding, but that it is evidentially guiding. The main reason to believe 
that utilitarianism fails to be doxastically guiding is that our acts have wildly 
unpredictable “chaotic” effects on the future. At the same time, utilitarianism 
is evidentially guiding because we can use it to obtain reason to believe that 
an act is right according to the theory. In the next chapter, these two definitions 
of action guidance are put to use when I discuss action guidance objections to 
utilitarianism. 
2.1 Action Guidance: A First Take 
Suppose that you visit me in Uppsala. As you arrive to the airport, you take 
out a map I sent you that contains instructions for travelling from the airport 
to my apartment. But the map is barely readable, and my squiggly hand drawn 
arrows and unconventional abbreviations of street names are nearly incompre-
hensible. So you call me up and tell me that the map is useless, and then you 
ask me where I live. I cheerfully tell you to not worry and to “find my apart-
ment” and that “my home is right here.” Clearly, you will not be satisfied with 
my answer. While the map may lead to my home and my utterance that “the 
apartment is here” may be true, you want an additional quality in the map and 
the instruction: you want them to be helpful to you. If the map and instructions 
are not helpful to you, then something is wrong with them. Action guidance 
objections to utilitarianism are closely related to such complaints – they could 
just as well be called “unhelpfulness objections.” Although utilitarianism tells 
us to maximize pleasure minus pain, to learn this is not helpful. It is like being 
given the barely readable map or to be instructed to “find my apartment”: it 
leaves us almost wholly in the dark about what to do. And if utilitarianism is 
not helpful to us, then there is something wrong with it, just as with the map 
and the instruction to “find my apartment.” This is the underlying idea behind 
action guidance objections to utilitarianism, although it remains to be seen 
how exactly these objections are to be understood, which is the aim of the next 
chapter. The present chapter prepares the ground for this upcoming discussion 
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by considering what action guidance is and whether utilitarianism is or is not 
action guiding. 
The main objective of this chapter is to define two kinds of action guidance, 
so let me begin with some clarificatory remarks about this project. First, when 
I propose definitions of these kinds of action guidance, I do not claim that the 
phrase “action guidance” is ambiguous, like how “bank” can refer either to 
the edge of a river or to a place to deposit one’s money. With expressions like 
“ways of guiding,” “kinds of guidance,” and “types of guidance,” I mean only 
that there are different versions of action guidance. This is like how items of 
food are tasty in different ways even if the term “tasty” is not ambiguous, or 
how cars belong to different brands even if the term “car” is not ambiguous.  
Second, the project of this chapter is explicative: it is partly descriptive and 
partly stipulative. For example, I do not claim that there are only two kinds of 
action guidance, or that philosophers have always or even typically referred 
to these kinds of action guidance. What is important is that the two kinds of 
action guidance that I propose can be defined clearly, capture a large part of 
what we intuitively feel are ways of being action guiding, make sense of the 
objections that I discuss in the next chapter, and play constructive roles in 
evaluating these objections. 
While the precise definitions of action guidance will follow later in this 
chapter, let me start by providing two simplified definitions, so you get a 
rough idea of what I am after. First, a moral theory is doxastically guiding for 
an agent if and only if, by thinking about what it says, the agent can come to 
know that an act is right according to the theory. This is similar to how a map 
works: how you can come to know where I live by reading the map and think-
ing about what it says. In contrast, a moral theory is evidentially guiding for 
an agent if and only if, by thinking about what the theory says, the agent can 
come to have reason to believe that an act is right according to the theory. 
What is the relation between doxastic and evidential guidance? A demand 
for a theory to be doxastically guiding is stronger than a demand for it to be 
evidentially guiding, because if we assume that knowing p entails being justi-
fied in believing p, a theory being doxastically guiding implies it being evi-
dentially guiding, but a theory being evidentially guiding does not imply it 
being doxastically guiding. For example, by thinking about what a theory T 
says, one might come to have reason to believe that an act is right according 
to T, even as (i) these reasons do not suffice for knowing that the act is right 
according to T, (ii) one fails to believe that the act is right according to T, and 
(iii) the act is not in fact right according to T.  
As should be clear, the definition of doxastic guidance tries to capture a 
very demanding kind of action guidance – one of “being able to teach us what 
to do” – while the definition of evidential guidance tries to capture a minimal 
kind of action guidance – one of “being practically relevant to us.” This natu-
rally raises the issue of whether there is a definition that lies somewhere be-
tween these two extremes: one on which utilitarianism is not action guiding, 
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but which is nevertheless less demanding than doxastic guidance. I address 
this concern at the end of Section 2.4. Finally, for those acquainted with the 
literature on how to define action guidance, I should note that my definition 
of doxastic guidance will be similar in some respects to definitions proposed 
by Holly M. Smith and Eric Carlson.25 Evidential guidance, in contrast, has 
not been previously defined in the literature.26 
2.2 Action Guiding for Us 
To begin with, we need to distinguish between an agent being guided by and 
being able to be guided by a moral theory.27 For example, imagine an animal 
activist who spends his life taking care of rescue chickens, who live out their 
full lives on his sanctuary farm. We can suppose that the activist is able to be 
guided by utilitarianism – perhaps he believes this theory is true – even if he 
never in fact is guided by it. For example, perhaps he does not use utilitarian-
ism to guide his actions because that would require him to not only rescue 
chickens, which he finds deeply rewarding, but also to raise millions of addi-
tional chickens for the sake of maximizing pleasure minus pain, which he 
finds repugnant. In what follows, whenever an agent is able to be guided by a 
moral theory, or in a position to be guided by it, I will say that the moral theory 
is action guiding for the agent. Another way to explain the difference between 
being guided by and being able to be guided by a moral theory is this: to be 
guided by utilitarianism includes performing an action and to do so for dis-
tinctly utilitarian reasons. In other words, being guided by a moral theory ends 
in an action; you cannot be guided without acting. But to be able to be guided 
by a moral theory need not end in an action, as one can be able to be guided 
by utilitarianism even if no action is performed. 
When formulating action guidance objections to utilitarianism, the relevant 
issue is whether the theory is action guiding for us: that is, whether we have 
the ability to guide ourselves by means of the theory. The relevant issue is not 
whether we are ever actually guided by utilitarianism. To continue the analogy 
with the map, suppose that had you consulted the map, you would have come 
to know exactly where I live. But as it is, you do not consult the map, take a 
wild guess, and end up in the wrong part of Uppsala. In that case, the problem 
clearly resides with you and your behavior, not with the map. Similarly, if the 
                               
25 More precisely, doxastic guidance is similar to what Smith calls external guidance (1988), 
pp. 91-95, broad guidance (2012), pp. 370-378, and guidance in the extended sense (2018), pp. 
11-32, and to what Carlson calls AG1 (2002), pp. 73-76. 
26 Smith defines a weaker notion of action guidance that she calls internal guidance (1988), pp. 
91-92, narrow guidance (2012), p. 374, and guidance in the core sense (2018), pp. 12-21. These 
definitions of action guidance are very different from that of evidential guidance. Moreover, 
while utilitarianism is evidentially guiding, it is arguably not action guiding on Smith’s defini-
tions. 
27 This distinction is made by Carlson (2002), pp. 73-74.  
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animal activist does not guide his behavior by means of utilitarianism, then 
the problem resides with him and not with the theory. 
When we consider whether a moral theory should be action guiding for 
agents, we first need to decide for which agents it should be action guiding. 
Perhaps we do not want to require universal guidance – i.e. that a moral theory 
can guide all moral agents. There is most likely no moral theory that is uni-
versally guiding, and the action guidance objector may not want to put forward 
such a sweeping criticism of moral theories. Of course, to require only partial 
guidance raises the issue of where precisely to draw the line. For example, is 
a moral theory problematic if it cannot guide non-human animal or extrater-
restrial moral agents? What about the ancient Egyptians or future humans? 
Does a moral theory need to be guiding for small children and the cognitively 
impaired? Is it enough if we require that a theory is action guiding for nearly 
all agents, with just a few exceptions? For the objections that I will discuss, 
we need not answer these questions, as it is enough to focus on a subgroup of 
all moral agents for which it is uncontroversial that a moral theory should be 
action guiding: namely the group of nearly all adult contemporary humans 
with normal human cognitive capacities.28 
A related issue concerns in which choice situations a moral theory should 
be action guiding for agents. Let us define a choice situation as a range of 
alternative and mutually exclusive acts available to a particular agent at a par-
ticular point in time. Examples of choice situations are deciding whether to 
buy fries with your meal at McDonald’s, or deciding whether to walk, bicycle, 
or drive to work. Here again the problem of demarcation arises – we can re-
quire that a theory should be guiding with respect to all choice situations, or 
merely to a proper subset of these situations. Some exceptions seem plausible. 
For example, in choice situations where we lack the necessary time to consult 
a moral theory, such as when falling off a cliff when hiking in the mountains, 
we need not require that the theory is action guiding for agents. Other choice 
situations should be excluded because they are extremely unusual, such as 
finding yourself in a hostage situation. Finally, some choice situations are such 
that a normal human adult cannot reasonably be expected to focus on what a 
moral theory says in the situation, as in the movie Aliens when Ripley, point-
ing a flamethrower, faces down an alien. Therefore, I will limit the relevant 
choice situations to nearly all those ordinary choice situations where we have 
sufficient time for deliberation and where we can reasonably be expected to 
focus on what the moral theory says. 
Going forward, it will be useful to have a shorthand expression to sum up 
the above expectations on a moral theory. Therefore, I will stipulate that a 
moral theory is “action guiding for us” if and only if it is action guiding for 
(a) nearly all (b) adult, (c) contemporary (d) humans with (e) normal human 
cognitive capacities in (f) nearly all (g) ordinary choice situations where there 
                               
28 Cf. Väyrynen (2006), p. 296. 
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is (h) sufficient time for deliberation and (i) where the agent can reasonably 
be expected to focus on what the theory says. 
2.3 Explicit Cognitive Action Guidance 
Doxastic and evidential guidance are examples of cognitive action guidance.29 
Cognitive action guidance is action guidance by means of your cognitive abil-
ities. Were you to read the map, think about what it says, and come to learn 
where I live on this basis, then you would have been cognitively guided by the 
map. Basically, cognitive guidance involves two main ingredients: cognitively 
processing what the guiding object “says” (in this case, visually inspecting the 
map, comprehending the instructions, interpreting the drawings, and so on), 
and coming to a conclusion on the basis of this processing. Similarly, were 
you to read the formulation of a moral theory, think about what it says, and 
come to learn that it tells you to donate to the Against Malaria Foundation on 
this basis, then you would have been cognitively guided by the theory. This 
account of cognitive guidance is meant to be agnostic about what cognitive 
abilities are involved: it could be pattern recognition, linguistic competence, 
or elementary logic, to name a few examples. 
Non-cognitive action guidance is defined negatively, as action guidance 
that is not cognitive. As an example of non-cognitive guidance, consider a 
roadblock. A roadblock can guide us in a traffic situation, but not by means of 
us cognitively processing what the roadblock says. Instead, it guides us in vir-
tue of its shape and form as a physical obstacle. Similarly, a law of nature can 
guide the research efforts of a scientist, in that the scientist performs her ex-
periments because the law of nature is true and makes these experiments fea-
sible and productive. But the scientist might never have heard of this law of 
nature, and might never have thought about what it says. While the scientist is 
guided by it in the sense that it causally influences her behavior, she is not 
guided by means of using her cognitive abilities to process what it says. To 
give a final example, utilitarianism has non-cognitively guided my choice of 
research topic. I decided to write this book because utilitarianism is an inter-
esting theory – therefore, had it not been interesting, I would not have written 
this book. Even so, I have not been guided in writing this book by processing 
information or thinking about what utilitarianism says is right, and so I have 
not been cognitively guided by the theory. That is, to write this book I never 
tried to apply utilitarianism. Had I been cognitively guided by utilitarianism 
                               
29 I frequently shorten the names of the different kinds of action guidance to make the text more 
readable. For example, cognitive action guidance is referred to as cognitive guidance, and dox-
astic explicit cognitive action guidance is referred to as doxastic guidance. 
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in my choice of occupation, I would have done something else with my time, 
such as working a lucrative job to fund effective animal charities. 
We can further distinguish between two kinds of cognitive guidance: ex-
plicit and implicit.30 When I am explicitly guided by a rule, principle, or the-
ory, I represent it to myself (i.e., I “have it in mind”) and think about what it 
says. For example, imagine an inexperienced driver. As she arrives at a cross-
ing, she sees that the light is red, represents the rule “stop for red lights,” and 
concludes that she should stop the car. In this case, the driver has been explic-
itly cognitively guided by the rule “stop for red lights.” 
In contrast to explicit guidance, implicit guidance involves no explicit rep-
resentation of a rule, theory, or principle. An experienced driver who sees a 
red light will not represent the rule “stop for red lights” to herself, but will 
stop her car without consciously thinking about the rule. Nonetheless, the ex-
perienced driver is still cognitively guided by the rule “stop for red lights,” 
since it is because she processes information about the stoplights and the rule 
that she stops her car. In this case, there is not an absence of cognitive pro-
cessing; it has merely moved to a sub-conscious or non-conscious level. 
Here is another way to explain the difference between explicit and implicit 
guidance. In the case of explicit guidance, the cognitive work takes place “be-
fore the mind’s eye,” and it is therefore in principle available to introspection. 
But in the case of implicit guidance, the cognitive work does not take place 
“before the mind’s eye” – the whole process is hidden from view. While the 
inexperienced driver can follow her thoughts by introspection, the experienced 
driver may find it less than trivial to account for why she acted as she did. The 
experienced driver cannot simply introspect her thought processes to find out 
why she stopped the car. 
There is an additional distinction to be drawn between two kinds of explicit 
cognitive guidance, which follows a commonly drawn division between two 
systems of thinking: system 1 and system 2 thinking.31 To begin with, let us 
consider the difference between these systems. System 1 thinking is auto-
matic, fast, and intuitive, whereas system 2 thinking is manual, slow, and con-
trolled. For example, suppose that you are asked to solve for x in 10*10=x. In 
this case, the answer “100” just pops up without any effort. This is an example 
of system 1 thinking – you see the answer quickly and effortlessly. On the 
other hand, suppose that you are asked to solve for x in 12*12=x. In this case, 
you may need to use some system 2 thinking, and work through the problem 
step-by-step. For example, you may reason as follows: “10*12 is 120, while 
2*12 is 24, so the answer is 120+24=144.” This kind of problem solving is an 
example of system 2 thinking: of manual calculation rather than of direct in-
tuition. In reality, we nearly always use a mix of the two types of thinking to 
solve a particular problem. For example, even in the latter case I use system 1 
                               
30 This distinction is due to Smith (1988), p. 90; (2018), p. 28. 
31 Kahneman (2013), pp. 19-105. 
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thinking to some extent, such as to directly see (a) that 10*12 is 120, (b) that 
2*12 is 24, and (c) that if I add the products of 10*12 and 2*12, then I will 
obtain the answer to 12*12. 
Corresponding to the distinction between system 1 and system 2 thinking, 
there is what we may call automatic explicit cognitive guidance and manual 
explicit cognitive guidance. For an illustration of these kinds of guidance, con-
sider two inexperienced drivers. The first driver has taken driving courses for 
some time, while the second driver has never sat in a car before. While the 
first driver explicitly represents the rule “stop for red lights” to herself, she 
directly sees that it applies to the situation she is in. She is explicitly cogni-
tively guided by the rule, but in an automatic way. The second driver might 
instead engage his manual thinking (we are assuming a very inexperienced 
driver). For example, before stopping his car, he may think to himself: 
 
(i) I have reached a crossing and the light is red. 
(ii) The rule “stop for red lights” says that I should stop at crossings 
where the light is red. 
(iii) Therefore, I should stop at this crossing according to this rule. 
(iv) I should follow the rule “stop for red lights.” 
(v) Therefore, I should stop at this crossing. 
 
Again, remember that automatic and manual guidance are instances of explicit 
cognitive guidance. In the above case, each of the drivers represents to herself 
a proposition by explicitly thinking about what it says, or by “having it in 
mind.” What distinguishes the drivers is how the explicit cognitive guidance 
plays out, whether it is automatic and fast, or whether it is manual and slow. 
In fact, most actual instances of explicit cognitive guidance will be automatic 
and manual not fully, but to certain degrees, such as 80% automatic and 20% 
manual, for example. In the sections that follow, I assume that action guidance 
objections are concerned solely with explicit cognitive action guidance, but 
that whether the guidance is automatic or manual does not matter. Conse-
quently, when I use the expression “thinking about” what moral theories say I 
mean to be neutral between this thinking being automatic or manual. What is 
important to keep in mind is that explicit guidance – which essentially in-
volves the representation of principles, rules, and theories – need not only 
come in the guise of manual guidance, but can be automatic to various degrees. 
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Figure 1 summarizes the distinctions that have been introduced in this sec-
tion, as well as their hierarchical order (the precise definitions of doxastic and 
evidential guidance is the subject of the next section). 
Figure 1. Kinds of action guidance 
2.4 Doxastic and Evidential Guidance 
How can we define doxastic guidance? As I have noted, doxastic guidance is 
an instance of explicit cognitive guidance. In Section 2.1 I defined it as fol-
lows: a moral theory is doxastically guiding for an agent if and only if, by 
thinking about what it says, the agent can come to know that an act is right 
according to the theory. This simplified definition is not ideal for several rea-
sons, which I will elaborate on below. The full definition of doxastic guidance 
is considerably more complex than the simplified one, so it requires more in 
the way of explanation. It goes as follows: 
 
DOXASTIC GUIDANCE 
 
A moral theory M is doxastically guiding at a time T for an agent S with 
respect to a choice situation C of the agent if and only if: 
(i) there is an act A in C that S knows at T how to perform and that 
is such that were S both (a) not to know at T that A is right 
according to M and (b) think about which act is right according 
to M, then S would on this basis come to know that A is right 
according to M, and 
(ii) S has the necessary time and cognitive ability at T to think about 
what is right in C according to M. 
 
I will now elaborate on each part of this definition. First, note that the defini-
tion distinguishes between (a) the time when the theory is guiding for the 
agent, and (b) the choice situation with respect to which the theory is guiding 
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for the agent.32 The time and choice situation need not be contemporaneous. 
For example, a moral theory can be action guiding for me today with respect 
to a choice situation that I will face tomorrow. 
Second, consider the initial part of condition (i), that “there is an act A in C 
that S knows at T how to perform.” The requirement that the agent knows how 
to perform the act is designed to sidestep a problem raised by Eugene Bales 
and elaborated on by Smith.33 A definition of action guidance must prevent a 
moral theory from being action guiding in an “unhelpful” way, such as in vir-
tue of prescribing the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” Most of us can 
think about what utilitarianism says and come to know that it tells us to max-
imize pleasure minus pain. But this does not suffice for utilitarianism to be 
action guiding in any interesting sense. The kind of action guidance we are 
concerned with is about a theory being helpful, and it is not helpful to learn 
that we should maximize pleasure minus pain. The problem is that we do not 
know how to maximize pleasure minus pain. Therefore, by requiring that we 
know how to perform the act in question, we exclude acts such as “maximize 
pleasure minus pain” from consideration; unlike easily performed acts of 
drinking coffee or taking a walk, which we do know how to perform.34  
Third, consider the remaining part of condition (i), which consists of the 
past subjunctive proposition “were S both (a) not to know at T that A is right 
according to M and (b) think about which act is right according to M, then S 
would on this basis come to know that A is right according to M.” This part of 
the definition is self-explanatory in light of my earlier presentation of explicit 
cognitive guidance, except for my reason to include conjunct (a) of the ante-
cedent, namely that of were S “not to know at T that A is right according to 
M.” I formulate the definition in this complicated way to avoid the following 
objection. If an agent already knows that an act is right according to a theory, 
then it is impossible for her to come to know that it is right on the basis of 
thinking about what the moral theory says. This is because already knowing 
that p precludes coming to know that p. However, that a person already knows 
what utilitarianism prescribes in a situation should surely not prevent utilitar-
ianism from being doxastically guiding for her. To return to the map analogy, 
if you already know the way to my apartment, then you cannot learn where I 
live by reading a map, simply because you cannot learn what you already 
know. However, this clearly does not point to any problem with the map. The 
interesting question here is this: Would you be able to learn where I live by 
                               
32 This has been noted by Smith, who includes the distinction in her definitions of action guid-
ance. See, for example, Smith’s definition of having the ability to directly use a moral theory 
in the extended sense in Smith (2018), p. 18. 
33 Smith (2012), pp. 373-376; (2018), pp. 15-21, and Bales (1971), p. 261. 
34 This is inspired by Smith’s solution. In her definitions, Smith employs the concept of epis-
temic ability, which is due to Goldman (1976), pp. 192-204. See also Smith (2018), pp. 18-21. 
Another way to escape the problem is to say that the act of maximizing pleasure minus pain is 
not even available to the agent, and so is not right (or wrong) according to utilitarianism. I 
discuss such issues later in Section 3.5. 
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reading the map if you did not already know my apartment’s location? Simi-
larly, the interesting question with respect to moral theories is this: Would you 
be able to know what a moral theory says is right by thinking about what it 
says if you did not already know what the theory says is right? 
 Fourth, consider condition (ii), that “S has the necessary time and cognitive 
ability at T to think about what is right in C according to M.” The reason for 
including this condition in the definition of doxastic guidance is that an agent 
might lack the time to think about what a theory says, or that the theory could 
be formulated using extremely complex technical terminology.35 In such 
cases, it might still be true that were the agent to think about what the theory 
says, she would come to believe that an act is right according to it on this basis. 
This is because of how, in the closest possible world where the agent thinks 
about what the theory says, she does have the time and cognitive ability to 
think about what it says. Nevertheless, if she in her actual circumstances lacks 
such time or cognitive ability, the moral theory is intuitively not action guiding 
for her. 
Let us now consider an example of how to apply the definition of doxastic 
guidance to a concrete case. Suppose that at 5:00 p.m., I see an unconscious 
man lying at the wayside 20 meters in front of me. As I close in, I will soon 
be faced with a choice situation consisting of two mutually exclusive alterna-
tive actions: to help the man or to keep walking. Is utilitarianism doxastically 
guiding for me at 5:00 p.m. with respect to this soon-to-be-realized choice 
situation? Let us consider the two conditions (i) and (ii), as utilitarianism is 
doxastically guiding for me if and only if both are satisfied. The satisfaction 
of the second condition (ii) is easy to determine: I definitively have the time 
to think about what is right in this choice situation according to utilitarianism; 
for example, I can simply stop walking for a moment. So condition (ii) is sat-
isfied. What about condition (i)? To begin with, “to help the man” and “to 
keep walking” are both acts that I know how to perform. But neither act is 
such that, were I not to know what utilitarianism tells me to do in the situation 
(which in fact I do not), then thinking about what act it prescribes would make 
me come to know that the act is right according to utilitarianism. For example, 
I will not know what consequences that helping the man will have over a mil-
lion years, even if I think about it for some time. So condition (i) is not satis-
fied. It follows that utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding for me at 5:00 
p.m. with respect to the choice situation of helping the man. 
There are three striking consequences of my definition of doxastic guid-
ance, each of which merits further comment. 
First, consider a poor, illiterate farmer who is deciding which crop to grow 
this year. He does not know what utilitarianism says, and he lacks the educa-
tion and time required to learn it. Nevertheless, on the definition which I have 
proposed, utilitarianism could be doxastically guiding for the farmer at the 
                               
35 Cf. Carlson (2002), p. 73, on the importance of being able to deliberate. 
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time just before planting season and with respect to the choice situation of 
deciding which crop to plant. In particular, condition (ii) of the definition does 
not rule this out. Even if the farmer does not know about utilitarianism, he still 
has the time and cognitive ability to think about what it says – we are not 
requiring that the farmer can think about what it says, but merely that he has 
the time and cognitive ability to do so. As it is, I think this is the correct verdict. 
A map’s helpfulness is not diminished by it being hidden in a safe; similarly, 
a moral theory’s helpfulness is not diminished by people not knowing about 
it. Such “external” factors should not count when it comes to determining 
whether a theory is action guiding for us. 
Second, suppose that you can either give your money to a starving child or 
use the same money to buy pizza. Suppose that according to utilitarianism, it 
is right to help the starving child and wrong to buy pizza. Finally, let us assume 
that, as a matter of fact, you will not think about what utilitarianism says about 
this choice situation, since you do not care much for this particular moral the-
ory – we can stipulate that you are a staunch Kantian. We now add the follow-
ing complication to the case: while you deliberate over what to do, your every 
move is being watched by a terrorist who will bomb a school if and only if 
you think about what utilitarianism says and then help the starving child. In 
this case, it could be true that utilitarianism is doxastically guiding for you, 
even if you could never use the theory to find out that it tells you to help the 
starving child. This is because if you thought (correctly) about which act is 
right according to utilitarianism, then you would have to conclude that buying 
the pizza is right – since if you helped the starving child in such a situation, 
the terrorist would bomb the school. Perhaps surprisingly, this example shows 
that even if a theory is doxastically guiding with respect to an agent and a 
choice situation, this does not guarantee that the theory is helpful for letting 
the agent find out what is actually right in that choice situation. The reason is 
that the act of thinking about what a theory says might have further conse-
quences for what is right according to it. This consequence appears acceptable 
to me, but others may find it less so. 
Third, consider a person who knows which of her available acts maximize 
pleasure minus pain, and also knows that utilitarianism tells her to maximize 
pleasure minus pain. It may appear that utilitarianism must be action guiding 
for this person. But utilitarianism can fail to be doxastically guiding for this 
person. Suppose that the person suffers from a strange mental illness, such 
that whenever she thinks about what a moral theory prescribes, she is cogni-
tively paralyzed and fails to believe anything about what is right according to 
the theory. In this case, it will for any of her available acts be false that, were 
this person not to know that the act is right according to utilitarianism, and 
think about which act is right according to the theory, then she would on this 
basis come to know that the act is right according to the theory. So condition 
(i) is not satisfied for this agent in any choice situation. Is this a problem for 
my definition of doxastic guidance? I do not think so. We must distinguish 
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between being able to use a theory to guide our behavior (i.e., the question of 
whether it is action guiding for us) and being able to do what the theory says. 
The person with the strange mental illness can do what utilitarianism says, but 
she cannot use utilitarianism to guide her actions. 
Having defined doxastic guidance, I will next define the notion of eviden-
tial guidance. The differences in formulation from doxastic guidance are rela-
tively minor; rather than referring to coming to know that an act is right, this 
definition refers to coming to have reason to believe that an act is right. The 
differences between the definitions of doxastic guidance and evidential guid-
ance are put in bold: 
 
EVIDENTIAL GUIDANCE 
 
A moral theory M is evidentially guiding at a time T for an agent S with 
respect to a choice situation C of the agent if and only if: 
(i) there is an act A in C that S knows at T how to perform and that 
is such that were S both (a) not to have any reason at T to 
believe that A is right according to M and (b) think about which 
act is right according to M, then S would on this basis come to 
have reason to believe that A is right according to M, and 
(ii) S has the necessary time and cognitive ability at T to think about 
what is right in C according to M. 
 
To see how this definition can be applied to a particular case, consider again 
the choice situation where I can either help a man or walk past him. As we 
saw earlier, condition (i) of the definition of doxastic guidance was not satis-
fied, since thinking about what utilitarianism says will not provide me with 
knowledge of which act is right to perform according to utilitarianism. How-
ever, at least on the face of it, condition (i) of the definition of evidential guid-
ance is satisfied, since by thinking about what utilitarianism says, I will come 
to have some (although only a little) reason to believe that helping the man is 
right according to utilitarianism. This is because I have reason to believe that 
helping him will prevent future pain from illness, or missed pleasures from 
him being unconscious or dead. Furthermore, condition (ii) of the definition 
of evidential guidance, being identical to condition (ii) of the definition of 
doxastic guidance, is again satisfied: I have the time and cognitive ability to 
think about what utilitarianism prescribes at this time. Therefore, we can con-
clude, at least tentatively, that utilitarianism is evidentially guiding for me at 
this time and with respect to this choice situation. I say “tentatively,” because 
it is perhaps not obvious that condition (i) is in fact satisfied in cases like these: 
I will evaluate more carefully whether utilitarianism is evidentially guiding 
for us in Section 2.6. 
For now, I will return to a concern that I brought up earlier in this chapter: 
that the definitions of doxastic and evidential guidance are too extreme, and 
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that there exists some more interesting middle ground between these defini-
tions. Could we not formulate a definition that refers, not to us coming to have 
knowledge or reason for belief, but to us coming to have justified belief that 
an act is right according to utilitarianism? Would that not give us a more mod-
est definition of action guidance? Consider the following definition: 
 
A moral theory M is action guiding at a time T for an agent S with re-
spect to a choice situation C of the agent if and only if: 
(i) there is an act A in C that S knows at T how to perform and that 
is such that were S both (a) not to have justified belief at T to 
believe that A is right according to M and (b) think about which 
act is right according to M, then S would on this basis come to 
have justified belief that A is right according to M, and 
(ii) S has the necessary time and cognitive ability at T to think about 
what is right in C according to M. 
 
I admit that the above definition may capture an interesting and “properly de-
manding” sense of action guidance at least as well, or even better, than does 
doxastic guidance. Nevertheless, the above definition is unhelpful for evalu-
ating action guidance objections to utilitarianism. The problem is that utilitar-
ianism is action guiding on the above definition, and so this definition cannot 
be used to successfully object to utilitarianism. That utilitarianism is action 
guiding on this definition can be demonstrated as follows. Consider the fol-
lowing two acts: 
 
A1. Give 23 dollars to the Red Cross today. 
A2. Do not give 23 dollars to the Red Cross today. 
 
A2 is what we may call a negative act or an act of avoidance. 36 By thinking 
about what utilitarianism says in a choice situation which involves an alterna-
tive act such as A2, we will easily acquire justified belief that performing A2 
is right according to utilitarianism. The reasoning goes as follows. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that giving precisely 23 dollars to the Red Cross today will 
maximize pleasure minus pain among one’s available alternatives for purely 
statistical considerations. There are so many alternatives to giving 23 dollars 
to the Red Cross today, perhaps thousands or even tens of thousands of acts, 
including many small variations on this act, such as giving 24 dollars, giving 
22 dollars, and so on. So we will be justified in believing that A1 – giving to 
the Red Cross – is wrong according to utilitarianism. And if A1 is wrong ac-
cording to utilitarianism, then A2 must be right, because the only way in which 
to not perform A1 is to perform A2. Indeed, the above result should be fairly 
                               
36 My thanks to Erik Carlson for drawing my attention to such acts, in the context of theories 
being action guiding. 
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unsurprising. It is analogous to how, when I randomly choose a lottery ticket 
among 1000 tickets and there is only one winning ticket, I am justified in be-
lieving that the particular ticket that I bought will not win. In such a case, it is 
just too unlikely that the ticket I picked is the winning one. The above argu-
ment generalizes to other choice situations as well. In any choice situation, 
there will be a highly specific alternative act (such as A1) whose negative 
counterpart (such as A2) we are justified in believing is right to perform ac-
cording to utilitarianism. 
The same argument cannot be used to show that utilitarianism is doxas-
tically guiding. Even if I am justified in believing that A2 is right, I will not 
know that A2 is right; and even if I am justified in believing that the lottery 
ticket will not win, I will not know that the ticket will not win. In general, 
knowledge that p cannot be obtained by the mere statistical consideration of 
the probability that p, which is not the case with justified belief. There are 
various explanations for this fact, which I will not evaluate here. In general, 
however, knowing that p seems to require that a certain causal connection 
holds between one’s belief that p and p itself, for which mere statistical con-
sideration of probabilities do not suffice. Now, for action guidance objections 
to get off the ground, and for us to get the strongest possible versions of these 
objections, we need to find a definition of action guidance on which utilitari-
anism is not action guiding. Therefore, we should focus on a definition of ac-
tion guidance such as doxastic guidance: one which is formulated in terms of 
gaining knowledge, and not in terms of gaining justified belief, that an act is 
right according to a moral theory. 
Another worry one might have is that doxastic and evidential guidance rep-
resent not different kinds of guidance, but only degrees to which a theory can 
be action guiding. On this proposal there is only one kind of action guidance, 
and to fulfill the criteria for evidential guidance is to be action guiding in this 
one way to some extent, while fulfilling the criteria for doxastic guidance is to 
be action guiding in this one way to a high extent. However, I believe this 
concern is unfounded. As I have glossed it, for a theory to be evidentially 
guiding, it must be able to play a role in deliberation or decision making – i.e., 
it must be “practically relevant.” But if a moral theory is evidentially guiding, 
it is not just practically relevant to a low degree – it is practically relevant to 
the maximum degree.37 So the definition of evidential guidance does point to 
something different than doxastic guidance – i.e., a theory’s practical rele-
vance. In any case, the difference between these two ways of characterizing 
the definitions of action guidance will not matter for the discussion that fol-
lows in the next chapter. For my purposes in this book, it will do just as well 
to think about these definitions as being about a single dimension of action 
                               
37 Presumably, there is not even a scale here – either a moral theory is practically relevant, or it 
is not. 
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guidance, as it does to think of them (as I have in this chapter) as being about 
two separate dimensions. 
What about other definitions of action guidance than those that I have con-
sidered in this chapter? Both Smith and Carlson have proposed their own de-
tailed definitions of action guidance, seemingly with the aim to capture a type 
of demanding action guidance similar to that of doxastic guidance.38 I have 
hesitated to use Smith and Carlson’s definitions in my discussion for two rea-
sons. To begin with, it seems to me that their definitions require some revi-
sions. Carlson does not address the issue of utilitarianism incorrectly being 
action guiding for an agent merely in virtue of prescribing that she performs 
the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” Moreover, Smith’s most recent def-
inition of action guidance incorrectly implies that utilitarianism is not action 
guiding for an agent who lacks a belief about whether an act maximizes pleas-
ure minus pain, even if the agent would have had such a belief (even one 
amounting to knowledge) had she thought about what utilitarianism says.39 
More importantly, however, my definition of doxastic guidance lends itself 
well to defining a notion of evidential guidance, and I am not sure of how to 
best modify Carlson’s and Smith’s definitions for this purpose. 
2.5 Is Utilitarianism Doxastically Guiding? 
With our definitions in hand, let us now consider whether utilitarianism is ac-
tion guiding for us. Recall first the stipulated definition of “action guidance 
for us” that I introduced earlier: 
 
A moral theory is “action guiding for us” if and only if it is action guid-
ing for (a) nearly all (b) adult, (c) contemporary (d) humans with (e) 
normal human cognitive capacities in (f) nearly all (g) ordinary choice 
situations where there is (h) sufficient time for deliberation and (i) 
where the agent can reasonably be expected to focus on what the theory 
says. 
 
                               
38 Smith (1988), pp. 91-95; (2012), pp. 370-378; (2018), pp. 11-32, Carlson (2002), pp. 73-76. 
I review Smith (2018) in Rosenqvist (2019). For more work on how to define action guidance, 
see Väyrynen (2006), pp. 293-294, and Mason (2013), pp. 3-8. With “Carlson’s definition” I 
refer to what he calls AG1. His second definition, AG2, is a substantially more demanding 
definition of action guiding – impermissibly so, in my opinion – as it includes a motivational 
requirement. 
39 The problem is that Smith’s definition of “ability in the extended sense to use a principle” – 
one of her more recent definitions of action guidance – requires that the agent truly believes 
that if she performed some act, then that act would (in the case of considering the principle of 
utilitarianism) maximize pleasure minus pain. But surely utilitarianism can be action guiding 
for a person without this being true: a person might not form a belief about what utilitarianism 
prescribes until after she has thought about what it says. Nevertheless, utilitarianism can clearly 
be action guiding for her before such thinking takes place. 
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As I will consider two kinds of action guidance – doxastic guidance and evi-
dential guidance – the relevant questions are whether utilitarianism is doxas-
tically guiding for us versus evidentially guiding for us. 
Next, recall the definition of doxastic guidance: 
 
DOXASTIC GUIDANCE 
 
A moral theory M is doxastically guiding at a time T for an agent S with 
respect to a choice situation C of the agent if and only if: 
(i) there is an act A in C that S knows at T how to perform and that 
is such that were S both (a) not to know at T that A is right 
according to M and (b) think about which act is right according 
to M, then S would on this basis come to know that A is right 
according to M, and 
(ii) S has the necessary time and cognitive ability at T to think about 
what is right in C according to M. 
What about condition (ii)? When an agent has sufficient time for deliberation, 
she has the time to think about what utilitarianism says. Moreover, all humans 
with normal human capacities will have the cognitive ability to think about 
what utilitarianism says, as it is a fairly simple moral theory. Therefore, con-
dition (ii) is satisfied for us, in the light of my definition of what it means for 
a theory to be “action guiding for us.” 
However, condition (i) is not satisfied for us. In many or even all choice 
situations, there is no act such that: had we not known that the act is right 
according to utilitarianism, and subsequently thought about which act is right 
according to the theory, then we would on this basis come to know that the act 
is right according to utilitarianism. The main problem is that our acts have 
“chaotic effects,” which makes their consequences over even shorter time 
spans wildly unpredictable. (The term “chaos” comes from the branch of 
mathematics known as “chaos theory,” which deal with deterministic systems 
highly sensitive to minor variations in initial conditions).40 Since condition (i) 
is not satisfied for us, utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding for us. 
What does it mean that acts have chaotic effects, and why does it matter for 
whether utilitarianism is doxastically guiding? That acts have chaotic effects 
means that their consequences “ripple outward” in wildly unpredictable (that 
is, chaotic) ways. To illustrate, suppose that one Tuesday afternoon I brew tea 
instead of coffee before going home from work. Because brewing tea takes a 
few seconds less time than brewing coffee, I finish work faster and leave for 
                               
40 That consequentialist theories are difficult to apply because they have chaotic effects is noted 
by Lenman (2000), pp. 344-350. See also Frazier (1994), pp. 46-47. For responses to Lenman, 
see Mason (2004), Cowen (2006), Lukas (2008), Hare (2011), pp. 199-201, Dorsey (2012), 
Burch-Brown (2014), and Greaves (2016). 
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home earlier (we are assuming a flexible workplace schedule). Driving home 
earlier puts me in a different traffic situation than I would otherwise have been 
in. Moreover, the exact nature of which traffic situation I am in slightly affects 
the schedules of other drivers that I interact with. Accordingly, some drivers 
will be delayed, or arrive earlier, by just a second or two because I brewed tea 
instead of coffee. Therefore, just as I operate on a slightly different schedule 
because I brewed tea instead of coffee, other drivers will also come to operate 
on different schedules because of my choice. Moreover, their schedules will 
affect the schedules of others that they interact with during the rest of the day 
– partners, children, friends, waiters, and so on. In this way, such small second 
– or even millisecond – variations in schedules will reverberate through the 
nearby population and beyond. 
At this point in the story, I am considering fairly inconsequential effects of 
brewing tea: whether someone goes to bed a second or two earlier may not 
matter for the total amount of pleasure minus pain being produced.41 But it is 
easy to see how, sooner or later, the consequences of brewing tea that Tuesday 
will become much more serious. To see this, it is sufficient to consider acts of 
procreation.42 Even very slight variations in how people have pro-creative sex 
will affect which people are ultimately born, because there are so many pos-
sible sperm-ovum combinations, each of which would bring into the world a 
unique person. And the moment that the effects of my brewing tea spills over 
into making one person rather than another being born – be it a day or a year 
from when I performed the act – the ensuing effects will snowball quickly. 
Different people existing means different lives being lived, which will have 
more dramatic effects on people’s schedules and when still more people are 
born. And so it continues until every single person on Earth owes her existence 
to my choice of brewing tea. 
The above reasoning shows that a folk theory or folk belief of causation 
must be false: namely, the view that the causal ramifications of ordinary and 
trivial acts are both (a) locally restricted and (b) diminish over time. G. E. 
Moore puts this view (although he does not confidently assert it) as follows: 
 
It does in fact appear to be the case that, in most cases, whatever action we 
now adopt, “it will be all the same a hundred year hence,” so far as the exist-
ence at that time of anything greatly good or bad is concerned: and this might, 
perhaps, be shewn to be true, by an investigation of the manner in which the 
effects of any particular event become neutralised by lapse of time.43 
                               
41 Although even this is not clear: a second of unconsciousness due to sleep will contribute less 
to total pleasure minus pain than will a second of mild pleasure due to remaining awake. 
42 Cf. Parfit (1984), p. 361. 
43 Moore ([1903] 2004), p. 153. Moore goes on to point out that “[f]ailing such a proof, we can 
certainly have no rational ground for asserting that one of two alternatives is even probably 
right and another wrong.” 
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J. C. C. Smart calls this the ripples in the pond postulate: 
 
[W]e do not normally in practice need to consider very remote consequences, 
as these in the end approximate rapidly to zero like the furthermost ripples on 
a pond after a stone has been dropped into it.44 
However, if even trivial acts like brewing tea affects which people will be 
brought into existence, then few or none of our acts can be such that their 
consequences will sooner or later “approximate rapidly to zero.” Therefore, 
the ripples in the pond postulate must be false.45 
While the ripples in the pond postulate is false, a more moderate postulate 
may be true. In many facets of life, there are “timing correctors,” taking the 
form of norms, habits, desires, traditions, and institutions, which make some 
events relatively insensitive to the exact timing of other events. For example, 
if you need to get up at 7:00 a.m. every morning to get to work, then even if 
you went to bed a few seconds earlier or later due to my brewing tea, you will 
still get up at 7:00 a.m. Similarly, if I want to go to university, I will not let 
minor delays stop me, and will find the time to send in my application. If I do 
not have the time to send it in today, I will do so tomorrow. In general, the 
existence of timing correctors explain why I can trust everyone to show up at 
the right time to a meeting, despite the persistent chaotic effects that I just 
mentioned. Such correcting influences will partly counteract at least some 
chaotic effects. 
Moreover, even when we consider acts that affect which people are born, 
it is not obvious that which individuals exist will have major long-term con-
sequences on the broad outlines of history. To begin with, many of us are 
easily replaceable in our current occupations; if a person is not hired to a job, 
someone else will be hired. In addition, many important technologies would 
perhaps have been invented even without the actual people who made the in-
ventions simply because “the time was right” for their invention.46 The above 
argument amounts to a kind of light-weight technological determinism (not to 
be conflated with philosophical determinism): although brewing tea rather 
than coffee might affect the minor details of when exactly television or the 
internet were invented, barring larger catastrophes their invention was, the ar-
gument goes, preordained as the result of larger societal developments. 
So far so good, but even if what I just said is true, this is not enough to 
make utilitarianism doxastically guiding for us. To know that an act is right 
according to utilitarianism, we need to know that it maximizes pleasure minus 
pain. This focus on maximization means that even if an act A produces only 
                               
44 Smart (1973), pp. 33-34. 
45 Several authors have objected to the Ripples in the Pond Postulate. See Frazier (1994), pp. 
47-49, Lenman (2000), pp. 350-351, and Greaves (2016), pp. 313-315. 
46 Cf. Wright (2000). 
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slightly less pleasure minus pain than some alternative act, A is wrong accord-
ing to utilitarianism. In other words, according to utilitarianism, very little is 
required to “push” an act from being right to being wrong. For example, sup-
pose that brewing tea instead of coffee only affects the schedules of a few 
drivers that I interact with during my half hour commute, and does so only for 
a few hours. After this interval, timing correctors ensure that their schedules 
are properly “reset.” Basically, we are assuming that something like the rip-
ples in the pond postulate is true. In this example, any differences in pleasure 
minus pain due to brewing tea compared to brewing coffee is rather small. 
Nevertheless, it seems plausible to think that brewing tea will at least some-
what affect which pleasures and pains are produced during that half hour. 
Even a second more of anxiety on behalf of one driver, or the sudden occur-
rence of an unpleasant thought to another, might be enough to push brewing 
tea from being right to being wrong. Moreover, for almost all of our acts it 
will be extremely difficult to predict even such minor near-term consequences 
of our acts, because the consequences unfold quickly and mostly out of sight. 
Finally, note that what we need is knowledge that an act maximizes pleasure 
minus pain, but that the above kind of reasoning gives us at most justified 
belief that an act maximizing pleasure minus pain – the relevant causal con-
nection between this belief and the inner lives of the unknown commuters is 
lacking.  
To make things worse for the utilitarian, note that in the case that I just 
described, I introduced a major simplification. I assumed that there are only 
two alternative acts available to me in the choice situation – to brew tea or to 
brew coffee; however, real choice situations include many more alternatives. 
Of the thousands of acts available to me at any given moment, only a very 
small number of these will maximize pleasure minus pain. For example, when 
traveling to work, one might think that there exist only a few alternatives: to 
travel by car, bus, or bicycle. But there are many alternatives that we usually 
do not consider, either because they are unusual or because they are inconven-
ient. I can take a taxi to work, I can walk to work even if it takes several hours, 
I can walk in the opposite direction for an hour before turning around and 
taking the bus, and so on. And there are many different routes to travel by car, 
many different ways to deal with traffic situations, etc. Only one or a few of 
these acts will actually be right according to utilitarianism, since only one or 
a few of them will maximize pleasure minus pain. As a result, not only do we 
have to predict an act’s consequences in exact ways in order to know that it 
maximizes pleasure minus pain, but we also have to do this for the act’s thou-
sands of alternatives. This is, to put it mildly, impossible for any normal hu-
man being. 
Another response to the claim that our acts have chaotic effects is the can-
cellation postulate, which Kagan puts as follows:  
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Although we may lack crystal balls, we are not utterly in the dark as to what 
the effects of our actions are likely to be; we are able to make reasonable, ed-
ucated guesses. And thus we can – and do – set ourselves goals and choose our 
acts with an eye toward how we are most likely to promote those goals. Un-
certainty need not lead to paralysis. (Of course it remains true that there will 
always be a very small chance of some totally unforeseen disaster resulting 
from your act. But it seems equally true that there will be a corresponding very 
small chance of your act resulting in something fantastically wonderful, alt-
hough totally unforeseen. If there is indeed no reason to expect either, then the 
two possibilities will cancel each other out as we try to decide how to act.)47 
 
The cancellation postulate might show that we, according to utilitarianism, 
can know some act to be rational to perform in a situation – that for matters 
of acting rationally, we can ignore unknowable consequences of our acts.48 
However, this is beside the point in the current discussion, as the cancellation 
postulate is still not useful for defending the claim that we can come to know 
that an act maximizes pleasure minus pain. And that is what we need for util-
itarianism to be doxastically guiding. There is no reason to believe that the 
consequences of our acts are so well-behaved that unforeseen pleasure result-
ing from an act will perfectly balance out unforeseen pains resulting from the 
same act. And even if the unforeseen pleasure and pain produced by an act 
roughly cancel each other out, this is not enough for the agent to know that the 
act maximizes pleasure minus pain. As I noted before, very little is required 
for an act to be wrong instead of right according to utilitarianism; even a one-
second episode of anxiety might tip the scale in the other direction. What we 
need is not rough equality between positive and negative unforeseen conse-
quences, but perfect equality. It is unlikely that such perfect equality exists, 
and even if it does exist, we are not in a position to know about it. So we 
should reject the cancellation postulate. 
Finally, let me consider another argument often used to defend utilitarian-
ism against various challenges: that of advancing a decision procedure or set 
of second-level moral rules for indirectly applying utilitarianism.49 For exam-
ple, William H. Shaw suggests that: 
 
secondary rules help utilitarians deal with the future-consequences-are-hard-
to-foresee problem. Whatever action we choose to perform, it will be impossi-
ble to foresee its full and exact causal ramifications. We will almost always be 
ignorant of some of the immediate and intermediate consequences of the 
choices we make. Moreover, those choices have causal effects that continue 
indefinitely into the future and are exceptionally hard to discern because criss-
crossed by other events. Given these uncertainties, it is possible that doing 
something truly dreadful, like running over a pedestrian who calmly walks in 
front of my car while I am stopped at a red light, might somehow have good 
                               
47 Kagan (1998), pp. 64-65. For discussion, see Lenman (2000), pp. 351-359, Mason (2004), 
Dorsey (2012), Elgin (2015), and Greaves (2016), pp. 315-316. 
48 Cf. Norcross (1990) and Mason (2004). For a reply to Mason, see Lang (2008). 
49 Frazier (1994), pp. 49-52. See also Gren (2004). 
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results. (Perhaps she will soon die anyway in a yet more terrible way. Perhaps 
if she lives, she will have evil children who cause the world great harm.) But 
past human experience teaches that running over the pedestrian is exceedingly 
unlikely to maximize long-term happiness. This is a precept or "intermediate 
generalization" on which I can safely rely. I don't need to study the situation 
further or speculate about remote and unlikely possibilities.50 
 
For the purpose of arguing that utilitarianism is doxastically guiding, this strat-
egy does not work. First, we would have to know which decision procedures 
and moral rules are such that using them for decision making will maximize 
pleasure minus pain, and this is at least as difficult as coming to know of any 
particular act that it maximizes pleasure minus pain. Second, to look at a 
rule’s existing track record of producing pleasure and pain is of no help to us: 
because to evaluate its track record, we have to evaluate the consequences of 
earlier acts conforming to the rule. Yet we cannot do this, since we do not 
know for any previously performed act conforming to the rule whether it max-
imizes pleasure minus pain. As a way to see this, note that any act performed 
throughout history is still having significant consequences, and will keep hav-
ing such consequences for a long time.51 Of course, none of this suggests that 
considering rules and decision procedures is of no help to the hedonistic act 
utilitarian. An appeal to rules and decision procedures will let her answer the 
(confused) objection that a utilitarian can only decide what to do on the basis 
of detailed time-consuming calculation. Nevertheless, the appeal does nothing 
to show that utilitarianism is doxastically guiding for us. 
2.6 Is Utilitarianism Evidentially Guiding? 
Is utilitarianism evidentially guiding for us? I earlier defined evidential guid-
ance as follows: 
 
EVIDENTIAL GUIDANCE 
 
A moral theory M is evidentially guiding at a time T for an agent S with 
respect to a choice situation C of the agent if and only if: 
(i) there is an act A in C that S knows at T how to perform and that 
is such that were S both (a) not to have any reason at T to be-
lieve that A is right according to M and (b) think about which 
act is right according to M, then S would on this basis come to 
have reason to believe that A is right according to M, and 
(ii) S has the necessary time and cognitive ability at T to think about 
what is right in C according to M. 
                               
50 Shaw (1999), p. 146.  
51 Frazier (1994), pp. 46-47. 
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Since condition (ii) of doxastic guidance is satisfied for us, the same goes for 
condition (ii) of evidential guidance, as these conditions are identical. There-
fore, to determine whether utilitarianism is evidentially guiding for us, we 
need merely to evaluate whether condition (i) is satisfied for us. 
In evaluating whether condition (i) is satisfied for us, it is helpful to note 
that this condition is very weak, in the following two respects. First, having 
reason to believe that p does not imply believing that p. Second, having reason 
to believe that p is compatible with also having reason – stronger, weaker, or 
equally strong – to believe that not p. That is, I am understanding “reason for 
belief” as pro tanto reason for belief, rather than as all-things-considered rea-
son for belief. 
Can we come to have some reason to believe that an act maximizes pleasure 
minus pain? I think we can. For us to have such reason, I would argue, it is 
enough that among one or more acts that we are considering at a given time, 
and among the pleasure and pain produced by those acts which we are aware 
of at that time, we have reason to believe that one of the acts produces at least 
as much pleasure minus pain as any of the other acts. That is, to obtain a reason 
to believe that an act maximizes pleasure minus pain, we need not look to all 
our available alternatives in a choice situation, or to all the consequences in 
terms of pleasure and pain. It is sufficient to look to our immediately intro-
spectively accessible, available information at the time – that is, to the consid-
erations that we at have “in mind.” 
To give an example, suppose that I am sitting down one evening after work. 
I suddenly become very thirsty, and I consider whether to drink some wine or 
beer. I am aware of how drinking either of the beverages will give me some 
pleasure, but also of how drinking wine will give me slightly more pleasure 
than drinking beer (I like wine more than beer). In this case, I would argue, I 
have some (very weak) reason to believe that drinking wine maximizes pleas-
ure minus pain. 
Of course, if I start to think about additional acts available to me in the 
choice situation, and additional consequences for pleasure minus pain arising 
from performing those acts, then I may come to have reason to believe that 
another act maximizes pleasure minus pain, and may consequently cease to 
have any reason whatsoever to believe that drinking wine maximizes pleasure 
minus pain. Nevertheless, no fancy calculations are needed at any point in this 
process. To obtain a reason to believe that an act maximizes pleasure minus 
pain, I do not need to go beyond my immediately accessible information at the 
time. 
If I am right, it should be easy to see how similar arguments can be made 
for nearly all human agents, and with respect to nearly all ordinary choice 
situations that we are faced with. At nearly any time and with respect to nearly 
any choice situation, we can think about which act is right according to utili-
tarianism, and on this basis come to have (again, very weak) reason to believe 
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that an act is right according to the theory. Therefore, condition (i) is satisfied, 
and utilitarianism is evidentially guiding for us 
Now, one could object that in the case that I described I actually have no 
reason whatsoever to believe that drinking wine maximizes pleasure minus 
pain – not even a very weak reason in the pro tanto sense which I am here 
considering. But this strikes me as unreasonable. To see this, consider the fol-
lowing analogy. Suppose that you work in a warehouse that stores 1000 bar-
rels of oats and barley. You have no idea of the proportion of oat and barley 
in each barrel, and you have no relevant background information bearing on 
this matter, such as how oats and barley are usually distributed among barrels. 
You now open two barrels – 219 and 517 – and learn that of these two barrels, 
219 has more oats minus barley on the thin visible top layer than does 517. 
Again, you know nothing about the other barrels in the warehouse, and you 
are still ignorant of what lies beneath the top layer of 219 and 517. At this 
point, the manager arrives and informs you that he must send the barrel with 
the most oats minus barley to a customer. He realizes that you do not know 
which barrel in the warehouse has the most oats minus barley, and that you 
have not inspected any of the other barrels. But he still asks you to “take your 
best guess.” In this situation, it seems rational for you to guess that barrel 
number 219 has the most oats minus barley – it would not be acceptable for 
you to flip a coin. But if it is rational for you to guess that 219 has the most 
oats minus barley, then you must have some reason, however weak, to believe 
this. Otherwise, it would be acceptable for you to flip a coin. Similarly, sup-
pose that I have considered only the pleasure and pain produced by drinking 
the wine or beer, and that I have to take a guess of which act is right according 
to utilitarianism. In this situation, it seems rational for me to guess that drink-
ing wine is right according to utilitarianism – again, it would not be acceptable 
for me to flip a coin. But if it is rational for me to guess that drinking wine is 
right according to utilitarianism, then I must have some reason, however, 
weak, to believe this. As a result, I think it is reasonable to say that I can come 
to have some reason to believe that an act maximizes pleasure minus pain, as 
long as we remember that this reason will only be a very weak pro tanto reason 
for belief.  
Let us now take a step back, and return to the overall project of defining 
two kinds of action guidance. We can now see why for a moral theory to be 
evidentially guiding for an agent is for it to, in a sense, be practically relevant 
for that agent. When a theory is evidentially guiding for an agent in a choice 
situation, it must be possible for that agent to identify some consideration in 
the situation which is relevant for decision making according to the theory. 
Furthermore, we can see that it is not a trivial achievement for a moral theory 
to be evidentially guiding, and so practically relevant. For example, theories 
that use vague language or unfamiliar technical terminology might fail to even 
be evidentially guiding for us. That utilitarianism is evidentially guiding for 
us might account for why it strikes us as highly relevant to answering various 
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moral questions – and might explain why utilitarians themselves have not 
shied from engaging in all sorts of practical inquires, such as questions about 
abortion, euthanasia, and animal ethics. While utilitarianism makes it very dif-
ficult to learn what is morally right or wrong according to the theory, the fact 
that what is morally relevant according to utilitarianism – pleasure and pain – 
is so easily identifiable makes it very easy to “get started” with reasoning 
about what is morally right or wrong on the utilitarian theory. 
To conclude, I began this chapter by suggesting that we think of a demand 
for action guidance as a demand for a theory to be helpful to us. We can now 
see that as a moral theory, utilitarianism is in different senses both very un-
helpful and very helpful. It is in one sense very unhelpful because so much 
matters according to the theory, too much for us to grasp with our limited 
cognitive abilities, and as a result utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding for 
us. In another sense, however, the theory is very helpful because it is easy to 
identify in every choice situation something that matters according to the the-
ory, and as a result utilitarianism is evidentially guiding for us. While utilitar-
ianism cannot teach us what to do, it is nearly always of practical relevance. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, this matters for what kind of action guid-
ance objections that we can successfully direct against the theory. 
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3. Action Guidance Objections 
With the definitions of doxastic and evidential action guidance in hand, I now 
turn to evaluating action guidance objections to utilitarianism. In this chapter, 
I distinguish between several action guidance objections on the basis of their 
stated conclusions. First, I consider the objection that utilitarianism is a bad 
moral theory. Second, I evaluate the objection that utilitarianism fails to be a 
moral theory. Third, I discuss the objection that utilitarianism is not an inter-
esting or important moral theory. Fourth, I discuss the objection that utilitari-
anism is a false moral theory, either because it violates the “ought implies can” 
principle, or because it is incompatible with our ability to gain moral 
knowledge. 
 
 
3.1 Setting the Stage 
Let me first clarify why and how some arguments fall beyond the scope of this 
chapter. To begin with, some objections against utilitarianism are not action 
guidance objections, even if they draw upon considerations similar to those 
that I presented in the previous chapter. In what follows, I will assume that to 
be an action guidance objection to utilitarianism, an argument must include 
either a premise according to which utilitarianism is not action guiding in 
some way, or a premise that is crucially supported by such a claim. Otherwise, 
the argument is not ultimately concerned with action guidance. Some objec-
tions discussed in the literature fail to satisfy this condition, although they are 
ostensibly about action guidance. For example, in the following passage James 
Lenman argues that if utilitarianism is true, then we do not know that the 
“crimes of Hitler were wrong”: 
 
We have only the feeblest of grounds, from an objective consequentialist per-
spective, to suppose that the crimes of Hitler were wrong. Here, if anywhere, 
surely, there is a considered moral judgment at stake that is well-enough en-
trenched not to be up for grabs in the cut and thrust of reflective equilibrium, 
a judgment far enough from the periphery of the web of our moral beliefs to 
furnish a compelling reductio of any theory that might undermine it.52 
 
                               
52 Lenman (2000), p. 349. 
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Lenman’s idea is that if utilitarianism is true, then we are not justified in be-
lieving that Hitler’s (criminal) acts are wrong; but, the argument goes, we are 
justified in believing that these acts are wrong, and so we can conclude that 
utilitarianism is false. 
A first problem with Lenman’s argument is that it concerns wrongness. 
Even if utilitarianism is true, we are still justified in believing that Hitler’s 
(criminal) acts are wrong, because almost every act is wrong according to util-
itarianism – i.e., only the few optimal acts are right according to the theory. 
So we have more than “the feeblest of grounds” to believe that Hitler’s acts 
are wrong according to utilitarianism. As a result, Lenman’s argument would 
be more convincing if it was stated in terms of rightness. For example, he 
could argue that we are justified in believing that one of Mother Teresa’s char-
itable acts is right, but that utilitarianism (implausibly) rules such justification 
out. Alternatively, to adhere more closely to the spirit of his objection, Len-
man could state his case in terms of knowledge: he could claim that if utilitar-
ianism is true, then we do not know that Hitler’s (criminal) acts are wrong – 
that much seems correct. 
Suppose that we qualify Lenman’s argument in the latter way. Even so, it 
is still not ultimately concerned with action guidance. To see this, suppose that 
we extend our definition of doxastic guidance to cover wrongness, and that 
whenever we think about which act is wrong according to utilitarianism, we 
will on this basis come to know that one of Hitler’s criminal acts is wrong 
according to the theory. In such a case, the truth of utilitarianism will still 
undermine our actual claim to knowing that Hitler’s act is wrong. This is, first, 
because most of us do not have our knowledge about the wrongness of Hitler’s 
acts on the basis of thinking about what utilitarianism says; and, second, be-
cause it is implausible that we would, if utilitarianism is true, have this 
knowledge by other means, such as by direct moral intuition. The latter would 
(implausibly) require our intuitions to be sensitive to unknown empirical facts 
about pleasure and pain situated in the far future. So even if utilitarianism is 
doxastically guiding with respect to wrongness, utilitarianism will still imply 
that we do not know that Hitler’s criminal acts are wrong. Similarly, even if a 
map is helpful for letting you learn where I live, the map is irrelevant for your 
actual knowledge of where I live before you have consulted it. In the light of 
the above considerations, we should conclude that Lenman’s objection is not 
ultimately concerned with action guidance, but rather with how utilitarianism 
is incompatible with what we consider to be our actual moral epistemic situa-
tion. For this reason, rather than considering Lenman’s original argument, I 
will discuss a closely related objection in section 3.6 that properly counts as 
an action guidance objection. This is the objection that utilitarianism, because 
it is not action guiding, is incompatible with our ability to gain moral 
knowledge, rather than with us having moral knowledge. 
Some objections count properly as action guidance objections, but are still 
not sufficiently independent of other arguments against utilitarianism to merit 
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consideration. For example, Lenman has also argued that our ignorance about 
the future makes the integrity objection to utilitarianism more pressing; this is 
the objection that utilitarianism conflicts with how we intuitively are morally 
permitted to live our lives according to our own ideals and values.53 Even if 
Lenman is right, this specific problem relies intimately on the success of the 
integrity objection; if that objection succeeds, then utilitarianism is done for, 
and if it fails, then Lenman’s objection fails as well. In this text, I focus instead 
on action guidance objections whose success are not so obviously held hostage 
to the success of other objections to utilitarianism. In other words, I try to 
answer this question: Does the fact that utilitarianism is not doxastically guid-
ing for us give us further reason to reject the theory, apart from that already 
provided by other objections? 
Another group of objections which is missing from my discussion is that 
of distinctively meta-ethical action guidance objections. For example, perhaps 
we could argue against utilitarianism by demonstrating that morality is a “hu-
man construct” or that it is “determined by humans,” and then show how these 
meta-ethical facts justifies the demand that moral theories should be action 
guiding.54 While I will not investigate such arguments in this book, I wish to 
point out that it is not trivial to make them work – even if we can make the 
ideas that morality is a “human construct” and is “determined by humans” 
clear and coherent. For example, intuitively, the idea that morality is “made 
by humans” seems at most to support that the true moral theory is practically 
relevant to decision making – and for this purpose it is enough that a moral 
theory is evidentially guiding, which utilitarianism is. We could also argue 
against utilitarianism by embracing some non-cognitivist meta-ethical theory, 
according to which moral statements are not even truth-apt – that is, they are 
neither true nor false. Perhaps such a view can justify a demand that moral 
theories should be action guiding – for example, it does not seem far-fetched 
to think that if moral statements are imperatives, then it is the function of moral 
statements to be action guiding (since it is, we could argue, the function of 
imperatives in general to “prompt action”), and perhaps we can find a argu-
mentative path from that claim to an objection to utilitarianism. Even so, we 
might wonder what it even means to “object” to a moral theory on non-cogni-
tive meta-ethical views. In particular, we might wonder whether utilitarianism 
is even a proposition on such views, one that can have properties such as being 
bad, being false, and so on. If utilitarianism cannot be bad, false, etc., how can 
anything possibly be a “problem” for it? In any case, if action guidance objec-
tions are shown to depend on the above kind of controversial meta-ethical as-
sumptions, this makes them weaker as objections to utilitarianism, as they will 
now inherit any problems that face their underlying meta-ethical views. So 
                               
53 Lenman (2000), pp. 367-370. 
54 Cf. Jonas Gren’s discussion of constructivism and the requirement that utilitarianism is action 
guiding in Gren (2004), pp. 116-136. 
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even if I do not address the above kind of meta-ethical objections in this book, 
there will be something gained by learning whether there are successful non-
meta-ethical action guidance objections to utilitarianism – objections which 
do not carry any burdensome meta-ethical baggage. If there are no such ob-
jections, that is good news for utilitarianism. 
3.2 The Badness Objection 
In what follows, I distinguish action guidance objections from each other by 
considering their stated conclusions. Most importantly, I will need to consider 
objections stating that utilitarianism is false – to conclude that a theory is false 
is the most obvious way of objecting to it. That is the task for Sections 3.5 and 
3.6. However, before considering these arguments, I want to examine other 
potential conclusions of action guidance objections. One such conclusion is 
that utilitarianism is worse as a moral theory in virtue of not being action guid-
ing, whether or not it is also false. That is, we could argue that if a theory is 
not doxastically guiding, then it is a bad moral theory, where the badness is 
pro tanto rather than all-things-considered badness. (Of course, a theory could 
still be all-things-considered good in virtue of having various positive quali-
ties, even if it is pro tanto bad in virtue of not being action guiding.) The above 
kind of view is suggested by Pekka Väyrynen, whose “guidance constraint” 
states that “[o]ther things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are bet-
ter to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance.”55 
A complication for any version of a badness objection to utilitarianism is 
that “badness” can mean very different things depending on the relevant con-
text. The challenge is therefore to find an interpretation of “bad” that both 
makes it plausible to think that utilitarianism is bad in virtue of not being dox-
astically guiding and that counts as a proper “objection” to the view. In other 
words, the conclusion of the badness argument has to be properly “problem-
atic” for utilitarianism. 
First, that a moral theory is “bad” could mean that there is evidence against 
the theory, or that we have reason to believe that the theory is false. This in-
terpretation gives us a clear objection to utilitarianism. However, the objection 
is also subservient to the more fundamental question of whether the theory is 
true. In this case, we will do better to directly consider objections against the 
truth of utilitarianism. (Compare: It is more convenient to argue that 
knowledge is not justified true belief, than to argue that we have reason to 
believe that knowledge is not justified true belief.) Having supported an ob-
jection to the truth of utilitarianism, we will have supported a badness objec-
tion against it; conversely, if we cannot support an objection to the truth of 
utilitarianism, then neither can we support a corresponding badness objection 
                               
55 Väyrynen (2006), p. 292. 
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against it. On this first interpretation of “badness,” we get a proper objection 
to utilitarianism, but it is not one that we need to evaluate separately from any 
objections to its truth. Again, I will deal with objections to the truth of utili-
tarianism in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
Second, some philosophers have argued that it is the function or point of 
moral theories to be action guiding. This might provide us with a version of 
the badness objection.56 For example, Elenor Mason notes that “the most im-
portant function of a moral theory is to guide action.”57 Lars Bergström writes 
that “moral norms should have practical relevance” because “[t]hat’s what 
they are for.”58 Terrance McConnell says that “one of the important functions 
of moral theories is to assess the conduct of others” and that “one of the main 
points of moral theories is to provide agents with guidance.”59 Peter Singer 
states that “the whole point of ethical judgements is to guide practice.”60 Rob-
ert Goodin writes that “[t]he point of morality is to be action-guiding” and 
Frank Jackson says that “the passage to action is the very business of ethics.”61 
A literal interpretation of these claims gives us the following badness objec-
tion to utilitarianism. To begin with, we suppose that moral theories have func-
tions, and that one such function is to be doxastically guiding. Next, we draw 
a comparison to other entities that have functions, such as human artefacts or 
biological entities. For example, an umbrella that does not protect against rain 
fails to fulfill its function, so it is a bad umbrella; and a heart that does not 
pump blood fails to fulfill its function, so it is a bad heart. Similarly, we can 
argue, utilitarianism does not fulfill its function, which is to be doxastically 
guiding, so it is a bad moral theory. 
The problem with the above argument is that the sentence “the umbrella is 
bad” seems to simply mean that “the umbrella fails to fulfill its function.” But 
in that case, the corresponding objection against utilitarianism concludes only 
that utilitarianism fails to fulfill its function: this is not by itself a problem for 
utilitarianism. In other words, in the context of function-talk, to say that some-
thing is “bad” does not express something truly or genuinely evaluative, but 
gives us merely a circumspect way to talk about the functions of various ob-
jects. 
Third, we can understand the “badness” as “moral badness.” In doing so, 
we will need to argue that utilitarianism is extrinsically or instrumentally mor-
ally bad (in virtue of not being doxastically guiding) because it is deeply im-
plausible that a moral theory is bad in the sense that, for example, pain is bad 
– that is, moral theories are never intrinsically or finally morally bad. 
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In support of the claim that “if utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding, 
then it is morally bad,” we can appeal to the notion of autonomy.62 Holly M. 
Smith, who was first to discuss autonomy in the context of moral theories 
being action guiding, says that a person lacks autonomy if she cannot “trans-
late her moral values into a choice of what to do.”63 Similarly, Pekka Väyrynen 
argues that if moral theories should be action guiding for us “the best expla-
nation of this fact features certain forms of autonomy and fairness,” with the 
latter referring to “fairness in the provision of the opportunity for morally 
committed moral agents to act well autonomously.”64 It is not clear what ex-
actly Smith and Väyrynen have in mind here. In an earlier text Smith says that 
a kind of action guidance is “valuable” because it “makes possible an im-
portant form of autonomy,” but she does not explicitly state that we are dealing 
with moral value.65 Väyrynen is more forthcoming on the issue:  
 
[W]e must also be open to the idea that if ethical theories are better to the extent 
that they provide adequate moral guidance, then the best explanation of that 
fact features some morally substantive ideals.66 
 
Väyrynen’s reference to “morally substantive ideals” suggests that we are 
dealing with specifically moral value. In any case, I will assume this for the 
sake of the argument. Clearly, Smith and Väyrynen cannot be concerned with 
the truth of non-guiding theories, since that requires a premise to the effect 
that we are in fact autonomous (which is why the true moral theory must make 
possible such autonomy), and that seems implausible. Moreover, it is not clear 
what kind of non-moral badness could be intended.  
Let us assume that the concern is about moral value: that utilitarianism is a 
morally bad theory because it does not allow us to be autonomous, and that it 
does not allow us to be autonomous because it is not doxastically guiding. 
Now, there are two interpretations of autonomy that we could have in mind 
when talking about the “autonomy” of agents. On the first interpretation, for 
an agent to be autonomous is for her to be able to act according to her own 
values. As I have argued elsewhere, this interpretation does not seem to be 
problematic for utilitarianism, because most people are not utilitarians.67 
Therefore, that these people cannot use utilitarianism to guide their actions 
will not prevent them from being autonomous and able to act according to 
their own (non-utilitarian) values. 
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On the second interpretation, for an agent to be autonomous is for her to be 
able to act according to the true values, whatever they are. But this interpreta-
tion is not a problem for utilitarianism either. On the one hand, if utilitarianism 
is true, then its moral badness will depend on how conducive it is to produce 
pleasure minus pain – something that we, because of reasons familiar at this 
point, cannot know.68 On the other hand, if utilitarianism is false, then its ina-
bility to guide our actions will not stop anyone from acting according to the 
“true values” – since in that case utilitarianism will not give us the true values. 
Finally, it is far from clear that we cannot live our lives according to utili-
tarian values – which presumably means to live one’s life, in some sense, ac-
cording to the utilitarian theory – just because utilitarianism is not doxas-
tically guiding. It is still possible to let our decision making be informed by 
utilitarianism. Since the theory is evidentially guiding for us, we can think 
about what it says and come to have reason to believe that an act is right ac-
cording to it. This may appear sufficient to let us live our lives according to 
the utilitarian theory. 
3.3 The No Moral Theory Objection 
Consider next the objection that utilitarianism, because it is not doxastically 
guiding, is not a moral theory. I will examine various versions of this objec-
tion, but the intuitive idea is straightforward. Suppose that we ask what hap-
piness is, and that in response we are told a detailed story involving various 
neurological facts. In this case, and assuming that physicalism about con-
sciousness is false, the response fails to address our question. Even if we learn 
many or even all neurological facts, we will not learn what happiness is. The 
responder unacceptably changes the subject from the philosophical question 
of what happiness is, to the biological question of what happens in the brain 
when we are happy. Likewise, we may suspect that when someone responds 
to moral questions by proposing a normative view that is not action guiding, 
she similarly unacceptably “changes the subject.” The proposed objection is 
not that the offered view is bad or false, although that could still be true for 
other reasons, but that it is out of place or irrelevant. 
Now, for the no moral theory objection to succeed it is not enough that 
utilitarianism employs a different concept of moral rightness than do other 
moral theories. In that case, utilitarianism will still be a moral theory, just one 
that is formulated using a different concept of moral rightness. That is, the 
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subject matter will not have been unacceptably changed from a moral to a non-
moral topic. Consider, for example, Jan Österberg’s suggestion that: 
 
Since consequentialism is not action-guiding […] its deontic notions are not 
conceptually related to the other moral notions. This means that its use of, for 
example, “right” and “wrong” are quite different from that of ordinary moral 
thought. […] But this, in turn, means that consequentialism is not a competitor 
to common-sense morality even in the latter’s role as a theory of right- and 
wrong-making criteria: their criteria do not concern the same deontic notions.69 
 
Österberg’s idea is that while utilitarianism employs one concept of moral 
rightness, this is not the same concept of moral rightness as those which are 
employed by other moral theories. More generally, the idea is that theories 
that are doxastically guiding employ different rightness concepts than moral 
theories that are not doxastically guiding. However, the above argument is not 
problematic for utilitarianism, because as long as their theory is about some 
moral deontic concept of rightness, it has not radically changed the subject. 
Utilitarianism is in such a case still a moral theory; it is still about morality. 
For example, perhaps there is a distinction between subjective and objective 
moral rightness, where only moral theories that are doxastically guiding can 
successfully employ the notion of subjective rightness. In that case, utilitari-
anism can still be a theory about objective rightness (which presumably does 
not require a theory to be doxastically guiding in such a way) and thereby 
qualify as a moral theory. 
Another approach is to argue that the utilitarian proposition, while it cor-
rectly employs the concept of moral rightness, does not deserve the label 
“moral theory.”70 However, even if this claim was plausible, it would make 
the resulting objection toothless. Utilitarians will respond that even if their 
view does not deserve the name “moral theory,” it is nevertheless a true view 
about moral rightness. Whether utilitarianism classifies as a moral theory is 
beside the point. What matters is that utilitarianism is about moral rightness 
and that it is true. Moreover, utilitarians will take issue with the claim that 
their theory does not deserve the label “moral theory.” Surely, they will argue, 
if a theory gives us an explanation of moral rightness, then it is a moral theory, 
and therefore utilitarianism does deserve this label. This illustrates how, to get 
a proper version of this objection to utilitarianism, the objection must relate to 
the content of utilitarianism, and not just to the mere labelling of it. 
Consider then what I think is the most interesting version of the no moral 
theory objection. It goes as follows. Because utilitarianism fails to even em-
ploy a deontic and moral concept, it radically changes the subject. The right-
ness concept it employs could, for example, be a purely evaluative concept, 
such as goodness or badness. For example, Vuko Andrić suggests that: 
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[M]oral theories must make sense of the deontic vocabulary we use in every-
day life. Terms like right, wrong, and obligatory are essentially action-guiding, 
whereas evaluative notions like good or bad are not. Evaluative properties can 
properly be ascribed to all sorts of entities, whereas the properties of rightness 
and wrongness primarily apply to actions or choices. Conceptual analysis thus 
reveals the action-guiding function of moral theories.71 
 
Why believe that these terms – right, wrong, and obligatory – are essentially 
action guiding? The following remarks by Österberg are helpful: 
 
In common-sense morality, deontic notions such as right and wrong are con-
ceptually related to other moral notions, such as guilt and responsibility, 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, being good and being bad. (For exam-
ple: you cannot be blameworthy, or reasonably feel guilt, for having performed 
(what you know is) a right action; you are praiseworthy only if you have per-
formed a right action; if many of your actions are wrong, you are hardly a good 
man.)72 
 
For the sake of the argument, I will grant that moral deontic concepts such as 
right, wrong, and obligatory are in fact essentially action guiding concepts. 
Even so, a problem remains for the objector. Let us assume that for the concept 
of rightness to be essentially action guiding is for the following to be true: in 
any case where an act is right, we can be guided by means of considering the 
proposition that it is right. (Although my definitions of action guidance do not 
apply to concepts but only to theories, I assume that a suitable counterpart to 
doxastic guidance can be invented here). It follows that, if the concept of right-
ness is essentially action guiding, then any true proposition of the form “x is 
right” can be used to guide behavior. For example, it cannot be true that “max-
imizing pleasure minus pain is right,” because that proposition cannot be used 
to guide one’s behavior. 
However, and this is my concern with the objection being considered, even 
if the concepts of rightness and wrongness are essentially action guiding in 
this way, it does not follow that moral theories are essentially action guiding. 
The above argument seems to falsely presuppose – similar to the ought implies 
can objection which I discuss in Section 3.5 – that utilitarianism tells us to 
carry out a difficult-to-perform act such as “maximize pleasure minus pain.” 
However, utilitarians can deny that their theory tells us to perform such an act. 
Instead, they can argue that utilitarianism tells us to perform only very easily 
performed acts, like “drink the glass of water” and “open the door,” where 
these are acts that as a matter of fact maximize pleasure minus pain. This could 
be achieved by restricting the notion of an act being “available to be per-
formed” in the formulation of utilitarianism, so that it applies only to easily 
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performed acts. In other words, we can be guided by means of considering 
that the act “drink a glass of water” is right, even if utilitarianism – that implies 
that we should drink a glass of water – is not action guiding for us. As a result, 
it is unclear how to argue from the claim that “right” is essentially action guid-
ing to the claim that moral theories are essentially action guiding. Moral de-
ontic notions can be essentially action guiding, even if utilitarianism is not. 
Now, we can reintroduce talk about the function of moral theories at this 
point in the discussion, not in support of the claim that utilitarianism is a bad 
moral theory as I discussed earlier, but in support of the view that moral the-
ories are essentially action guiding. For example, we could argue that because 
the function or role of moral theories is to be action guiding, moral theories 
(and not just moral concepts of rightness or wrongness) are essentially action 
guiding. However, even if we manage to drum up support for the claim that 
moral theories have as their function not only to be evidentially guiding, but 
also to be doxastically guiding, this is not a promising strategy. It is easy to 
see why. In general, just because something has as its function to be in a cer-
tain way, it is not thereby essentially in such a way. For example, a heart has 
as its function to pump blood, but hearts are not essentially pumping blood, 
since a heart that fails to pump blood is still a heart. Similarly, a moral theory 
that fails to fulfill its purpose to be doxastically guiding can still be a moral 
theory. 
3.4 The Importance and Interestingness Objection 
A moral theory can be true, good, and about a concept of moral rightness, yet 
fail to be important or interesting. Questions about interestingness and im-
portance often arise in philosophical discussions, although they seldom take 
center stage. For example, we commonly think that what is right according to 
the rules of etiquette is less important and interesting than what is morally 
right. Or suppose that we define a technical term “right*” to mean “maximize 
pleasure minus pain.” It would for such a rightness concept be trivially true 
that an act is right* if and only if it maximizes pleasure minus pain. But such 
a utilitarian theory is both unimportant and uninteresting, and therefore not 
worthy of further consideration. Such a theory does not tie into or promise to 
answer any of our central philosophical concerns. In similar ways, we may 
think that utilitarianism is not important or interesting (i.e., not worth caring 
about) if it is not doxastically guiding. 
What is importance and interestingness? These concepts are fairly under-
theorized within philosophy, but at least we can say this much: Whether a 
proposition p is important does not depend on us finding it important. For ex-
ample, even if no one thought that a moral question about euthanasia was im-
portant, it would still retain its importance. Importance is “provided by the 
world” in some sense – it is forced on us by the way things are. In contrast, 
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whether a proposition p is interesting is constituted or determined at least 
partly by our subjective responses towards p, so that if something is interest-
ing, it is interesting because we find it interesting. Matters of interestingness 
are thus “up to us.” This does not mean that we can change what is interesting 
merely by changing our wants and preferences, but that, unlike matters of im-
portance, we can change what is interesting by changing our perspective on 
the world. 
Is it true that, because utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding – or action 
guiding in a similarly demanding sense – it is not important or interesting? 
James Lenman suggests this much (my emphasis): 
 
If consequentialism is to be a theory of any real normative interest, it must at 
least furnish us with a regulative ideal to guide our choices either of actions or 
decision procedures; it must offer such choices a consequentialist rationale.73 
 
Similar, consider remarks to the effect that moral theories should be “useful” 
or fulfill some of our desires or wants. For instance, Krister Bykvist says that 
a “moral theory seems useless if it can never guide agents when they deliberate 
about what to do.”74 Mark Timmons writes that “the practical aim of moral 
theory has to do with the desire to have some method to follow when, for 
example, we reason about what is right or wrong.”75 Finally, Andrić notes that: 
 
[W]e want to apply moral theories; we want them to tell us what is the moral 
thing to do in real-life cases of moral conflict, dispute, and uncertainty, and we 
want to implement moral theories by doing what they require. Life poses moral 
challenges; and moral theories are supposed to yield convincing deontic judge-
ments in order to equip us with knowledge about what ought to be done on 
which, ideally, we can base our decisions.76 
 
A plausible background assumption here is that, if a moral theory like utilitar-
ianism is not useful or fulfills our desire to solve moral problems and chal-
lenges, which is arguably the case because it is not doxastically guiding, then 
it is not important or interesting. 
However, there is a problem for constructing an action guidance objection 
to utilitarianism along the above lines. Intuitively, a theory only needs to be 
important and interesting to some degree to be acceptably important and in-
teresting. In other words, a theory can be less than maximally important and 
interesting without being unacceptably low in interestingness and importance. 
If this was not so, very few theories in philosophy would be acceptably im-
portant and interesting, since few theories are maximally important and inter-
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esting. Clearly, however, most philosophical theories are acceptably im-
portant and interesting. And although utilitarianism is not maximally im-
portant and interesting, because it is not doxastically guiding, I will now argue 
that it is still interesting and important to a very high degree, or at least to an 
acceptable degree. I will present four reasons to think that utilitarianism is 
both important and interesting, even though it is not doxastically guiding. 
First, even if utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding, the truth of utilitar-
ianism rules out the truth of other moral theories, including moral theories that 
are doxastically guiding. Accordingly, merely by knowing that utilitarianism 
is true, we can know that a large number of moral theories are false. This 
qualifies utilitarianism as both important and interesting to a significant de-
gree. That is, many non-utilitarians will have to worry about utilitarianism 
being true even if the theory is not doxastically guiding, because the truth of 
utilitarianism rules out the truth of their own favored views. 
Second, utilitarianism is both important and interesting in virtue of being 
theoretically important and interesting – that is, in constituting a plausible ex-
planation of rightness and wrongness, which as such needs to be taken seri-
ously. Therefore, utilitarianism’s lack of doxastic guidance can be partly com-
pensated by its theoretical plausibility. Moreover, utilitarianism is not theoret-
ically interesting just to academic philosophers, but to anyone trying to seri-
ously explain why an act is right or wrong – a person asks such questions also 
in her day-to-day life, like when asking: “Why do I have to visit that relative?” 
or “Why should I give money to the Red Cross?” 
Third, utilitarianism is a provocative theory, which makes it more interest-
ing, although not more important. Utilitarianism hints that moral reality may 
be very different than what common-sense tells us, and this kindles our inter-
est. Of course, utilitarianism provokes us mainly by having us consider 
thought experiments where we stipulate the levels of pleasure minus pain pro-
duced by acts. However, by judging from people’s reactions to the theory’s 
implications in such cases, this does not seem to make utilitarianism any less 
provocative. 
Fourth, as we have seen, utilitarianism is evidentially guiding as it is prac-
tically relevant for decision making. If utilitarianism is true, then in nearly all 
choice situations you can learn something about what reason you have to be-
lieve that an act is right by thinking about what utilitarianism says. This makes 
the theory more important and interesting to us.  
Taken together, the above four considerations suggest that while utilitari-
anism is not maximally important and interesting, it is at least acceptably so. 
We should therefore reject the importance and interestingness objection. 
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3.5 The Ought Implies Can Objection 
The final two objections that I will discuss in this chapter are objections to 
utilitarianism in the classic sense: they are arguments that utilitarianism is 
false. To begin with, Frances Howard-Snyder argues that utilitarianism is in-
compatible with the principle that “ought implies can.”77 Her argument, recon-
structed with premises and a conclusion, goes as follows: 
 
THE OUGHT IMPLIES CAN OBJECTION 
 
(P1) You cannot maximize pleasure minus pain. 
(P2) If you cannot maximize pleasure minus pain, then it is not the case 
that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain. 
(P3) If it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, 
then utilitarianism is false. 
(C) Utilitarianism is false. 
 
The conclusion of the argument follows from the premises, so let us consider 
each premise in turn. To begin with, premise (P1) is supported by a compari-
son to acts that we intuitively cannot perform. For example, you cannot defeat 
the Hungarian grandmaster Judith Polgár in a game of chess or open a safe to 
which you lack the code. In both of these cases, you lack the ability to perform 
the act – i.e., you cannot do it. Various explanations are available for why one 
suffers an inability to perform an act – although, naturally, giving such an 
explanation is not necessary to justify that one has the inability, since this mat-
ter can be judged on intuitive grounds. Some examples of potential explana-
tions of inability include: that you cannot perform an act because you do not 
know how to perform it, because you would fail to perform it if you tried, or 
because it is too difficult for you to perform it. Whichever explanation is cor-
rect, Howard-Snyder is right in saying that if you cannot defeat Polgár or open 
the safe, then you cannot maximize pleasure minus pain. Any explanation that 
applies to the former claims must also apply to the latter. For example, you do 
not know how to maximize pleasure minus pain, you will fail to maximize 
pleasure minus pain if you try, and maximizing pleasure minus pain is too 
difficult for you. That is, if you cannot defeat a chess grandmaster, how could 
you hope to maximize pleasure minus pain? 
As for premise (P2), it is plausible in virtue of the principle that ought im-
plies can. The ought implies can principle states that if you ought to perform 
an act, then you can perform that act. That is, an obligation to φ presupposes 
an ability to φ. For example, it cannot be true that I ought to pick you up at the 
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airport if I cannot pick you up. That is, if my car is being repaired or the airport 
is too far away, then I have no obligation to pick you up. The ought implies 
can principle is equivalent to the proposition that if you cannot perform an act, 
then it is not the case that you ought to perform the act, which straightfor-
wardly gives us premise (P2). 
Finally, premise (P3) is meant to be plausible in virtue of the definition of 
utilitarianism. If utilitarianism is true, the argument goes, you ought to max-
imize pleasure minus pain. Therefore, by modus tollens, if it is not the case 
that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, then utilitarianism is false. 
Although Frances Howard-Snyder does not intend the ought implies can 
objection to constitute an action guidance objection to utilitarianism, it quali-
fies as such in this discussion.78 While a notion of action guidance is not di-
rectly appealed to in the objection, whether utilitarianism is doxastically guid-
ing is relevant to evaluating premise (P3). Had utilitarianism been doxastically 
guiding for you, you would in many circumstances have the ability to maxim-
ize pleasure minus pain: namely by using utilitarianism to find out which act 
is right according to the theory – an act which will have the property of max-
imizing pleasure minus pain.79 
The main problem with the ought implies can objection becomes clear 
when we consider how to exactly understand premise (P1).80 That you “cannot 
maximize pleasure minus pain” can be interpreted in either of the following 
two ways, and the ought implies can objection is unsuccessful on either inter-
pretation: 
 
(A) You cannot perform an act that has the property of maximizing 
pleasure minus pain. 
 
(B) You cannot perform the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” 
 
On the A-interpretation of “cannot maximize pleasure minus pain,” premise 
(P1) is false, since I can perform an act that has the property of maximizing 
pleasure minus pain. In any choice situation, there is an easily performed act 
such as “drink a glass of water” or “open the door” that has the property of 
maximizing pleasure minus pain.81 Clearly, I can perform some such act – I 
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can drink a glass of water, open a door, or do some other simple act whose 
performance will maximize pleasure minus pain. Likewise, while I cannot 
perform the act “defeat Judith Polgár,” I can perform an act that would make 
me defeat Judith Polgár: this is just a long conjunctive act such as “move E4, 
D3, etc.” Few of us can defeat Polgár, but most of us can “move E4, D3, etc.” 
On the B-interpretation of “cannot maximize pleasure minus pain,” prem-
ise (P1) states that you cannot perform a specific act – the act “maximize 
pleasure minus pain.” However, if you cannot perform the act “maximize 
pleasure minus pain,” then it is not among your available alternatives, and so 
utilitarianism does not tell you to perform it. In this case, we should instead 
reject premise (P3): 
 
(P3) If it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, 
then utilitarianism is false. 
 
This is because utilitarianism can be true even if it is not the case that you 
ought to perform the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” As a result, the 
ought implies can objection fails on either interpretation. 
3.6 The Epistemic Objection 
According to the epistemic objection, utilitarianism is incompatible with our 
ability to gain moral knowledge. Several authors have raised this objection in 
connection to the ought implies can principle. For example, H. J. McCloskey 
writes that “[w]e are not truly free to do the right or obligatory act if we cannot 
in advance know what is the right act. ‘Ought implies can’, and ‘Can’ implies 
‘Can know’.”82 Similarly, Lars Bergström notes that “’Ought’ implies ‘can’, 
and ‘can’ implies ‘knows how’.”83 McCloskey and Bergström appear to con-
sider these conceptual truths; while others indicate that the problem is that we 
intuitively have the ability to obtain moral knowledge, but that utilitarianism 
rules this out.84 With this in mind, consider the following argument against 
utilitarianism: 
 
THE EPISTEMIC OBJECTION 
 
(P4) I can come to know of at least some available acts that they are 
morally right. 
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drink a glass of water, and if that act is the same act as the act of maximizing pleasure minus 
pain, then I can maximize pleasure minus pain as well.  
82 McCloskey (1973), p. 62. 
83 Bergström (1996). 
84 See Frazier (1994) as well as Lenman’s comments cited in the beginning of the chapter. 
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(P5) If utilitarianism is true, then I cannot come to know of any availa-
ble acts that they are morally right. 
(C) Utilitarianism is false. 
Unlike the argument by Lenman which I discussed briefly in Section 3.1, the 
epistemic objection is properly about action guidance, and so an action guid-
ance objection. As is the case with the ought implies can objection, doxastic 
guidance plays an indirect role in evaluating the premises of this argument. If 
utilitarianism had been doxastically guiding, we could have used it to come to 
know that some available acts are morally right – and in such a case, premise 
(P5) would have been false. However, because utilitarianism is not doxas-
tically guiding for us, we lack this tool for ascertaining what is morally right. 
So the question of whether utilitarianism is doxastically guiding for us is rel-
evant to evaluating premise (P5). 
The conclusion of the objection follows from the premises. What can we 
say about the premises? Premise (P4) can be supported in either of two ways. 
First, we can argue that it is a conceptual truth that, if an act is morally right, 
then we can know it is morally right. Granting that at least some of my avail-
able acts are morally right, it follows that I can come to know that some of my 
available acts are morally right, which is enough to support (P4). Second, we 
can point to cases where we intuitively have an ability to gain moral 
knowledge. For example, it is intuitively true that I can come to know that 
brushing my teeth this evening is morally right, that drinking coffee right now 
is morally right, or that riding my bicycle to work is morally right. These acts 
are clearly morally right, and it should be easy for me to figure this out. This 
too supports (P4). 
As regards premise (P5), it is plausible in virtue of my previous discussion 
of how our acts have chaotic and wildly unpredictable effects on the future – 
that it is impossible to learn which of our acts maximize pleasure minus pain. 
That said, premise (P5) must be understood in a restricted way: for it to be 
plausible, we must focus on actions in the real world and not on actions in 
imagined cases. This is because in thought experiments we may come to know 
which acts are morally right according to utilitarianism by stipulating that they 
maximize pleasure minus pain. Nevertheless, this is not a serious restriction 
on the argument, because (P4) remains plausible even if we consider only ac-
tions in the real world. 
Mark Lucas has suggested two ways in which to reject premise (P5), both 
of which are arguments for us having alternative means for knowing that an 
act is morally right, other than simply thinking about what the true moral the-
ory says. Interestingly, these arguments may work even if utilitarianism is not 
doxastically guiding. 
First, Lukas notes that we could argue for a foundationalist epistemology, 
according to which “some moral beliefs are so obviously true that they are in 
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effect self-justifying.”85 Just like I can know that I have two hands, as in G. E. 
Moore’s famous argument, I can know that tooth brushing is morally right, 
and this is so even if I cannot use the true moral theory to find out that tooth 
brushing is morally right. In this case, I would come to have this knowledge 
by direct intuition. Second, Lukas suggests that we can adopt a “hybrid coher-
entist/externalist epistemology about the justification of beliefs about certain 
acts.”86 On this epistemological view, we would first on a sub-conscious or 
semi-conscious level note various features of an act. These observations will 
give rise to a moral intuition that the act is right, wrong, obligatory, etc. and 
would also justify the content of this intuition. He writes that: 
 
This conclusion is based on limited information. It is based just on the features 
of [the] act that I have directly observed or that I have inferred to exist. And it 
is based on beliefs and moral intuitions all of which are subject to revision 
should more information arise. Nevertheless, it is in virtue of such a process, I 
think, that I form my belief and through which my belief gets its justification.87 
I believe that neither of these two arguments against (P5) are plausible on 
closer examination – although to be fair, Lukas merely sketches these re-
sponses and is not strongly endorsing either of them. Both of the responses 
share a problem that is anticipated by Lukas in his discussion of the first view, 
that “such a view would turn us in to soothsayers of a sort.”88 To see the prob-
lem, suppose that I know that utilitarianism is true and that tooth brushing is 
morally right. On the basis of these two pieces of knowledge, I can come to 
know that tooth brushing produces at least as much pleasure minus pain as any 
alternative act available to me. In this case, knowledge of two purely philo-
sophical facts would give me knowledge of a purely empirical fact – and an 
empirical fact that is not knowable by means of employing our best instru-
ments of observation and theories of science. That we can obtain empirical 
knowledge in such a way, by means of mere armchair philosophy, seems 
deeply implausible.89 Presumably, such soothsaying is impossible because 
when our moral intuitions work with empirical information, they are limited 
to considering the empirical information which we are already aware of. 
Instead of challenging premise (P5), I propose that the utilitarian challenge 
premise (P4). The same argument that is used to argue that utilitarianism is 
not doxastically guiding (i.e., that our acts have wildly unpredictable chaotic 
                               
85 Lukas (2008), p. 6. 
86 Lukas (2008), p. 7. 
87 Lukas (2008), p. 8. 
88 Lukas (2008), p. 6. 
89 Importantly, this argument does not presuppose that knowledge is closed under implication 
or known implication. Even if it is not always true that knowing P and knowing P→Q enables 
us to know that Q, it still seems plausible to think that knowing that utilitarianism is true and 
knowing that an act is right would enable us to know that this act maximizes pleasure minus 
pain. 
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effects) also makes it plausible to think that we do not know which acts are 
morally right even in ordinary choice situations. Surprisingly weak claims are 
needed for this argumentative strategy to work. We need only defend the claim 
that a few types of significant consequences for human health or well-being 
matter for whether an act is morally right. Since we do not know of any ordi-
nary act that it will or will not have such significant consequences, we do not 
know of any ordinary act whether it is morally right. Moreover, there are good 
candidates for what may constitute such significant consequences. For exam-
ple, if an act brings about a million deaths in a thousand years, that seems to 
matter for whether it is morally right. But for any act available to us, we cannot 
know whether it will bring about a million deaths in a thousand years. To give 
a more specific example, suppose that you will live for thousands of years 
because of future advances in medicine. As you witness massive death and 
destruction in the year 3019, you trace this calamity back to an evening in 
2019, where you stood in your bathroom with toothbrush in hand. Apparently, 
you learn, had you not brushed your teeth that evening in 2019, then a million 
lives would have been saved a thousand years later. Everything else being 
equal, brushing your teeth was surely morally wrong in this situation. One 
reason to think that it was wrong is that it is fitting to regret your choice of 
brushing your teeth, and the reason to think that regret is fitting is surely that 
standing there a thousand years later you realize that brushing your teeth was, 
in fact, morally wrong. Presumably, you would not in the year 3019 say that 
“Yes, I caused a million deaths, but since I did not know that I caused a million 
deaths, what I did was nevertheless right.” 
Now, we might have different views on how demanding the true moral the-
ory is. If a moral theory tells you to give all your money to charity and spend 
your whole life helping others, then perhaps the theory is too demanding. We 
might also think that in some cases a lack of knowledge excuses certain kinds 
of behavior, especially in cases where little is at stake. But the case under 
consideration is one where the theory demands very little of you, and where a 
lot is at stake: to save a million lives, you need only to put down your tooth-
brush. In such a situation, putting down your toothbrush is clearly what you 
should do, regardless of your epistemic situation at the time. You do not de-
serve any blame for brushing your teeth, of course, because of your ignorance 
about the future. But to put it down is nevertheless obligatory. To sum up, 
what the wildly unpredictable chaotic effects of our acts show is not only that 
utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding for us, but also that each of our acts 
has a large potential to sooner or later affect the lives of a million people in 
very significant ways, pertaining to intuitively salient moral dimensions such 
as those of life, death, happiness, suffering, and freedom. This fact should, 
regardless of our confidence in utilitarianism, make us reject (P4) and along 
with it the epistemic objection. 
Let me take stock of the argumentation in this chapter. I have examined a 
number of action guidance objections, and can conclude that none of them 
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looks promising. But I admit that my discussion may still fail to satisfy the 
action guidance objector. Many of us have an inner voice telling us that there 
is something wrong with utilitarianism because it is not action guiding, and 
that voice is not always silenced by being given a comprehensive list of failed 
objections, as I have tried to do. The situation seems similar to the difficulty 
moral realists have in convincing people that there are non-natural irreducible 
moral facts. Regardless of which arguments are offered in defense of the real-
ist position, many feel that the theory must be false and that there simply has 
to exist a better objection to it. Perhaps the best action guidance objection to 
utilitarianism is just that intuitively, if a moral theory is not doxastically guid-
ing, then it is false. Since utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding, it is there-
fore false. However, even if we have the intuition that the true moral theory is 
doxastically action guiding, this intuition seems to give us reason to believe 
in its content only if there is a plausible explanation for why its content would 
be true. It is not like the intuition that pain matters morally – an intuition that 
seems trustworthy regardless of whether its content can be explained or not. 
But as my discussion above shows, it is difficult to find an explanation for 
why the true moral theory would be action guiding. With this note, I end my 
discussion of action guidance. At the end of the day, it is not the utilitarian’s 
job to make her opponents’ objections work for them. If the objector wants an 
action guidance objection against utilitarianism that succeeds, she needs to 
find better objections. 
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4. Moral Intuitions 
Utilitarianism conflicts with strongly held moral intuitions, such as intuitions 
about what is morally right and wrong, and these conflicts give us reason to 
believe that utilitarianism is false. In this chapter, I first explain what moral 
intuitions are and why they give us reason to believe in their content. Next, I 
introduce three intuitive objections to utilitarianism based on the following 
three thought experiments: Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Mon-
ster. Finally, I consider three responses to these objections, and show how 
each of them is unsuccessful. These discussions set the stage for Chapters 5 
and 6, where I discuss two more promising replies on behalf of the utilitarian, 
both of which, in different ways, concern the role that imagination plays in 
thought experimentation. 
 
 
4.1 Intuitions and Moral Theories 
Moral intuitions are tacitly, if not explicitly, treated by us as giving reasons to 
believe in moral claims. For example, we say that it seems wrong to lie on a 
job application and that it appears that we should prioritize the welfare of our 
children. In some of these cases, we report having a moral intuition and take 
that intuition to support our position. Moreover, when we face novel moral 
questions we often stop and wait for a moral intuition to surface, and we sel-
dom proceed without having elicited at least some intuitions to rely on.  
Even if moral intuitions play this central role in our moral thinking and 
reasoning practices, that does not mean that they are epistemically significant, 
where an intuition is epistemically significant if and only if it gives the intuiter 
defeasible reason to believe in its content.90 I will later suggest two reasons to 
think that intuitions are epistemically significant. But for now, let us think 
about how intuitions can be employed in the evaluation of moral theories if 
this is so. 
In general, there are two ways in which moral intuitions can matter for the 
evaluation of moral theories. On the one hand, moral intuitions can support a 
theory and so give you reason to believe that the theory is true. For example, 
suppose that you morally intuit that giving to a specific charity is right and 
                               
90 This way of phrasing the issue leaves open whether it is the intuition or the proposition that 
we have the intuition that constitutes evidence for claims. 
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that utilitarianism implies that doing so is right. In this case, the intuition gives 
you reason (although only weak such) to believe that utilitarianism is true. On 
the other hand, moral intuitions can conflict with a theory and so give you 
reason to believe that the theory is false. For example, suppose that utilitari-
anism implies that choosing a lamb steak at a restaurant is wrong, but that 
intuitively it is right for you to order the steak. In this case, the intuition gives 
you reason to believe that utilitarianism is false. 
In this and the following two chapters, I explore the consequences for util-
itarianism of the idea that moral intuitions are epistemically significant. I dis-
cuss three intuitive objections to utilitarianism, and I consider various ways in 
which utilitarians may defend their theory against these objections. First, how-
ever, I will clarify what intuitions are, and present some reasons to think that 
they are in fact epistemically significant. 
4.2 Intuitions and their Epistemic Significance 
Several philosophers have written about how to understand intuitions, and I 
will not explore this topic in any greater detail here.91 However, it will be use-
ful to have a basic understanding of what intuitions are for the discussion that 
follows. 
To begin with, intuitions share a number of characteristics. First, we use a 
certain vocabulary to report having them. When you intuit that p, you can re-
port having this intuition by saying that “intuitively p,” “it seems like p,” “it 
appears that p,” or “it looks like p.” Second, intuitions have propositional con-
tent. You intuit that something is the case, such that giving to a charity is mor-
ally right, or that letting your cat starve is wrong. Third, intuitions are imme-
diate. When you intuit that killing animals for food is wrong, this intuition 
appears in your mind suddenly and without warning; it does not slowly take 
shape during deliberation. Fourth, intuitions are non-voluntary. You cannot 
decide which intuitions to have or when to have them. For example, I cannot 
decide to intuit that torturing innocents is morally obligatory – I intuit that 
torturing innocents is morally wrong whether or not I want to. Fifth, intuitions 
vary in strength, so while I intuit that it is morally wrong to let my cat starve, 
I more strongly intuit that it is morally wrong to kill my cat. Sixth, and finally, 
intuitions are mental states with, or at least accompanied by, a particular phe-
nomenology. 
Let me further comment on the vocabulary used to report having intuitions. 
While terms such as “seems” and “appears” can refer to moral intuitions, they 
can also be used for other purposes. It is important to not conflate these dif-
ferent uses of these terms. One such alternative purpose is what we may call 
“epistemic reporting.” For example, suppose that I have acquired significant 
                               
91 See, for example, Bealer (1998) and Pust (2017). 
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reason to believe in utilitarianism, even though the theory does not strike me 
as true. Whenever I think about utilitarianism it “leaves me cold,” so I do not 
intuit that it is true. Nevertheless, when reflecting on my available evidence in 
this situation I may truthfully tell you that “in the light of my evidence it seems 
that utilitarianism is true.” In this case, “seems” refers not to a mental state of 
“seeming,” but to having on balance (a little) more reason to believe that util-
itarianism is true rather than false. More obviously, terms like “seems” and 
“appears” can be used to hedge statements, without thereby referring to any 
underlying mental states. 
As should be clear, intuitions share many characteristics with beliefs, so it 
is natural to ask whether they are beliefs. While nothing important in this book 
hangs on intuitions being distinct from beliefs, as opposed to constituting a 
special kind of beliefs, I think it is reasonable to think that intuitions are mental 
states distinct from other propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires.92 
For example, I can intuit that p is wrong, but still distrust this intuition (e.g., 
perhaps I think that the intuition is unduly influenced by my cultural back-
ground) and so decline to form a judgment about p. This is not possible if to 
intuit that p is to believe that p. Moreover, intuitions have a different phenom-
enology than do beliefs – they have a psychologically insisting quality to them 
that “pushes” us towards believing in their contents. This is difficult to make 
sense of if intuitions are beliefs.  
Why believe that having a moral intuition that p gives me defeasible reason 
to believe that p – that moral intuitions are, in the terminology that I employ, 
epistemically significant? To begin with, moral intuitions are seemings, and 
seemings include mental states such as: 
 
(1) It seems to me that a cat stands outside my window. 
(2) It seems to me that the dish contains chili. 
(3) It seems to me that two plus two equals four. 
 
All of (1)-(3) constitute the same type of mental state – that is, one of a prop-
osition appearing or seeming to be true. While (1) and (2) are not what we 
typically would call intuitions, (3) is a clear example of an intuition – more 
precisely, a mathematical intuition. In general, intuitions appear to be a kind 
of intellectual seemings which contrast with perceptual seemings like (1) and 
(2). On this account, intuitions constitute a proper subset of seemings: every 
intuition is a seeming, but some seemings are not intuitions. 
A first argument for why moral intuitions are epistemically significant 
leans directly on a comparison between them and other seemings. The argu-
ment goes as follows. Seemings such as (1)-(3) are clearly epistemically sig-
nificant. If it seems to me that the dish contains chili, in the context of tasting 
the dish, then that seeming gives me defeasible reason to believe that it does 
                               
92 Bealer (1998), pp. 208-210, Huemer (2008), p. 99, and Pust (2017). 
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contain chili. Next, presumably the best explanation as to why seemings like 
(1)-(3) are epistemically significant is that they are seemings: that they are 
mental states with the same psychologically insisting quality to them, one 
which pushes us towards believing in their contents. For example, that a cat 
seems to stand outside my window justifies the corresponding belief in virtue 
of how it just seems to me that there stands a cat in that location. Similarly, 
that two plus two seems to equal four justifies the corresponding belief in vir-
tue of how it just seems to me that two plus two equals four. While it is possi-
ble that only some such seemings are epistemically significant and that others 
are not, it is difficult to explain what criteria would rule in only some seemings 
as epistemically significant. For example, it cannot be that all epistemically 
significant seemings have a perceptual basis, as (3) lacks such a basis, yet is 
epistemically significant. So, the argument goes, we should conclude that 
seemings in general are epistemically significant. Because moral intuitions are 
seemings, they are also epistemically significant. 
A second argument for why moral intuitions are epistemically significant 
draws on a comparison to other philosophical intuitions. Why do I have reason 
to believe that, whenever it seems to me that a cat stands outside the window, 
this seeming gives me reason to believe that a cat stands outside my window? 
Presumably, because it seems that the intuition gives me such a reason. But 
this is an appeal to an epistemic philosophical intuition. Or consider what rea-
son we have to believe that there cannot exist quadratic triangles. In this case, 
we refer to an ontological philosophical intuition that it seems like there can-
not exist any such objects. Both epistemic and ontological philosophical intu-
itions – philosophical because they have philosophical propositions as their 
subject matters – are clearly epistemically significant. Therefore, we should 
expect moral intuitions to be epistemically significant as well, because they 
are also philosophical intuitions.93 
Recall that the claim that moral intuitions are epistemically significant is a 
fairly weak one. As I defined the notion of epistemic significance earlier in 
this chapter, that a moral intuition is epistemically significant means only that 
it defeasibly gives the intuiter a reason to believe in its content, such as to 
believe that giving to a charity is right. This claim is compatible with the ep-
istemic status of moral intuitions being undermined in various ways, and their 
not giving us any actual reason for belief. 
In what follows, I assume not only that moral intuitions are morally signif-
icant, but that moral intuitions in general are not undermined. In other words, 
I assume that global skepticism about moral intuitions is false – where global 
skepticism could arise either because no moral intuition is epistemically sig-
nificant, or because all moral intuitions are undermined. I will not attempt to 
argue for this view in this book, but will assume it for dialectical reasons. If 
                               
93 This type of argument could be challenged if intuitions are produced by sufficiently hetero-
geneous processes. See Nado (2014). 
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moral intuitions never give us any reasons for belief in their content, then no 
intuitive objection to utilitarianism works. But utilitarians cannot help them-
selves to this defense, because by appealing to global skepticism, the utilitar-
ian will at the same time lose most or all positive support for her theory. 
Simply put, the positive case for utilitarianism relies heavily on theoretical 
moral intuitions, including the intuitive plausibility of the utilitarian theory 
itself, and on evaluative intuitions such that pleasure is good and that pain is 
bad. The case for utilitarianism also relies on moral intuitions about particular 
cases, such as how to deal with emergencies, the correct prioritization of re-
sources, and the permissibility of medical triage under some circumstances. 
For the above reasons, I will assume that the following are the rules of the 
game. In defending their theory, utilitarians can give us reason to distrust spe-
cific moral intuitions that conflict with utilitarianism. However, they may not 
let such arguments lead us to distrust all moral intuitions, or to in other ways 
undermine the positive case for utilitarianism. In other words, utilitarianism 
must defend their theory while surviving this defensive ordeal intact, with sub-
stantial remaining positive support. A utilitarian’s defense against intuitive 
objections must therefore be surgical in nature: she must find a way to handle 
the troublesome intuitions while retaining enough intuitive support. The argu-
ments that I discuss in the rest of this book are all attempts at such a defense. 
4.3 Three Intuitive Objections 
To narrow the focus of my discussion, I will only consider moral intuitions 
about particular acts. These particular moral intuitions must be distinguished 
from generic moral intuitions, which have as their contents generic statements 
such as “torture is wrong” and “it is right to take care of your family.” Because 
“torture is wrong” is a generic statement, it is compatible with various partic-
ular acts of torture being right or obligatory, like how the generic statement 
“lasagna is tasty” is compatible with specific dishes of lasagna not being tasty. 
That lasagna is tasty means only that typically or in general lasagna is tasty, 
or that paradigmatic examples of lasagna are tasty. Similarly, that torture is 
wrong means only that typically or in general torture is wrong, or that para-
digmatic examples of torture is wrong. As a result, even if we have the generic 
moral intuition that torture is wrong, and even if we learn that a specific act of 
torture is right according to utilitarianism, we have not thereby identified a 
conflict between the intuition and utilitarianism. Instead, to get a conflict be-
tween the intuition and the theory, we need to establish that if utilitarianism is 
true, then torture is not typically or in general wrong. This is difficult, in part 
because the truth conditions of “torture is wrong” are less transparent to us 
than the truth conditions of “the act of torturing person P at the time T is 
wrong”. That being said, while I will focus on particular moral intuitions, I do 
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not thereby deny that generic moral intuitions are relevant for evaluating util-
itarianism. For example, suppose that the generic statement “it is wrong to not 
pay your taxes” is intuitively true. Moreover, suppose that utilitarianism im-
plies that it is obligatory to not pay your taxes under a wide range of circum-
stances, including many paradigmatic and typical cases. For example, perhaps 
you should in such cases refrain from paying your taxes and instead give the 
money to animal charities. Under these circumstances, the truth of utilitarian-
ism may imply that the generic statement “it is wrong to not pay your taxes” 
is false, and imply that the generic statement “it is obligatory to not pay your 
taxes” is true. In this case, the intuition that it is wrong to not pay your taxes 
will give one reason to believe that utilitarianism is false. The reason that I 
focus on particular moral intuitions is therefore not that they provide the only 
way of arguing for or against utilitarianism, but that they provide an easy and 
straightforward way to construct strong intuitive objections to the theory. 
Setting aside generic moral intuitions, there are two ways in which utilitar-
ianism can conflict with particular moral intuitions. First, utilitarianism can 
conflict with the intuited deontic status of acts – let us call these intuitions 
deontic particular moral intuitions. Second, utilitarianism can conflict with the 
intuited explanation of why acts have that deontic status – let us call these 
intuitions explanatory particular moral intuitions. For an example of the latter 
conflict, suppose that giving my child food produces the most pleasure minus 
pain, and suppose that my moral intuitions agree with utilitarianism that giv-
ing my child food is obligatory. Even so, there can be a conflict between my 
intuitions and utilitarianism about why feeding my child is obligatory. Intui-
tively, it may seem that “giving my child food produces the most pleasure 
minus pain of any alternative acts available to me” does not explain why giv-
ing my child food is obligatory (this is an example of an explanatory particular 
moral intuition). However, in that case utilitarianism must be false, since it 
gives precisely this (incorrect) explanation. In other words, utilitarianism can 
be false not only by having incorrect implications for which acts are right, 
wrong, or obligatory; but also by giving incorrect explanations as to why acts 
are right, wrong, or obligatory. Now, one reason to focus here on the deontic 
particular moral intuitions, rather than on the explanatory particular moral in-
tuitions, is that the former are typically stronger. Moreover, when we consider 
how utilitarianism conflicts with deontic particular moral intuitions, we get 
the conflicts with the explanatory particular moral intuitions for free. If utili-
tarianism does not have the correct implication in a case, then it cannot give 
the correct explanation either. That is, if utilitarianism does not even imply 
that giving my child food is obligatory, then neither can it explain it being 
obligatory. 
Figure 2 summarizes the distinctions between different kinds of intuitions 
which have been introduced in this section: 
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Figure 2. Kinds of intuitions 
Now, when focusing on the deontic particular moral intuitions (which I will 
henceforth refer to simply as moral intuitions), note that intuitive objections 
to utilitarianism can be represented by the following general schema: 
 
(P1) If utilitarianism is true, then the act A has the deontic status D. 
(P2) A does not have D. 
(C) Therefore, utilitarianism is false. 
 
An important question is how to support the premises of such an argument. 
While we can support premise (P2) by appealing to our moral intuitions, it is 
less obvious how to support premise (P1).94 The problem is that if A is an act 
in a real world scenario, and D is either the deontic status of rightness or ob-
ligatoriness, then we have little reason to believe that (P1) is true in such an 
argument. As I note in Chapter 2, the future consequences of our acts are al-
most completely hidden from us. So we have barely any clue as to which acts 
are right or obligatory according to utilitarianism in real world scenarios. And 
we cannot support (P1) by an appeal to intuition – to how it seems that, if 
utilitarianism is true, then A has D. For such intuitions to be reliable, they 
would have to be sensitive to complex empirical facts about the far future, 
which they are not. Finally, note that what I just said is true even if utilitari-
anism is false because, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, everyone must 
accept that the long-term consequences of our acts matter for rightness and 
obligatoriness to at least some degree. 
When intuitive objections concern the wrongness of acts rather than their 
rightness or obligatoriness, it is far easier to support premise (P1). Almost 
every act is wrong according to utilitarianism, since there are so many subop-
timal acts available to us at any given moment. Therefore, we have significant 
reason to believe of any act that it is wrong according to utilitarianism. As I 
pointed out earlier, this is similar to a lottery where only one of a thousand 
                               
94 Cf. Tersman (1991); (1993), pp. 122-123. 
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tickets will win; in such a case, I have significant reason to believe of any 
ticket that it will not win. This fact has peculiar consequences for the evalua-
tion of utilitarianism. While utilitarianism will for this reason have incorrect 
implications in all cases where intuitively acts are right or obligatory, it will 
also have the correct implications in all cases where intuitively acts are wrong 
(since again, for any act about a real world case that we consider, we have 
significant reason to believe that it is wrong according to utilitarianism). Here 
it is difficult to see whether it is the objector to or the defender of utilitarianism 
who has the upper hand. In what follows, I therefore focus exclusively on 
cases where we can avoid these blanket judgments about rightness and wrong-
ness. As a result, I discuss only imagined cases, considered by means of 
thought experimentation. In imagined cases, we can stipulate that acts have 
certain features, such as to maximize pleasure minus pain, and so avoid the 
above complications. When thought experimenting we can therefore, at least 
on the face of it, justifiably believe premise (P1) in intuitive objections to util-
itarianism, which leaves us free to evaluate the intuitive support for premise 
(P2). 
With these lengthy introductory remarks out of the way, let me now present 
three imagined cases together with the corresponding intuitive objections to 
utilitarianism. I will return to these cases and objections in the discussion that 
follows. 
 
EXPERIENCE MACHINE 
 
William has the chance to plug into an experience machine. If he plugs 
in, he will be extremely well off in terms of pleasure minus pain. He 
will have these experiences for the rest of his life. Therefore, plugging 
in produces the most pleasure minus pain of any act available to him.95  
 
The experience machine objection goes as follows: If utilitarianism is true, 
then it is morally obligatory for William to plug into the machine. But intui-
tively, it is not morally obligatory for William to plug in. At the very least, 
William is morally permitted to not plug in, even if he is also morally permit-
ted to plug in. Therefore, utilitarianism is false. 
 
TRANSPLANT 
 
Six patients lie sedated in their beds. Sarah can maximize pleasure mi-
nus pain by killing patient Six and use her organs to save the lives of 
                               
95 Nozick originally presented such a case when objecting to hedonism as a theory of value. See 
Nozick ([1974] 2012), pp. 42-45. Here, I employ a similar case, but present it as an objection 
to utilitarianism. 
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the other five patients. If she does not kill patient Six, the other five 
patients will die, and Sarah will produce a less than optimal amount of 
pleasure minus pain.96 
 
The transplant objection goes as follows: If utilitarianism is true, then it is 
obligatory for Sarah to kill patient Six and transplant the organs. But intui-
tively, it is not morally obligatory for Sarah to kill patient Six. At the very 
least, she is morally permitted to not kill patient Six. Therefore, utilitarianism 
is false. 
 
UTILITY MONSTER 
 
Tim has resources available to him that can either help a thousand indi-
vidual humans feel some amount of pleasure or help a non-human crea-
ture feel much more pleasure. Tim will maximize pleasure minus pain 
if and only if he gives the creature all of his resources.97 
 
The utility monster objection goes as follows: If utilitarianism is true, then it 
is obligatory for Tim to give the non-human creature all of his resources. But 
intuitively, it is not morally obligatory for Tim to do so. At the very least, it is 
morally permissible for him to distribute the resources among the thousand 
individual humans instead. Therefore, utilitarianism is false. 
Taken together, these three objections represent a broad group of intuitive 
objections that are employed against utilitarianism. Each objection works by 
exploiting a particular objectionable quality of utilitarianism. The experience 
machine objection exploits utilitarianism’s exclusive focus on pleasures and 
pains – that it is only how we feel and not how we live that matters according 
to the theory. Second, the transplant objection exploits that there is no princi-
pled ban on violence and killing according to utilitarianism – that it finds no 
inherent problem with killing a person to save the lives of others; that the ends 
always justify the means. Third, the utility monster objection exploits how 
according to utilitarianism the distribution of pleasure and pain among indi-
viduals does not matter – that it is only the total amount of pleasure minus 
pain that matters. 
How can utilitarians respond to these objections – and, by extension, to 
other intuitive objections as well? First, the utilitarian can argue that even if 
the moral intuitions do give us reason to believe in their content, they do not 
give us reason to believe that utilitarianism is false. I examine such strategies 
in Section 4.4 and Chapter 5. Second, the utilitarian can argue that the relevant 
moral intuitions do not even give us reason to believe in their content. I will 
                               
96 The case was first discussed by Thomson (1976), p. 206. Transplant shares all or most im-
portant features with the so-called “footbridge” trolley cases. 
97 The case is due to Nozick ([1974] 2012), p. 41. 
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examine such strategies in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Third, the utilitarian can argue 
that while the moral intuitions give us some reason to reject utilitarianism, 
utilitarianism can be successfully defended by an appeal to other more trust-
worthy intuitions. Such a defense is the topic for Chapter 6.  
4.4 Scope Restriction 
Moral theories can be thought of as moral laws, holding over a wide range of 
circumstances. For example, a moral theory has a wide geographical reach: if 
a moral theory is true, then it is not only true in Sweden, but also in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and every other country on Earth. Conversely, if the 
moral theory is false in any country, it is also false in Sweden. Similarly, a 
moral theory is commonly thought to have a wide modal reach: if a moral 
theory is true, then it is true not only in the actual world, but also in many 
merely possible worlds, or alternative ways in which reality could be like. 
Conversely, if a moral theory is shown to be false in such a possible world, it 
must also be false in the actual world. This explains why there is no principled 
problem with evaluating moral theories merely by considering our moral in-
tuitions about imaginary circumstances. 
The above points suggest a way of defending utilitarianism against intuitive 
objections, which we may name scope restriction. Say that the “scope” of a 
moral theory is the set of possible worlds in which a moral theory is true if it 
is true in the actual world. For the intuitive objections that I mentioned earlier 
to be successful, the scope of moral theories must extend to the imagined cases 
of Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. Therefore, to defend 
utilitarianism against these objections, we need only to show that the scope of 
moral theories fails to extend to these scenarios, in which case our moral in-
tuitions about these cases become irrelevant to the evaluation of utilitarianism. 
That is, even if utilitarianism does in such a case conflict with our moral intu-
itions about these cases, we still could not draw upon these conflicts to argue 
that utilitarianism is false. It would be like arguing against the laws of nature 
in the actual world – like the second law of thermodynamics – by demonstrat-
ing that they fail to hold in the world of The Lord of the Rings.98 The proper 
response to such an argument is straightforward. The laws of nature are re-
stricted in scope, and their scope does not extend to imaginary worlds like The 
Lord of the Rings. Similarly, the utilitarian could argue that the moral laws are 
restricted in scope, and that their scope does not extend to cases like Experi-
ence Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. Therefore, whether or not our 
                               
98 Presumably, most uses of magic, even the more subtle kind used by Gandalf and the other 
Maia, enables the magician to decrease entropy in isolated systems, rendering the second law 
of thermodynamics false. 
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intuitions about such imaginary circumstances are to be counted on, they pro-
vide no evidence against utilitarianism. 
The problem is that, to restrict the scope of moral theories, we must deny a 
standard philosophical view. This is the view that the scope of moral theories 
is all and only the metaphysically possible worlds. Because the worlds of Ex-
perience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster are metaphysically possi-
ble, they will fall within the scope of moral theories according to the standard 
view. There are various rationales for why the scope of moral theories would 
extend this far in modal space. For example, perhaps the scope of philosophi-
cal laws in general, such as theories about personal identity, knowledge, and 
reference, extend to these worlds. Since moral theories are philosophical laws 
in this sense, they share this scope. But plausible objections have also been 
offered against the standard view.99 For the utilitarian’s argument to get going, 
I will simply assume that we can reject the standard view, and focus on how 
the utilitarian could take her argument from there. As we shall see, even when 
granting this controversial assumption, it is difficult to make the utilitarian 
defense against intuitive objections work. 
Even when we refute the standard view of scope restriction, much work 
remains before we have an adequate defense of utilitarianism in hand. To 
begin with, we need to argue for a plausible alternative restriction of scope. 
Moreover, we need to show that this alternative restriction nets positive results 
for the plausibility of utilitarianism. For example, it is not helpful to the utili-
tarian theory to get rid of cases like Experience Machine, Transplant, and Util-
ity Monster, if we also get rid of imagined cases that are used to support the 
theory. 
One salient possibility is to limit the scope of moral theories to the nomo-
logically possible worlds – i.e., the worlds that share the laws of nature with 
the actual world. However, there are numerous problems with such a proposal. 
For one thing, it would be surprising if the moral laws exactly match the laws 
of nature, because what could account for this overlap? Moreover, we can 
easily conceive of nomologically impossible worlds that should intuitively be 
included in the scope of moral theories. For example, consider a world which 
is exactly like ours, but where a small miracle occurs whenever a bird flaps its 
wings, giving it slightly more lift and so violating the laws of nature. Surely 
this world should not be excluded from the scope of moral theories for such a 
trivial reason. If utilitarianism is true in the actual world, then it is true in this 
“small miracle”-world as well. So the correct scope restriction seems unlikely 
to be purely nomological in this way. 
Furthermore, even if a nomological scope restriction is plausible, it is not 
clear that utilitarianism will benefit from such a restriction. First, the cases of 
                               
99 For arguments against strong supervenience for moral claims, see Tännsjö (2010), pp. 47-50, 
Hattiangadi (2018), and Rosen (Unpublished manuscript). 
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Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster are nomologically pos-
sible, at least with minor unimportant modifications to these cases. Second, 
there are counterpart cases to Experience Machine, Transplant and Utility 
Monster that are clearly nomologically possible, yet which elicit nearly as 
strong moral intuitions. For example, we can substitute the experience ma-
chine for drugs, entertainment, virtual reality, or being lied to by loved ones, 
all of which make similar “inauthentic” pleasures and pains possible. The 
transplantation can be changed for a “footbridge” where to maximize pleasure 
minus pain we must push a man from a bridge in front of a train to save the 
lives of five others (i.e., one of the classic trolley cases). Finally, Utility Mon-
ster can be changed for a version of the “repugnant conclusion” thought ex-
periment, where to maximize pleasure minus pain we must cause a billion 
people with slightly above zero in well-being to exist, rather than causing a 
thousand people with a moderately comfortable lifestyle to exist. In these 
cases we have nearly as strong anti-utilitarian intuitions, and these cases are 
also clearly nomologically possible. 
Instead of tying the scope of moral theories to metaphysical or nomological 
necessity, we could tie it to a sui generis type of necessity, such as normative 
or moral necessity.100 But this move leads to another issue. The description of 
Experience Machine is compatible with – that is, the case can be “situated in” 
– any of several possible worlds. Therefore, it is not correct to think of a 
thought experiment as being a possible world; rather, a thought experiment is 
better thought of as being compatible with various possible worlds. While 
some possible worlds in which we can situate Experience Machine may be 
morally impossible, what we need to defend utilitarianism is a significantly 
more ambitious claim: that all of them are morally impossible. Why is this so? 
When we perform thought experiments, we look to the closest possible worlds 
in which a described case is true. This is the possible world that differs the 
least from the actual world. And even if there is only one possible world for 
which the description of Experience Machine is true and that is also morally 
possible, then we are likely to imagine precisely this world when conducting 
the thought experiment, simply because it shares its moral laws with the actual 
world (and so does not differ from the actual world in this respect). But it 
seems unlikely that there is not a single morally possible world in which Ex-
perience Machine can be situated. So restricting the scope of moral theories 
to the worlds that are normatively or morally possible seems unlikely to help 
the utilitarian. 
A different kind of scope restriction restricts the scope of moral theories, 
not to a particular set of possible worlds, but to a particular set of choice situ-
ations. For example, we might think that the scope of moral theories extends 
only to familiar or commonly encountered choice situations, as opposed to 
                               
100 For example, Rosen (Unpublished manuscript) has argued that moral principles hold with 
normative necessity rather than metaphysical necessity. 
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unfamiliar or unusual ones. Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility 
Monster – as well as their realistic counterparts mentioned earlier – all have 
one feature in common: they are unusual cases. So this kind of scope re-
striction, it seems, would nicely exclude these cases from consideration. Of 
course, it is a fairly odd view about scope restriction to hold in the first place, 
as it is not clear what arguments could be given in its favor. 
In any case, even if this type of non-modal scope restriction would be rea-
sonable, this “familiar circumstances” defense of utilitarianism faces the fol-
lowing problem. In what way are the circumstances thought to be familiar? 
One possibility is that we require choice situations to be societally, culturally, 
biologically, or technologically familiar. But why would these features of 
choice situations decide the scope of moral theories? It seems that the famili-
arity involved must be of a distinctively moral kind. But Experience Machine, 
Transplant, and Utility Monster involve quite familiar moral issues: how to 
value pleasure and pain had from living a real or authentic life, how to deter-
mine whether violence or killing are permissible means to help others, and 
how to prioritize the well-being of different people. These cases are merely 
clad in a fantastic or unusual attire to strengthen our moral intuitions. So it 
seems that this proposal results either in an implausible view of scope re-
striction, or that it fails to properly exclude cases like Experience Machine, 
Transplant, and Utility Monster. 
Moreover, in this section I have focused on difficulties for excluding cases 
from the scope of moral theories. But even if we get this far, and do success-
fully exclude cases like Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster, 
we must also take care not to jettison cases that elicit utilitarian friendly intu-
itions. For example, consider a case of medical triage, where a doctor must 
choose between using her resources to save one person or save five people 
(the death of the one is not a means for saving the five). In this case, our moral 
intuitions strongly match the utilitarian verdict: the doctor should save the 
five. But if Transplant is excluded from consideration because it is unusual, 
then surely the case of medical triage is excluded as well, since it too is unu-
sual. 
I admit that the above arguments are not conclusive, but at least they sug-
gest that scope restriction is a difficult path to take for the utilitarian. There is 
no clear and easy approach that will let us defend utilitarianism by excluding 
the imagined cases that I have considered. The strategies that I discuss in what 
remains of the book are less ambitious. If the strategy of scope restriction is a 
metaphysical strategy, which defends utilitarianism by arguing that moral re-
ality is in a certain way, then the rest of the strategies that I will consider are 
epistemic strategies, in that they let us defend utilitarianism by arguing that 
our epistemic position or abilities are in a certain way. 
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4.5 Debunking Arguments 
I will now consider another type of strategy for defending utilitarianism: 
namely that of so-called debunking arguments. But before I begin, let me say 
something about the terminology that I employ. I have stipulated that a moral 
intuition is epistemically significant if and only if it gives the intuiter defeasi-
ble reason to believe in its content. I have also assumed that moral intuitions 
are epistemically significant in this way. Now, as I pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, even when an intuition is epistemically significant it may still lack 
justificatory force. That is, that a moral intuition is epistemically significant 
means only that it gives the intuiter a defeasible reason to believe in its con-
tent. To refer to moral intuitions whose justification is not in such ways “de-
feated,” let us say that a moral intuition is epistemically trustworthy if and 
only if it actually gives the intuiter reason to believe in its content. While I 
have assumed that all moral intuitions are epistemically significant, I have left 
it open which moral intuitions are epistemically trustworthy. Although utili-
tarians cannot argue that no moral intuition is epistemically trustworthy – per 
the rules of the game mentioned earlier – utilitarians could still argue that some 
intuitions are not trustworthy and therefore pose no problem for utilitarianism. 
The strategy considered in this section constitutes one such argument.  
Joshua Greene and Peter Singer have argued that we have evolved emo-
tional responses to violence and that this renders some of our moral intuitions 
untrustworthy.101 In their arguments, Greene and Singer try to debunk anti-
utilitarian intuitions, by pointing to their suspect evolutionary or psychologi-
cal origins. Singer writes that: 
 
For most of our evolutionary history, human beings have lived in small groups, 
and the same is almost certainly true of our pre-human primate and social 
mammal ancestors. In these groups, violence could only be inflicted in an up-
close and personal way – by hitting, pushing, strangling, or using a stick or 
stone as a club. To deal with such situations, we have developed immediate, 
emotionally based responses to questions involving close, personal interac-
tions with others.102 
 
Greene gives a more detailed account of these emotionally based responses: 
 
First, this automatic setting responds more to harm caused as a means to an 
end (or as an end), rather than as a side effect […] Second, it responds more to 
harm caused actively, rather than passively. […] [T]hird, it responds more to 
harm caused directly by personal force, rather than more indirectly. [...] Put-
ting these three features together, it seems that our alarm gizmo responds to 
                               
101 See Singer (2005) and Greene (2013), and especially Greene’s remarks on pages 264, 274 
and 328. For criticism of Singer and Greene, see Tersman (2008), Sandberg and Juth (2010), 
and Meyers (2015). 
102 Singer (2005), pp. 347-348. 
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actions that are prototypically violent – things like hitting, slapping, punching, 
beating with a club, and, of course, pushing.103 
 
Here is how the above argument could apply to one of the cases that I consid-
ered earlier. In Transplant, Sarah has the option to kill a patient so that she can 
use the patient’s organs to save the lives of five other patients. When contem-
plating whether Sarah should perform this act, its description triggers what 
Greene calls our “alarm gizmo” because the action is “prototypically violent.” 
As a consequence, we intuit that it would be wrong for Sarah to kill the patient 
– let’s call this the “do not kill” intuition. The argument is that because of its 
evolutionary and psychological origin, the “do not kill” intuition is untrust-
worthy. 
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that Singer and Greene get the 
evolutionary background and the psychological details of the “alarm gizmo” 
right. Even so, giving an account of why we have the “do not kill” intuition 
does not by itself render this intuition untrustworthy. For example, an evolu-
tionary or psychological explanation for why I see colors does not by itself 
make my color perceptions untrustworthy; similarly, an evolutionary or psy-
chological explanation for why I have moral intuitions does not by itself make 
these intuitions untrustworthy. 
Here it is important to see that the utilitarian debunker is a selective de-
bunker.104 The selective debunker tries to get rid of only some moral intuitions, 
while the global debunker tries to get rid of all moral intuitions. That the util-
itarian is a selective debunker makes it difficult for her to employ a strategy 
sometimes favored by global debunkers in meta-ethics. A global debunker can 
argue that it is a remarkable coincidence if the evolutionary advantageous 
moral intuitions track truth. This fact supposedly supports that the intuitions 
do not in fact track truth, because it would be too unlikely for them to do so. 
Whatever its ultimate merits, such a global debunking argument is not readily 
available to the utilitarian debunker. Recall that the utilitarian debunker has 
already accepted that many moral intuitions are trustworthy, in particular 
those supporting utilitarianism, and many of these trustworthy intuitions 
clearly have evolutionary explanations as well. Therefore, the utilitarian must 
accept that there are many epistemically trustworthy intuitions that have evo-
lutionary explanations. But in that case, it is neither unlikely nor surprising 
that a moral intuition such as the “do not kill” intuition is both explained by 
evolutionary facts and is epistemically trustworthy. 
Another approach is to appeal to the moral relevance or salience of acts. 
For example, Singer asks: 
                               
103 Greene (2013), pp. 246-247. 
104 For discussion of debunking arguments targeting moral realism, see Street (2006), Enoch 
(2010), and Kahane (2011). 
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[W]hat is the moral salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a way that 
was possible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became possible 
only two hundred years ago? I would answer: none.105 
 
Singer’s idea is that there is nothing morally special about prototypical vio-
lence. Since moral intuitions produced by means of what Greene calls our 
“alarm gizmo” identify as wrong precisely acts of prototypical violence, the 
argument goes, we should not trust intuitions produced by this mechanism. It 
does not track something morally relevant. But to support this claim about 
moral relevance or salience, Singer must also make an appeal to intuitions: 
that there seems to be nothing special about prototypical violence. And this 
intuition is probably not widely shared, as many non-utilitarians surely feel 
that there is a clear difference between prototypical and non-prototypical vio-
lence. For example, there is intuitively a moral difference between hitting a 
man with a club in the head than it is to either shout at him – even if the out-
come in both cases is a terrible headache. Even utilitarians like myself will 
agree that there seems to be a difference between these cases – it is just that 
we for theoretical reasons do not believe that there is such a difference. 
For similar reasons, it does not help to show that the utilitarian friendly 
intuitions are the “products of reason” and that the utilitarian unfriendly ones 
are the “products of emotion,” for it is far from clear whether we should trust 
reason-based intuitions any more or less than emotion-based ones. Moreover, 
many intuitions such that “pleasure is good” and that “pain is bad” do not seem 
to be products of reason, but have a similar emotional character as intuitions 
about prototypical violence. While I do not know whether these intuitions 
have similar psychological origins to those about prototypical violence, at 
least they arise intensely and suddenly in the same way. 
In conclusion, what the utilitarian needs is a specific account of how moral 
intuitions are formed and why some of them are trustworthy and some are not. 
That is, we need to say something about the underlying mechanisms behind 
intuition formation. Having done that, the utilitarian can argue that our moral 
intuitions about cases such as Experience Machine, Transplant and Utility 
Monster fail to become epistemically trustworthy through this process, alt-
hough moral intuitions which are more friendly to utilitarianism remain trust-
worthy. Let us now turn to one such attempt at defending utilitarianism, which 
appeals to our non-conscious application of moral theories. 
                               
105 Singer (2005), pp. 348. 
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4.6 Non-conscious Application 
The argument that I discuss later in this section focuses on the unusual char-
acter of cases like Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster, and 
how this might affect the epistemic trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. To 
many, the use of such cases in ethics is annoying and unserious. But it is dif-
ficult to explain why their use would be problematic. As I have noted earlier 
in Section 4.4, the standard view is that moral theories hold by metaphysical 
necessity, which means that their scope extends even to unusual cases like 
Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. But if that is the case 
then, everything else being equal, we should be able to test moral theories like 
utilitarianism against our moral intuitions about these cases. 
Consider then a natural idea: that our intuition forming abilities simply 
function badly when we consider unusual cases, and that the resulting moral 
intuitions are therefore epistemically untrustworthy. For example, Richard 
Hare says that: 
 
[People’s] intuitions are the product of their moral upbringings […] and, how-
ever good these may have been, they were designed to prepare them to deal 
with moral situations which are likely to be encountered […] there is no guar-
antee at all that they will be appropriate to unusual cases. Even in the unusual 
cases, no doubt, the usual moral feelings will be in evidence; but they provide 
no argument.106 
 
And Robert Goodin writes that: 
 
What those counterexamples do – all that they do – is to conjure up a situation 
in which doing the utility-maximizing thing would lead to intuitively unap-
pealing results. The circumstances they depict, however, are very far from 
those to which our standard intuitions are standardly shaped. (They involve 
things like promises to dying friends on otherwise unpopulated desert islands 
and “super efficient pleasure machines” and such like.) Precisely because of 
that, we may well decide that it is our intuitions rather than the prescriptions 
of our utilitarian moral theory that ought to be readjusted in such unusual cir-
cumstances.107 
Hare refers to our moral upbringings and Goodin refers to how our intuitions 
are “standardly shaped.” In both cases, the idea is that our moral intuitions are 
epistemically trustworthy only if they are formed on the basis of common, as 
opposed to unusual, cases. What makes the cases that I have considered in this 
chapter unusual? Presumably, they are unusual because they include experi-
ence machines, perfect transplant procedures, methods for keeping killings in 
the healthcare system a secret, and alien creatures with a strange psychology. 
These are not things that we encounter in everyday situations. 
                               
106 Hare (1981), pp. 131-132. 
107 Goodin (1995), p. 6. 
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Now, since we are assuming that moral intuitions are not in general untrust-
worthy, we need to explain what makes these intuitions – intuitions formed on 
the basis of unusual cases – untrustworthy, while many other moral intuitions 
remain trustworthy. Two types of arguments suggest themselves. First, we can 
argue that the problem is a lack of training. Just as a doctor requires extensive 
experience to have proper medical intuitions, a philosopher would require ex-
tensive experience with imagined cases to have trustworthy moral intuitions. 
But the problem is that philosophers do seem to have extensive experience 
with cases like those of Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster 
– they encounter these cases all the time: in the seminar room, in writing, and 
in discussion. And despite this massive experience with thinking and reason-
ing about these cases, for the most part philosophers have not changed their 
moral intuitions about the cases, and many still have moral intuitions that con-
flict with utilitarianism. So this “training” version of the defense is unlikely to 
help utilitarianism. 
Second, and more promising, we could argue that the problem is not a lack 
of experience on behalf of the intuiter, but some feature built into our intuition 
forming processes. In what remains of this section, I will evaluate one such 
proposal, namely James Wood Bailey’s inferential view of intuition for-
mation, on which moral intuitions are formed by means of the non-conscious 
application of moral theories.108 According to this view, when we form moral 
intuitions: 
 
[W]e are engaged in a sub- or semiconscious act of applying some set of prin-
ciples – along with a large amount of empirical knowledge […] The view that 
moral intuitions are a process of using tacit knowledge in conjunction with 
moral principles is not embarrassing at all. Not only does this make the phe-
nomenon of moral intuition similar to that of intuition as studied by psycholo-
gists, but it also gives a perfectly mundane account of the phenomenon of con-
flicts between the intuitions of different persons. […] It may in fact be the case 
that if utilitarians reason by using the same general tacit knowledge that the 
intuition holder uses sub- or semiconsciously, they will not conclude that we 
should do such-and-such. And thus like M. Jourdain, who had been speaking 
prose all his life without knowing it, our intuitions could well be fundamentally 
utilitarian without our really being aware of this fact. 
 
For present purposes, some qualifications are needed to transform Bailey’s 
idea into a working defense of utilitarianism. First, we need to assume that the 
theory which is being non-consciously (I employ this term rather than those 
of “sub-consciously” and “semi-consciously”) applied is true or at least has 
correct implications in most cases; if not, we will land in a general skepticism 
about moral intuitions. That is, if the non-consciously applied theory is false, 
then no moral intuition will give us reason to believe in its content, because 
                               
108 Bailey (1997), pp. 34-37. See also Eggleston’s (2010) discussion about “practical equilib-
rium.” 
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our moral intuitions will just reflect (i.e. be the result of the application of) 
that false theory. Second, it seems more reasonable to think that we non-con-
sciously apply the empirical statements that we tacitly believe to be true, rather 
than those that we know are true. For example, if I am wrong about some as-
pect of the world, but still believe that the world is in such a way, then that 
will surely not stop me from applying the empirical belief non-consciously. 
Third, we should assume that the empirical knowledge that is drawn upon is 
about the real world and not about imagined cases. To coin a term, let us call 
this modified version of Bailey’s view the qualified inferential view. 
The qualified inferential view suggests the following way of defending util-
itarianism.109 Consider Experience Machine. If the qualified inferential view 
about intuition formation is correct, and if utilitarianism is true, then our moral 
intuitions about Experience Machine are generated by non-consciously apply-
ing utilitarianism, together with our tacit empirical beliefs about the real 
world, to the case. Plausibly, the tacit empirical beliefs that we will draw upon 
include (a) that experience machines, like other machines, are prone to failure 
and (b) that the pleasure we gain from entertainment in the machine is not 
outweighed by the good we can do in the world outside of it, for example, by 
working to alleviate poverty. On the basis of utilitarianism and these tacitly 
held empirical beliefs, we will form the moral intuition that it is permissible 
not to connect to the machine – and we will do this even if we have stipulated 
that connecting to the machine maximizes pleasure minus pain. This means 
that the moral intuition does not give us any reason to believe that utilitarian-
ism is false, because we would intuit that it is permissible to not connect to the 
machine even if utilitarianism is true. 
However, the above defense of utilitarianism suffers from several prob-
lems. First, we typically do not believe of any acts that they maximize pleasure 
minus pain in the real world. And it is such empirical beliefs, rather than be-
liefs like (a) and (b, which are needed for the above argument to work. There-
fore, if the qualified inferential view is correct, then the truth of utilitarianism 
should lead us to generate no moral intuitions about the permissibility of not 
connecting to the machine, since there are no tacit beliefs with which the util-
itarian theory can combine to generate an intuition.110 Clearly, however, we do 
have moral intuitions about what is morally permissible in the case under con-
sideration: we have the intuition that it is permissible to not connect to the 
experience machine. It follows that utilitarianism is false, since had it been 
true, we would not have had this intuition. Therefore, contrary to expectation, 
what we get is an argument against and not in support of utilitarianism. 
                               
109 My discussion mirrors Bailey’s to some extent, although his defense of utilitarianism is more 
detailed, drawing on (among other things) assumptions from game theory. 
110 Alternatively, if we tacitly believe for every act that it fails to maximize pleasure minus pain, 
then we should expect to generate the moral intuition that it is wrong to not connect to the 
machine. 
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Second, the qualified inferential view is as such problematic. To begin 
with, it does not correctly account for how some moral intuitions are gener-
ated. For example, we have no real-world beliefs about creatures such as the 
utility monster, so if the qualified inferential view about intuition formation is 
correct, then we should expect our intuition generating apparatus to treat the 
creature either as a normal human or to ignore it altogether. However, this is 
not what happens in Utility Monster. We seem open to give the creature some 
additional moral weight due to its weird psychology; it is just that we are not 
prepared to give it the full moral weight accorded to it by utilitarianism. This 
is especially true if we imagine an alien creature that suffers immensely, more 
so than any existing creature is capable of suffering. In such a case, our moral 
intuitions seem to endorse giving significantly more resources to alleviate this 
creature’s suffering than we would to any ordinary suffering human. It is un-
clear, however, how the qualified inferential view can explain the formation 
of this intuition, since we do not have any real-world empirical beliefs about 
such an intensely suffering creature.  
In addition, the qualified inferential view seems unable to explain some 
instances of changing moral intuitions, or of changes to the strength of moral 
intuitions. After thinking for a long time about a particular thought experi-
ment, it is common to find that one’s intuitions change or weaken. But in such 
circumstances, we have typically not changed any of the relevant empirical 
beliefs about the real world. The qualified inferential view cannot account for 
such a change in intuitions or their strength, because if our empirical beliefs 
about the real world remain the same, then the generated intuitions must also 
remain the same. 
I am for the above reasons skeptical of the qualified inferential view, both 
as a way of defending utilitarianism, and as a view about how our moral intu-
itions are generated. That said, the distinction between unusual and common 
cases merits further attention. The defense of utilitarianism that I propose in 
Chapter 5 draws on this distinction, although in a novel way distinct from the 
strategies of scope restriction and non-conscious application.  
In general, I think that Hare, Goodin, and Bailey have the right idea about 
how to best defend utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Rather than, as 
Singer and Greene do, debunk the origins of our moral intuitions, we should 
investigate the underlying conditions behind intuition formation. In the next 
two chapters, I take a closer look at the conditions under which our intuitions 
are formed. In particular, I consider the role of imagination in eliciting moral 
intuitions, and in making these intuitions epistemically trustworthy. 
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5. Misimagining 
In this chapter, I argue that when we conduct thought experiments to test util-
itarianism against our moral intuitions, we sometimes unknowingly carry out 
the wrong thought experiment. In many such cases, we elicit moral intuitions 
that we believe give us reason to reject utilitarianism but that in fact do not. 
5.1 Imagining the Wrong Case 
The strategy for defending utilitarianism that I advance in this chapter differs 
from those that I discussed in the previous chapter. Earlier I considered re-
stricting the scope of utilitarianism to not extend over various thought exper-
iments. I also considered the strategies of debunking moral intuitions and pro-
posing a specific mechanism behind intuition formation, which I called the 
qualified inferential view. All these strategies share an assumption that is chal-
lenged in this chapter: that we manage to successfully carry out the thought 
experiments in the first place. I will argue that in some cases when we are 
testing utilitarianism using thought experiments, we unknowingly carry out 
the wrong thought experiment. To coin a term for this phenomenon, we misim-
agine the case – we try to imagine it, we fail to, and we imagine another case 
instead. Importantly, we sometimes misimagine a crucial aspect of a case: 
whether an act does or does not maximize pleasure minus pain. 
Because it might appear implausible that we ever misimagine cases when 
we conduct thought experiments, the rest of this section is dedicated to arguing 
that it is not strange or uncommon to think that we sometimes misimagine 
cases. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, I propose 
an explanation for why we misimagine some cases. I suggest that the cases we 
are especially prone to misimagine are those with stipulated features “unnat-
ural” to them. In Section 5.3, I conclude that each of the three cases being 
considered – Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster – are pre-
cisely cases of this kind. Each of these cases contains a stipulated feature that 
is “unnatural to” or “fits badly with” the case as it is described – namely stip-
ulations about the total amount of pleasure minus pain produced by acts. In 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5, I discuss two ways in which to prevent misimagining 
from occurring. Finally, in Section 5.6, I consider some potential objections 
to my view. 
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Similar ideas to mine can be found in the literature. For example, the argu-
ment that I discuss is related to the complaint that thought experiments are 
underdescribed – that they leave open different ways of filling out their de-
tails.111 However, the phenomenon I point to is different: We might misimag-
ine cases even if they are fully described, and we might successfully imagine 
cases even if they are wildly underdescribed. Moreover, it strikes me as odd 
to call cases like the ones I consider in this book underdescribed. For example, 
Experience Machine seems to me fully described; while its full description 
contains few details, this is because the case contains few details. As I see it, 
the focus on cases being underdescribed distracts from the real problem facing 
thought experimenters – that we may unknowingly imagine the wrong case.  
Another idea related to mine was considered in the previous chapter, 
namely that unusual cases are suspect. As I have already noted, my argument 
bears some similarity to this complaint. But my approach is subtly different: 
it finds no fault with cases as such being unusual. As I demonstrate in Sections 
5.4 and 5.5, cases may sometimes avoid the problem of being misimagined by 
being made more unusual. Sometimes, by making cases more unusual, im-
portant aspects of cases become more natural to them. Surprisingly, therefore, 
sometimes the problem is not that a case is too unrealistic, but that it is too 
realistic. 
Finally, my discussion draws on Sharon Hewitt’s discussion of hedonism 
and the experience machine, where she points out that our intuitions might fail 
to be sensitive to stipulation.112 While Hewitt does not put her argument in 
terms of us misimagining cases, our approaches have much in common. 
What would be well-established examples of misimagining cases? First, 
consider the phenomenon of imaginative resistance.113 As is well known in the 
philosophical literature, some propositions are especially difficult to imagine 
being true – they resist being imagined. For example, try to imagine that a 
sunset is horrifying, that torturing innocent people is fun, or that an episode of 
pain in your life is intrinsically good. Alternatively, we may consider the fol-
lowing case proposed by Brian Weatherson: 
 
JACK AND JILL 
 
Jack and Jill were arguing again. This was not in itself unusual, but this time 
they were standing in the fast lane of I-95 having their argument. This was 
causing traffic to bank up a bit. It wasn’t significantly worse than normally 
happened around Providence, not that you could have told that from the reac-
tions of passing motorists. They were convinced that Jack and Jill, and not the 
                               
111 For discussion of the problem of thought experiments being underdescribed, see Friedman 
(1987), pp. 200-201, Wilkes (1988), pp. 1-48, Sorensen (1992), pp. 246-24, Häggqvist (1996), 
pp. 136-159, and Wilson (2016), pp. 136-140. For a response to Wilkes, see Brooks (1994). 
112 Hewitt (2010), especially pp. 337-343.  
113 For a well-known treatment of imaginative resistance, see Gendler (2000). For a more recent 
overview, see Gendler and Liao (Forthcoming). 
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volume of traffic, were the primary causes of the slowdown. They all forgot 
how bad traffic normally is along there. When Craig saw that the cause of the 
bankup had been Jack and Jill, he took his gun out of the glovebox and shot 
them. People then started driving over their bodies, and while the new speed 
hump caused some people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to its 
normal speed. So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill should have 
taken their argument somewhere else.114 
In this case, we are stipulating that Craig did the right thing – that he did what 
was morally right to do in the situation. But we also find this difficult to im-
agine. In cases like these, either of two things might happen. First, we might 
fail to imagine any case whatsoever – our imagination simply shuts down. 
Second, we might imagine a case, but not the case that we were asked to im-
agine. For example, when trying to imagine a horrifying sunset, I might in-
stead imagine an ordinary beautiful non-horrifying sunset. This is an example 
of misimagining: I am asked to imagine a case C, but when trying to imagine 
C, I imagine a different case C*. Similarly, when I try to imagine the case of 
Jack and Jill, I will imagine a situation where it is not morally right for Craig 
to shoot them, rather than no case at all, or a case where it is morally right for 
Craig to shoot. This, again, is a case of misimagining. 
Cases of imaginative resistance exist at the extreme end of a continuum, 
and other propositions are less difficult, although still hard, to imagine. For 
example, Simon Stevin famously asked his readers to imagine a chain draped 
over a frictionless plane. The chain is easy to imagine, but it is difficult to 
imagine the plane. Any flat space that we are acquainted with exhibits some 
friction, and so performing this thought experiment taxes our imagination. 
Here it is easy to unknowingly imagine an ordinary plane with some friction, 
especially if we do not attend to the details of the case. 
Misimagining also occurs frequently when reading or listening to fiction, 
where we depend on elaborate descriptions to get the details right. If I read a 
text too fast, I often fail to imagine the case properly. I will imagine people 
looking different, wearing different clothes, possessing different motivations, 
and so on. Moreover, if I lack a complete understanding of the words used or 
concepts employed in a text, I might misimagine various parts of the case be-
ing described. Finally, in some cases, I might simply not remember the correct 
details, leading me to misimagine the case. Even if not all such instances of 
misimagination are conducted unknowingly, some clearly are. 
                               
114 Weatherson (2004), p. 1. 
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5.2 Explaining Misimagining 
What could explain that we tend to misimagine some cases, such as Jack and 
Jill, but not others? One idea is that when a feature of a case is unnatural to it, 
imagining other features of the case stops us from – or “cancels out” – imag-
ining this unnatural feature.115 That a feature is unnatural to a case means 
simply that it fits or coheres badly with the rest of the case as it is described- 
As it stands, this is a fairly shallow explanation – we will still want to know 
why our imagination strives after such coherence between the features of im-
agined cases. As such, this explanation should be compatible with a number 
of “deeper” explanations of the phenomenon of misimagination. Nevertheless, 
despite its shallowness, the explanation will be sufficient for my purposes in 
this chapter.  
The unnaturalness explanation accounts for several cases of misimagina-
tion. For example, imagining the sunset stops us from imagining it as horrible, 
because its being horrible is unnatural to the case. Similarly, imagining Jack 
and Jill arguing in the street stops us from imagining Craig’s act of killing 
them as morally permissible, because it being morally permissible is unnatural 
to the case. To say somewhat more about this proposal, let me now briefly 
introduce an account of what cases and thought experiments are, and of what 
we do when we perform thought experiments. 
To begin with, let us say that a case is a certain way the world could be 
like. Regardless of whether a case is a set of propositions, it can at least be 
represented by such a set. What we do when we describe a case using a short 
vignette – as I previously did for Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility 
Monster – is to list these propositions. Accordingly, a case is not a whole pos-
sible world – a full representation of an alternative reality – because the prop-
ositions that represent cases like Transplant are true in (i.e., “can occur in” or 
“are compatible with”) any of a number of possible worlds. 
To continue, let us say that a thought experiment is simply a case that has 
been formulated for a specific purpose: to test a hypothesis by means of think-
ing about the case. This means that while all thought experiments are cases, 
not all cases are thought experiments. For example, some cases are formulated 
                               
115 How does my suggestion relate to the vast literature on imaginative resistance, which I have 
not engaged with to any substantial degree? I am not entirely sure, but I suspect that the phe-
nomenon of misimagination is different from many of the concerns that are addressed in those 
discussions. For example, the problem that I am concerned with is not that some cases resists 
being imagined, that authorial authority breaks down in some cases, that we do not want to 
imagine some cases, or that the imagining of some cases has a peculiar phenomenology. In-
stead, the problem is that we sometimes unknowingly imagine a different case than the one that 
we intended to imagine, which has consequences for the practice of testing moral theories 
against our intuitions about cases. But perhaps I am wrong, in which case the above discussion 
would need to be better informed by the literature on imaginative resistance. See also Weather-
son’s taxonomy of different problems which are raised by cases like Jack and Jill, in Weather-
son (2004), pp. 1-2. 
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only for illustrative purposes, and are therefore not thought experiments, and 
some cases are formulated only for testing theories in a lab or computer sim-
ulation, and are therefore not thought experiments. On the above account, Ex-
perience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster are thought experiments, 
since they are formulated for the purpose of testing utilitarianism, and for do-
ing so by means of thinking about what the theory implies in these cases. 
What does it mean to perform a thought experiment? I will assume that to 
perform a thought experiment is to create a “model” of it by means of our 
imagination.116 Therefore, just as there can be computer models and wooden 
miniature models, there can be “thought models.” Along these lines, I assume 
that when conducting thought experiments, we imagine that the propositions 
representing it are true, not in the actual world, but in the model – the thought 
experimental “fiction.” 
When modeling a case by means of our imagination, we can use different 
types of imagination. To begin with, there are sensory and propositional im-
agination.117 Sensory imagination can be used to “paint a picture in your mind” 
or “seeing with your mind’s eye” what a mountain looks like. It is related to 
its perception analogues – that is, visualizing resembles seeing. Sensory im-
agination can occur using various sensory moods, and not just the visual one. 
Therefore, we can sensorily imagine smells, sounds, pain, heat, and so on. For 
example, I may imagine how painful it would be to have a headache right now, 
or how it would feel to freeze in my office. In contrast to sensory imagination, 
propositional imagination does not employ any sensory moods, but is simply 
about representing a proposition as being true. It is what we use when we im-
agine ten billion people living lives barely worth living – we assume or sup-
pose that they live such lives. Sensorily imagining a feature of a case seems 
to entail propositionally imagining it, because to sensorily imagine that a beau-
tiful mountain stands in front of me, I must suppose or assume that there is 
such a mountain. But propositionally imagining a feature does not entail sen-
sorily imagining it. For example, I can propositionally imagine ten billion peo-
ple without sensorily imagining even a single person. 
Another distinction, which is especially relevant to my arguments in this 
chapter, is that between active and passive imagination. For example, when 
reading a book, I might imagine that a character who has not been fully de-
scribed has black hair, a slender physical build, and wears a t-shirt with jeans. 
However, I might never have intended to imagine any of these details – they 
sprung into my mind uninvited, without being prompted by the author. Simi-
larly, when reading a story about a far-away country, I might imagine that this 
                               
116 A mental modelling account of thought experiments is defended by Nancy Nersessian 
(1992), (2007); Nenad Miščević (1992), (2007), and Tamar Szabó Gendler (2004). Rachel 
Cooper (2005) defends an account of thought experiments as models, although not as exclu-
sively mental models.  
117 McGinn (2004), pp. 128-139; (2009), p. 595. 
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country has a functioning healthcare system. Again, however, I may never 
have intended to imagine such a system – my brain filled in these details au-
tomatically. These are examples of passive imagination, which contrast with 
cases of active imagination, where we intentionally imagine various features 
of cases.118 Some reflection shows that the distinction between active and pas-
sive imagination is orthogonal to that between sensory and propositional im-
agination. As a result, there can be active and passive sensory imagination, 
and active and passive propositional imagination. For example, when I imag-
ine a character with black hair, I sensorily passively imagine her hair, and 
when I imagine the functioning healthcare system, I propositionally passively 
imagine this fact. 
Consider now cases of misimagining. That we misimagine a case is not 
necessarily due to lacking the ability to imagine the features of the case. In the 
Jack and Jill case, we can imagine that killing Jack and Jill is morally permis-
sible. For example, we can imagine that Jack and Jill’s arguing in this partic-
ular spot will set off a massive bomb, killing a million people and devastating 
the city – in which case they should indeed have taken their argument else-
where.119 Under those circumstances, it is not implausible that Craig did the 
right thing. Moreover, nothing in the description of the case as given by 
Weatherson prevents us from imagining this much; nevertheless, our passive 
imagination is uncooperative, and does not help us fill out the case in the re-
quired way. What happens in these cases is that our passive imagination runs 
with what is, broadly understood, natural to assume in a case, and this might 
or might not be helpful for imagining the propositions that are stipulated to be 
true of the case.120 In the Jack and Jill case, our passive imagination seems to 
draw on assumptions of what consequences arguments in the street usually 
lead to, and these consequences do not include millions dying from bombs.121 
Similarly, when reading works of fiction in which we have either forgotten 
about or have not been told about various characters’ moods, motivations, 
clothing, etc., our passive imagination seems to draw upon what is natural to 
                               
118 As an alternative to spelling out the active-passive distinction in terms of intentionally im-
agining features of a case, we could define it in terms of attentively or consciously imagining 
such features. I am not sure what is the best way to go here – there seems to be advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each of these proposals. In any case, I hope the phenomenon that 
I try to describe is clear enough. 
119 Cf. Weatherson (2004), p. 20. 
120 One’s views here might or might not mirror one’s views about truth in fiction. Note, how-
ever, that the question of what is true in a work of fiction is different from the question of what 
we imagine to be true when considering the work. See also Daniel Kahneman (2013), pp. 97-
99, on the phenomenon of “substitution.” According to Kahneman, sometimes our fast, intuitive 
system (System 1) answers, instead of a hard question that we are asked, a different question 
which is easier to answer. As Kahneman notes, we are often unaware that we have answered 
the wrong but easy question, and not the right but hard question. 
121 The author’s intentions matter as well, although perhaps just indirectly. There is a reason 
why Weatherson chooses a case where it is natural to assume that Jack and Jill’s arguing has 
no particularly adverse consequences. 
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assume is true in the case – such as assumptions from the real world or from 
the fiction-specific genre. For example, if we have not been told of any details 
about a particular dragon in a fantasy epic, we will passively imagine that it 
has scales and is difficult to slay, because that is the natural assumption to 
make in fantasy fiction. 
 One would think that our active imagination of stipulated features of cases 
always overrules our passive imagination. But in some cases the opposite 
seems to happen. For example, in the Jack and Jill case our passive imagina-
tion stops us from imagining that Craig is acting permissibly. It seems that our 
passive imagination quickly takes onboard various natural assumptions about 
cases, and once these details are in place, we are stopped by our passive im-
agination from actively imagining certain propositions being true – even when 
we are explicitly asked to imagine them. 
From the above discussion, it follows that certain cases are especially sus-
ceptible to being misimagined. These are cases that contain propositions that 
are “unnatural” to them, or that fit badly with the rest of the case as described, 
and where it is easy for our imagination to draw upon alternative, more natu-
ral, assumptions in order to make the case more coherent. That Craig is acting 
morally permissible is such a proposition. As we will see next, other examples 
of “unnatural” propositions include those describing the amount of pleasure 
minus pain produced by acts in Transplant, Experience Machine, and Utility 
Monster. 
5.3 Revisiting the Objections 
Just as we can fail to imagine that Craig is morally permitted to kill Jack and 
Jill, we can fail to imagine that an act maximizes pleasure minus pain. To 
begin with, consider the following variant of Transplant: 
 
FAILED TRANSPLANT 
 
Six patients lie sedated in their beds. Sarah can kill and use the organs 
of one patient to attempt to save five others. If she does, all six patients 
will die. In the ensuing outrage, the public will stop trusting in the 
healthcare system, leading to many fatalities and missed treatments. 
Killing the patient maximizes pleasure minus pain, while not killing her 
does not. 
 
At least initially, I tend to misimagine this case. I successfully imagine every 
proposition except for the last one – i.e., that killing the patient maximizes 
pleasure minus pain. Instead, I imagine a different case where killing the pa-
tient does not maximize pleasure minus pain. Only with some effort, I can 
force myself to imagine the case correctly; for example, I can imagine a bomb 
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that will kill millions of people if Sarah does not kill the patient – that would 
explain why killing her maximizes pleasure minus pain. But this is not what I 
first imagine when I encounter Failed Transplant. Because it is liable to make 
us misimagine it, Failed Transplant is obviously not a useful case for objecting 
to utilitarianism. When I try to imagine Failed Transplant, I successfully im-
agine a case in which it is intuitively morally wrong to kill the patient. But the 
content of that moral intuition does not give me any reason to reject utilitari-
anism, because in the case that I do in fact imagine, as opposed to the case that 
I try to imagine, killing the patient does not maximize pleasure minus pain. 
Utilitarianism does not imply that Sarah should kill the patient in the case that 
I imagine. In essence, I have the right moral intuition, but it is about the wrong 
case. 
Consider now the original variant of the case: 
 
TRANSPLANT 
  
Six patients lie sedated in their beds. Sarah can maximize pleasure mi-
nus pain by killing patient Six and use her organs to save the lives of 
the other five patients. If she does not kill patient Six, the other five 
patients will die, and Sarah will produce a less than optimal amount of 
pleasure minus pain. 
 
For this case too, I propose, there is a risk that we misimagine it. In Failed 
Transplant the problem is that we actively imagine that propositions like the 
following are true: “In the ensuing outrage, the public will stop trusting in the 
healthcare system, leading to many fatalities and missed treatments.” In con-
trast, in Transplant the problem is that we passively imagine such proposi-
tions. We passively imagine what is natural to assume to be true in a case, and 
it is natural to assume that someone will find out about the transplant, and that 
this will result in fatalities due to a lack of trust in the healthcare system. It is 
also natural to assume that transplants are not always successful due to, for 
example, tissue rejection, incompetence, infection, and so on. Therefore, it is 
likely that our passive imagination will interfer with our attempt to actively 
imagine that killing the patient does in fact maximize pleasure minus pain in 
Transplant. 
Corresponding arguments can be made for the other two cases that I have 
discussed: 
 
EXPERIENCE MACHINE 
  
William has the chance to plug into an experience machine. If he 
plugs in, he will be extremely well off in terms of pleasure minus 
pain. He will have these experiences for the rest of his life. Therefore, 
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plugging in produces the most pleasure minus pain of any act availa-
ble to him. 
 
 
UTILITY MONSTER 
  
Tim has resources available to him that can either help a thousand in-
dividual humans feel some amount of pleasure or help a non-human 
creature feel much more pleasure. Tim will maximize pleasure minus 
pain if and only if he gives the creature all of his resources. 
 
In Experience Machine, it is natural to imagine that machines often break 
down, that they do not always receive the proper level of maintenance, that 
they can be hacked and controlled by malicious actors, that others are not good 
at determining what will actually give us more pleasure and less pain, and that 
mere entertainment is nearly always less conducive to pleasure minus pain 
than is helping other humans and animals. In Utility Monster, it is natural to 
imagine that giving the resources to the monster will face steep declining mar-
ginal returns on the investment, and that the monster, like any other creature 
known to us, has a maximum level of pleasure that can be obtained by spend-
ing resources. In both cases, these natural assumptions interfere with us imag-
ining that the relevant acts (i.e., connecting to the machine and giving the 
monster the resources) do in fact maximize pleasure minus pain. 
Again, recall that the problem is not that we cannot imagine that these acts 
maximize pleasure minus pain. To do this, we need merely imagine a feature 
that makes it natural to assume that pleasure minus pain is maximized. For 
example, we can imagine that a bomb will kill millions of people if the agent 
does not kill the patient, plug in to the experience machine, or give the creature 
the resources. But such a “brute force” approach is not useful for constructing 
objections to utilitarianism, for obvious reasons: in such revised cases it is also 
intuitively obligatory to kill the patient, to plug into the experience machine, 
and to give the resources to the creature. 
My proposal is that the mere risk that these cases are being misimagined 
should lead us to consider revised cases instead. These revised cases should 
be ones where it is not unnatural to assume that the acts under consideration 
do, in fact, maximize pleasure minus pain. In doing so, we will of course need 
to stay true to the spirit of each objection – we cannot simply add that a bomb 
will explode if Sarah operates on the patient. I will now consider two general 
ways in which to carry out such revisions. First, I will consider adding details 
to the cases that make it more natural to assume that the relevant acts maxim-
ize pleasure minus pain. Second, I will consider removing details from the 
cases – not in the sense of making the list of stipulated propositions shorter, 
but by including propositions that ensure there is less room for our passive 
imagination to fill out the cases in the wrong way. 
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5.4 Adding Details 
Consider first how, by adding propositions to the description of a case, we can 
make it more natural to assume that an act does in fact maximize pleasure 
minus pain. For example, consider this revised version of Transplant: 
 
REVISED TRANSPLANT 
 
Civilization have broken down and Sarah – a highly qualified doctor – 
is alone responsible for an island of high technology located in a barren 
wasteland: an autonomous hospital in the middle of nowhere. What re-
mains of humankind is disorganized and spread out, and no communi-
cations exist between the hospital and the outside world. As it is, Sarah 
has admitted six patients to the hospital. All of them are lone wanderers 
who recently arrived from the surrounding wastelands, and who now 
lie sedated in her wards. No other patients will ever arrive to her hospi-
tal again – detailed scans show that these are the last brave souls who 
travelled through the desert before it became impassable. Moreover, Sa-
rah knows from extensive experience that she, together with her ad-
vanced robotic workforce, can perform any transplant whatsoever with 
no risks to the patients. She also knows that she can safely escort any 
survivors to safer lands. One of the patients is patient Six. Sarah can 
maximize pleasure minus pain by killing patient Six and use her organs 
to save the lives of the five other patients. If she does not kill patient 
Six, she will survive, but the other five patients will die. In such a case, 
Sarah will produce a less than optimal amount of pleasure minus pain. 
 
Revised Transplant is a different case than Transplant, because it is repre-
sented by a different set of propositions. That being said, Transplant still “im-
plies” Revised Transplant in a sense, because by imagining every proposition 
of Revised Transplant, you will also imagine every proposition of Transplant 
(note that the description of Transplant does not mention any context or spe-
cifics of the transplantation procedure). 
The details that are added in Revised Transplant are strategically selected. 
The goal with each revision to the original case is to make it more natural to 
assume that killing patient Six maximizes pleasure minus pain. First, I have 
removed any effects the transplantation procedure can have on society in gen-
eral. In Revised Transplant we imagine a hospital in the middle of nowhere, 
that humankind is disorganized and spread out, and that no communications 
exist between the hospital and the outside world. Second, I have removed the 
possibility that the transplantation could fail: we imagine a highly qualified 
doctor aided by an island of high technology and an advanced robotic work-
force. Third, I have removed potential effects on future patient care, such that 
people will not dare to be treated at the hospital in fear of being sacrificed for 
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the greater good, by stipulating that the six patients are the last ones to be 
treated at the facility. The case also introduces some unnatural features of its 
own – for example, that the survivors would be able to escape the desert af-
terwards. Therefore, I added that the survivors will be safely transported to 
safer lands. 
While the revisions made to Transplant are substantial in many ways, I take 
it that they still respect the spirit of the original objection, as they change noth-
ing that is relevant or important to the original case. The original objection, I 
assume, is proposed as a way to see how utilitarianism unacceptably permits 
killing innocent people by means of direct physical force, or prototypical vio-
lence. This feature remains fully represented in Revised Transplant. 
Do our moral intuitions differ between Transplant and Revised Transplant? 
If they do not, then this proposed defense of utilitarianism will fail. Even if 
we often do misimagine Transplant, we can instead appeal to our intuitions 
about Revised Transplant – a case which, I have argued, we are less prone to 
misimagine. I can only report on my own intuitions here. When I am con-
fronted with Transplant, I have the intuition (at least initially) that it would be 
wrong for Sarah to kill patient Six. In imagining this case, I imagine a doctor 
standing in a gloomy cellar with a scalpel in hand, the peaceful hospital above 
blissfully unaware of the crime being secretly committed. But when I consider 
Revised Transplant, I weakly intuit that Sarah should kill patient Six. To kill 
patient Six still strikes me as a horrible thing to do, but it also seems like a 
necessary evil and so the right thing to do. Now, your intuitions might differ 
from mine with respect to these cases – I admit that my intuitions are perhaps 
corrupted by my utilitarian beliefs. But even if your intuitions differ from 
mine, for utilitarianism to be made more plausible we do not require that the 
moral intuitions change. It is enough that their strength change. And presum-
ably even stalwart anti-utilitarians will have weaker intuitions about it being 
wrong for Sarah to kill patient Six in Revised Transplant, in contrast to intui-
tions they have on the basis of considering Transplant. 
Clearly, there are various ways in which to make revisions like those above, 
and I have only suggested one of several possible modifications of Transplant. 
For example, instead of stipulating various facts about the downfall of civili-
zation or the technological feasibility of organ transplantation, we could in-
stead stipulate facts about how people react to such operations. John Harris, 
for example, asks us to consider a world where organs are forcibly donated by 
means of a “survival lottery”: 
 
No one was considered to have an absolute right to life or freedom from inter-
ference, but everything was always done to ensure that as many people as pos-
sible would enjoy long and happy lives. In such a world a man who attempted 
to escape when his number was up [and was therefore chosen to become a 
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donor] or who resisted on the grounds that no one had a right to take his life, 
might well be regarded as a murderer.122 
 
As the case is described by Harris, no one would be afraid to use the healthcare 
system merely because, within that system, people are regularly killed to save 
others. Indeed, such killings are made routine, and lead to less deaths overall. 
Perhaps this gives us another way to avoid passively imagining that forced 
donations would cause fear and fatalities due to people avoiding life-saving 
treatment. On the other hand, Harris’ case also introduces an unnecessary di-
mension of justice or fairness: the person benefits from the existence of the 
organ lottery, but refuses to contribute when his number is up. In general, con-
structing cases like these will therefore require some creativity to get right, 
although that should not deter us, as this much is true for all cases which are 
used to test moral theories. 
For a suggestion of how to construct a revised version of Experience Ma-
chine, consider the following case proposed by Sharon Hewitt: 
 
We know how to keep everyone happy and healthy, and the machine can carry 
this out as well as – if not better than – we can. There aren’t any experiences 
for us to have that haven’t already been had, and that haven’t already been fully 
analyzed as to their phenomenal and physiological characteristics and cata-
logued in the experience machine. What things remain to be learned about the 
universe are going to be things we know, a priori, can have no effect on im-
proving anyone’s health or the subjective quality of anyone’s life – things like 
the exact number of atoms there are, or historical facts that are so specific that 
they don’t reveal to us any general truths about the world or human nature that 
we weren’t already aware of.123 
 
In the light of this description, consider the following attempt to revise Expe-
rience Machine. First, we stipulate that the machine has a 1000-year track rec-
ord of perfect run-time. Second, we assume that the protagonist – William – 
has sampled what the machine has to offer on several earlier occasions. These 
two assumptions make it more natural to assume that the machine does in fact 
provide superior experiences. Third, we add to the case that there are no mor-
ally worthy goals to strive for in the “real” world. This stipulation helps us to 
refrain from passively imagining that we can produce more pleasure minus 
pain by not connecting and instead engage in worthy charitable causes. 
I believe that another major revision to Experience Machine is called for. 
Instead of considering whether William should plug himself in, we should 
consider whether he should plug someone else in, such as an old friend. This 
change in perspective helps us focus on what William morally should do, in-
stead of what he prudentially should do. More importantly, it helps us ignore 
                               
122 Harris (1975), p. 83. 
123 Hewitt (2010), p. 342. 
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another problem for utilitarianism. The problem I have in mind is that we in-
tuitively have a very significant moral leeway in deciding what to do with our 
own lives, as opposed to the lives of others. Thus, even if I prefer to not per-
form an act A, and even if A causes me no pleasure and much pain, and even 
if performing A restricts my freedom, equality, and so on, I still seem morally 
permitted to perform A, given that it achieves whatever moral goals are worthy 
to achieve outside of my own life. While this is a problem for utilitarianism – 
and a worrying one – it is also a distraction in the current context. Experience 
Machine is meant to illustrate that utilitarianism does not properly distinguish 
between having authentic experiences, or living a life connected to reality, 
compared to living a life connected to the machine. Moreover, many other 
moral theories will also struggle to account for extensive moral freedom to 
decide how to live our own lives. Therefore, we will do best to remove this 
feature from the case, leaving this particular problem for another day. Doing 
so will also conveniently allow us to stipulate that William can interfer and 
unplug his friend if the machine malfunctions. This makes the assumption that 
William’s friend will have hedonically superior experiences in the machine 
more natural to the case. Finally, we should imagine that William’s friend 
cannot be consulted about whether to be plugged in or not – again, to avoid 
the problem of how a person is intuitively morally permitted to decide for 
herself how to live her own life. 
These modifications to Experience Machine results in the following case: 
 
REVISED EXPERIENCE MACHINE 
 
For 1000 years, a sophisticated machine civilization has run a number 
of highly reliable experience machines. William lives in this civiliza-
tion, and he has sampled what experiences a specific machine offers at 
several occasions. William has the opportunity to plug in an old friend, 
John, to this machine. While William cannot ask John what he prefers, 
he knows from careful and extensive testimony of millions of others 
over the past millennia, as well as from his own experiences, that John 
will have hedonically superior experiences by being plugged in. More-
over, there is nothing morally worthwhile to do in the world around 
William and John: poverty, disease, and mental illness have all been 
eradicated. Finally, William will continuously monitor John’s well-be-
ing in the machine and unplug him if the experiences are no longer he-
donically superior. If John is plugged into the machine, William max-
imizes pleasure minus pain; however, if John stays unplugged, William 
does not maximize pleasure minus pain. 
 
In this revised version of the case, I intuit that it is obligatory for John to plug 
Williams into the machine. 
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Finally, let us consider Utility Monster. It is difficult to remove the most 
problematic feature of this case, which are the intense pleasures that the non-
human creature will receive from being given Tim’s resources. The problem 
is that even if we stipulate that the creature is not human, we will still use our 
basic picture of a human being to imagine what the creature’s life is like, and 
humans seem limited to a certain maximal intensity in pleasure. Moreover, 
humans also suffer from declining marginal returns on pleasure-raising invest-
ments. 
What we can do is to consider a case where investing additional resources 
does not raise the intensity of the felt pleasure, but rather adds to its duration. 
In doing so, we can consider an explicitly human creature, rather than a “mon-
ster.” With that in mind, consider the following revised variant of the case: 
 
REVISED UTILITY MONSTER 
 
Tim has resources available to him that can make 1000 individual hu-
mans each feel a ten second episode of strong pleasure. Alternatively, 
Tim can give a single human the same resources, which would make 
this human feel 11,000 seconds of equally strong pleasure. Tim will 
maximize pleasure minus pain if and only if he gives this human the 
resources. 
 
When considering this case, my intuitions weakly support giving the single 
human the resources. Clearly, some will have more egalitarian intuitions and 
think that Tim should distribute his resources among the 1000 individual hu-
mans instead. But presumably this intuition is at least weaker than the intuition 
that Tim should give the 1000 humans the resources in Utility Monster. Of 
course, nothing said so far will convince those who think that, contrary to the 
utilitarian assumption, pleasures are less valuable the more intense they be-
come. So the case is still not ideal. Perhaps we should conclude that utility 
monster cases are simply not well suited as objections to utilitarianism, be-
cause the intensity of the pleasure had by the utility monster is both essential 
to the case and a highly unnatural assumption to make. 
In my discussion so far, I have focused on how to use the active imagination 
of stipulation propositions to add details to existing thought experiments. 
However, there exists another way to add details to cases. Science fiction and 
fantasy writers have long made use of our passive imagination for this pur-
pose. They first teach us how a fictional world works, and then they rely on 
readers to passively imagine the right details without being explicitly in-
structed to do so. We are often not even told the details at any point in the 
story, but will simply infer them from other descriptions of the world. For 
example, I passively imagine that Gandalf cannot throw fireballs due to the 
fictional context established by Tolkien when he wrote Lord of the Rings. Tol-
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kien never explicitly states that Gandalf cannot throw fireballs, but it never-
theless follows from how magic is presented as subtle and inconspicuous in 
Tolkien’s works. By learning how a fictional world works in this way, we can 
thus “train” our passive imagination to find certain things natural in it. 
Perhaps we can use the same approach when we test moral theories like 
utilitarianism. For example, we may read an elaborate sci-fi fiction novel 
where plugging into experience machines, performing transplants from one to 
five patients, and giving certain people high levels of resources really do reli-
ably maximize pleasure minus pain. Of course, we need to become acquainted 
with this world to such a degree that we actually believe and accept this. But 
when we do become acquainted with it, we should be able to read only short 
passages like those in Experience Machine and Transplant, and carry out the 
thought experiments without our passive imagination getting in the way. This 
would remove the need for more elaborate descriptions of cases. 
As it is, many existing fictional works are unsuitable for testing utilitarian-
ism against our moral intuitions. In most fictional works, killing, torturing, or 
saving 1000 innocent strangers but letting your loved one die, always have 
worse consequences than some alternative act. In most fictional works, it is 
natural to assume that some less repugnant solution is available and optimal. 
The hero who decides to save her loved one, rather than 1000 innocent people, 
always manages to save both her loved one and any innocents. But it should 
be possible to write stories where these expectations are upended. Reading 
such stories might help philosophers better test moral theories such as utilitar-
ianism. For example, we could consider various hyper-realistic stories, like 
those included in the computer game This War of Mine. In this game, the 
player controls a group of refugees trying to survive in a warzone. For exam-
ple, a player may have to choose between taking in a small girl who would 
otherwise die or to push the group’s resources over the brink, where the latter 
act would result in the death of them all. Such stories, which would include 
realistic and forced hard choices, may help us imagine that certain acts do in 
fact produce the most pleasure minus pain, however horrible they appear to 
us. Fictional works can similarly be produced that would help us passively fill 
out the details of Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. My 
suspicion is that when these cases are situated in such fictional settings, our 
intuitions will become more friendly to utilitarianism – either because our 
moral intuitions change, or because their strength change. 
5.5 Removing Details 
The approach that I considered in the previous section tries to flesh out cases 
to make a central claim of a case – that an act maximizes pleasure minus pain 
– more natural to it, and so easier to passively imagine. But there is another 
approach available to us, which is to construct cases that have less room for 
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our passive imagination to fill them out incorrectly. For example, consider the 
following case: 
 
MINIMAL TRANSPLANT 
 
Sarah stands on a ten by ten-meter platform located in empty space. 
There are no other objects in the universe, and all of existence will end 
in ten minutes. Six persons lie sedated in their beds on the platform in 
front of her. Sarah can use a hyper-advanced surgery tool to kill one 
patient and successfully save the lives of the five others. Upon doing 
so, the five will immediately wake-up and live a pain-free and pleasant 
existence for nine minutes. If Sarah does not operate, the five will die, 
but the sixth person will wake up and live a pain-free and pleasant ex-
istence for nine minutes. If Sarah operates, she maximizes pleasure mi-
nus pain. If she does not operate, she does not maximize pleasure minus 
pain. 
 
When considering Minimal Transplant, there is less room for us to passively 
imagine adverse effects on society, such that people will fear using the 
healthcare system. Our moral intuitions about this case are also, I presume, 
more friendly to utilitarianism. For my own part, I intuit that Sarah should 
operate in these circumstances. But even if you intuit that operating is morally 
impermissible, your intuition is likely weaker than when you considered 
Transplant. 
Examples like Minimal Transplant, just like does Revised Transplant, show 
that we can avoid the problem of aspects of a case being unnatural to it by 
making the case not more realistic, but less realistic. Many look down on un-
realistic thought experiments as being unserious or unnecessary. But the above 
discussion suggests one reason to employ unrealistic thought experiments in 
our thought experimental practices: to make cases easier to imagine correctly, 
and so avoid misimagining them. 
5.6 Objections and Responses 
Let me end this chapter by considering a few potential objections to the argu-
ments that I have put forward, as well as responses to these objections. 
Objector: “You are too pessimistic about my ability to avoid misimagining 
cases. If I try hard enough, I can successfully imagine the cases you describe. 
So I do not need to add to or remove any details from the cases that you dis-
cuss.” 
Response: I am not claiming that we always misimagine cases like Expe-
rience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster. I am arguing that we some-
times misimagine them and that it is not always transparent to us when we do 
 112 
so. Moreover, I worry that we do not always try hard to imagine cases cor-
rectly, even if we have the ability to successfully imagine them with enough 
effort. We often seem to imagine cases carelessly, quickly, and automatically. 
Finally, if you do in fact successfully imagine Transplant, then you should 
find that your intuitions do not differ between this case and that of Revised 
Transplant. But is that really so? I suspect that for many of us, our intuitions 
do differ between these cases. And one explanation for why they differ is that 
we do not, in fact, successfully imagine Transplant. 
Objector: “I disagree – that is not the best explanation for why we have 
different intuitions on the basis of considering these cases. While I have dif-
ferent moral intuitions in response to the revised cases, that is primarily be-
cause you introduce additional morally relevant factors. So it is not surprising 
that my moral intuitions differ – they differ because the morally relevant fac-
tors differ.” 
Response: I agree that this is another possible explanation for why our in-
tuitions differ between these cases. Even so, we cannot escape introducing 
potentially morally relevant factors to cases. Just because we do not stipulate 
them, we may still introduce them when we fill out cases via our passive im-
agination. For example, when I imagine Transplant, I imagine Sarah standing 
in a cellar with scalpel in hand. Surely, any number of such unintentionally 
added features are potentially morally relevant. That features are not explicitly 
stipulated does not mean that they are not being imagined. So, I would argue, 
the more detailed cases are not worse off in this respect than the less detailed 
ones. Furthermore, the detailed cases are better off in one respect: they help 
us avoid misimagining the cases. 
Objector: “But why not simply get rid of the details in Transplant and the 
other original cases?” 
Response: Because the details are needed for us to form intuitions about 
these cases. As Hewitt notes, if “our feelings were always responsive to […] 
abstract stipulation […] we would not need to appeal to concrete thought ex-
periments in the first place.”124 For example, consider the thought experiment: 
“Imagine that a person P can maximize pleasure minus pain by performing an 
act A, but not by performing its (only) alternative act A*, and that A is an act 
of prototypical violence. Should P perform A?” In response to this case, you 
will presumably not elicit any moral intuitions that conflict with utilitarianism. 
The case as described is too abstract. This shows that objections to utilitarian-
ism are not just incidentally adding details to cases – such as transplants, doc-
tors, patients, and so on – they essentially depend on them. Since we have to 
add at least some details to elicit moral intuitions, we should take care to only 
add details that are natural to the case as described. 
Objector: “I worry that your proposal is too radical. If you are right, then 
all thought experiments in philosophy become problematic.” 
                               
124 Hewitt (2010), p. 339. 
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Response: I think the proposal is far less radical than one might believe. 
The problem of misimagination concerns only cases that include stipulated 
propositions that are unnatural to them. Many cases that are used in philoso-
phy, such as the famous Gettier thought experiments, are clearly not of this 
kind. Moreover, consider a strange thought experiment proposed by Lippert-
Rasmussen. Lippert-Rasmussen notes that “it is possible to imagine worlds in 
which forced donations of one’s organs need in no way undermine one’s abil-
ity to control one’s life” and “in which the forced donation of most of a per-
son’s body will actually enhance his autonomy.”125 He then asks us to consider 
the following case: 
 
[Imagine] that people are born with huge bodies they can barely move, bodies 
with two hundred legs and arms. At any given moment, they can at best sense 
and control 1 percent of their bodies, although they can readily determine 
which percent that is. Since their bodies heal very easily, their ability to control 
their lives is promoted best if 99 percent of each body is removed in such a 
way that these abnormal individuals end up with what are, for us, normal hu-
man bodies.126 
 
This example is highly unrealistic and unusual, but nothing that is stipulated 
in it is unnatural to the case as described: it is not unnatural to assume that for 
the individuals we are told about, removing 99% of their bodies will enhance 
their autonomy; on the contrary, it would be unnatural to assume that doing so 
would not enhance their autonomy. But if even such extremely unrealistic 
cases can be unproblematic, then surely there is no general problem with our 
thought experimental practices here. There is only a specific problem with 
cases such as Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster, which 
upend our expectations about what would naturally be considered true in these 
cases. 
To conclude, I propose that the utilitarian can give a partial response to 
intuitive objections by pointing out that, in cases such as Experience Machine, 
Transplant, and Utility Monster, certain assumptions are unnatural to the cases 
as they are described. Next, the utilitarian can argue that we tend to misimag-
ine such cases – and to instead imagine cases which, unlike the ones we in-
tended to imagine, do not give rise to moral intuitions that are problematic for 
utilitarianism. Finally, the utilitarian can propose revised variants of the orig-
inal cases – either by adding or removing details – which contain less or no 
such unnatural assumptions, and which are also more favorable to utilitarian-
ism. In this chapter, I have considered some such revised cases, including Re-
vised Experience Machine, Revised Transplant, Revised Utility Monster, and 
Minimal Transplant. To be sure, the end result is not a conclusive vindication 
of utilitarianism, but it does make the theory seem more plausible. 
                               
125 Lippert-Rasmussen (2008), p. 109. 
126 Lippert-Rasmussen (2008), p. 109. 
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6. Sensory Imagination 
In this chapter, I present and defend a theory about how sensory imagination 
affects the epistemic trustworthiness of moral intuitions. I argue that if this 
theory is true, then utilitarianism can be partially defended against some intu-
itive objections. 
6.1 Sensory Imagination and Intuitive Objections 
This chapter offers a partial defense of utilitarianism against some intuitive 
objections which are formed on the basis of thought experiments. In the dis-
cussion that follows, I appeal to the importance of sensory imagination in 
thought experimentation. As I noted in the previous chapter, while proposi-
tional imagination is about supposing or assuming something to be the case, 
sensory imagination is about bringing up a picture of the thing or about pre-
senting the thing to yourself using a “sensory mood.” The general idea behind 
this chapter can be summarized as follows. Depending on how we imagine 
cases, we might form different moral intuitions on their basis. So it is im-
portant to know whether certain ways of imagining cases make our moral in-
tuitions any more or less epistemically trustworthy. As I will argue, sensory 
imagination of certain features of cases enhance the epistemic trustworthiness 
of our moral intuitions. Moreover, in several such cases, the right kind of sen-
sory imagination makes our moral intuitions more supportive of utilitarianism. 
Let me first explain how my argument is a defense of utilitarianism. An 
analogy is helpful here. Suppose that I propose to you an empirical theory – 
the no boat theory – according to which there are no boats on the Swedish lake 
Storsjön. To see whether the no boat theory is false, you can watch for boats 
at Storsjön: if you find a boat, then you have falsified my theory. So, let us 
assume that every afternoon you watch the lake, although you do this from 
afar and in foggy weather. Suddenly, you have the visual impression of a boat 
traversing Storsjön. Excited, you move closer to take a better look at the boat. 
But when doing so, you no longer have the visual impression of a boat; you 
see only a large grey rock that has the approximate size of a small boat. 
Clearly, you have been fooled. Now, this second visual impression constitutes 
a defense of the no boat theory, even if the first visual impression still gives 
you some reason to believe that a boat is on Storsjön. Even if the evidential 
value of the first visual impression is not cancelled out by the evidential value 
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of the second visual impression, it is at least outweighed by it. My defense of 
utilitarianism is analogous to such a defense of the no boat theory. I suggest 
that in some cases, sensorily imagining features of cases increases the epis-
temic trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. On my view, to merely propo-
sitionally imagine a case is like watching Storsjön from afar in foggy weather. 
That is, just as we can watch a lake under bad perceptual conditions, we can 
imagine a case under bad imaginary conditions. Sensorily imagining a case is 
like moving closer to the lake – we improve the imaginary conditions by the 
use of sensory imagination, just like we improve the perceptual conditions by 
moving closer to take a better look. A visual impression formed on the basis 
of bad perceptual conditions might give me some reason to reject the no boat 
theory, even if I have another visual impression that is formed on the basis of 
better perceptual conditions, and so gives me greater reason to accept this 
theory. Similarly, a moral intuition formed on the basis of bad imaginary con-
ditions might give me some reason to reject utilitarianism, even if I also have 
another moral intuition that is formed on the basis of better imaginary condi-
tions, and so gives me greater reason to accept this theory. 
The view that sensory imagination can improve the epistemic trustworthi-
ness of our moral intuitions strikes me as a common-sense view – although 
when it is expressed precisely it will have to be qualified in various ways, as 
we will see in the next section. For example, human rights advocates typically 
try to make us imagine what it is like to be tortured by describing the atrocities 
in ways that prompt us to sensorily imagine them taking place. Intuitively, 
when we carry out such episodes of sensory imagination, we are not merely 
becoming more convinced about the atrocities being wrong, but also attain 
more reason to believe that they are wrong.  
Moreover, when morally deliberating, we often try to put ourselves “in the 
shoes of others.” That is, we sensorily imagine being them or seeing the world 
“from their eyes.” Many philosophers have expressed ideas that imply that 
sensory imagination plays such an important role for learning about what is 
right or wrong. For example, Derek Parfit writes with respect to the utility 
monster thought experiment that: 
 
Nozick tells us to suppose that this imagined person [the utility monster] would 
be so happy, or have a life of such high quality, that this is the distribution that 
produces the greatest sum of happiness, or the greatest amount of whatever 
makes life worth living. [...] For this to be true, this Monster’s quality of life 
must be millions of times as high as anyone we know. Can we imagine this? 
Think of the life of the luckiest person that you know, and ask what a life would 
have to be like in order to be a million times as much worth living. [...] Act 
Utilitarians might say that, if we really could imagine what such a life would 
be like, we might not find Nozick’s objection persuasive.127 
 
                               
127 Parfit (1984), p. 389.  
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In this quote, Parfit must mean that we cannot sensorily imagine the monster’s 
quality of life, because we can clearly propositionally imagine it. The utilitar-
ian could argue, Parfit seems to suggest, that if we successfully sensorily im-
agined the monster’s quality of life, we would no longer find it counterintui-
tive that it should be given all our resources. Presumably, Parfit would also 
argue that once we sensorily imagine the monster’s quality of life successfully, 
our moral or evaluative intuitions will also become more epistemically trust-
worthy. 
More generally, the idea of “putting ourselves in the shoes of another” – 
which suggests sensorily imagining being in her shoes – when considering 
moral issues has been adopted in various ways by many philosophers, includ-
ing by Richard Hare in formulating his theory of preference utilitarianism, and 
by John Rawls in proposing his “veil of ignorance.”128 
6.2 The Sensory Imagination Theory 
The theory that I have in mind can be stated as follows: 
 
THE SENSORY IMAGINATION THEORY 
 
Everything else being equal, the higher the degree to which a person 
has sensorily imagined the morally relevant features of an act, the 
higher is the epistemic trustworthiness of her moral intuitions about this 
act. 
To see how this theory applies to a concrete case, consider a prison guard who 
must decide whether to put a prisoner in solitary confinement. Before deciding 
what to do with the prisoner, the guard sensorily imagines the fear, loneliness, 
and anxiety which would be caused by confinement. After this episode of im-
agination, the guard has a moral intuition that it is wrong to put the prisoner 
in confinement. If the sensory imagination theory is true, the guard’s moral 
intuition gives her more reason to believe that this act is wrong than it would 
had she not sensorily imagined the prisoner’s suffering. 
The sensory imagination theory must be clarified and qualified in several 
ways. First, I will assume that the added epistemic trustworthiness from sen-
sory imagination can go beyond learning non-moral facts. Accordingly, if we 
compare the first prison guard with a second guard – who knows the same 
non-moral facts, but has only propositionally imagined what it is like to be in 
solitary confinement – the first guard will have more trustworthy moral intui-
tions. That is, I assume that sensory imagination can improve the trustworthi-
ness of moral intuitions over and above helping us learn non-moral facts. 
                               
128 Hare (1981), Rawls ([1971] 2005), pp. 136-142. 
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Thus, sensory imagination helps us not only see more of a case, but to see a 
case more clearly. (That being said, my arguments are likely relevant to de-
fending utilitarianism even if sensory imagination only helps us learn new 
non-moral facts.) 
Second, the sensory imagination theory is compatible with an episode of 
sensory imagination on the whole subtracting from the epistemic trustworthi-
ness of a moral intuition. The theory only claims that the epistemic trustwor-
thiness is increased everything else being equal. For example, suppose that 
you visualize a terrible murder. You may be so shaken by this visualization 
that you cannot “think straight” and so reflexively condemn the murder. In 
this case, your moral intuition that the murder is wrong might on the whole be 
less epistemically trustworthy because you sensorily imagined it. But the use 
of sensory imagination as such still adds to the epistemic trustworthiness of 
the intuition. What epistemic weight is added by the sensory imagination is 
simply cancelled out by an unintended side effect: your inability to think 
straight. This is also true for other distorting influences that can be prompted 
by the use of sensory imagination, such as overwhelming emotional bursts of 
empathy, anger, sadness, and love. Similarly, to improve one’s perceptual 
conditions (e.g., by taking a closer look at an object) might bring about strong 
emotional reactions. These reactions might lower the epistemic trustworthi-
ness of our perceptual sightings on the whole, even if the improved perceptual 
conditions as such still improve their trustworthiness. 
Third, the sensory imagination theory is not only relevant to thought exper-
imentation. For example, suppose that an animal activist knows all the facts 
about how animals suffer in factory farms. Compare her to a second activist 
with the same knowledge, but who has additionally read a book that vividly 
describes the conditions in factory farms. Reading the book prompted her to 
sensorily imagine what it is like being an animal in a factory farm, including 
the pain, depression, and boredom from isolation. Intuitively, the second ani-
mal activist’s moral intuitions are more trustworthy in this case, even if she 
did not carry out a thought experiment. The sensory imagination theory ac-
counts for this improved trustworthiness. 
Fourth, the sensory imagination theory states that sensory imagination of 
morally relevant features of acts increases the trustworthiness of moral intui-
tions about those acts – not just any sensory imagination will do. For example, 
sensorily imagining the details of a murderer’s shoelaces makes no difference. 
Moreover, it is sensory imagination of morally relevant features of acts that is 
needed, as a feature may be morally relevant in a thought experiment even if 
it is not a morally relevant feature of an act being imagined in that thought 
experiment. 
Fifth, in formulating the sensory imagination theory, “morally relevant fea-
tures” refer solely to fundamental and non-derivative morally relevant fea-
tures. For example, whether the prisoner in the above case is adequately 
clothed is a non-fundamentally morally relevant feature of the case. It is non-
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fundamentally morally relevant because it is morally relevant only in so far as 
it brings about something that is morally relevant, such as pleasure or the ab-
sence of pain. Therefore, to sensorily imagine the prisoner’s clothes will typ-
ically not improve the epistemic trustworthiness of the guard’s intuition. But 
there is one exception: the sensory imagination theory should be understood 
as allowing for two ways of sensorily imagining fundamental and non-deriv-
ative morally relevant features. On the one hand, one can directly sensorily 
imagine such features, as when the guard sensorily imagines the pleasure and 
pain felt by the prisoner. On the other hand, one can indirectly sensorily im-
agine these features by directly sensorily imagining features that are, by the 
imaginer, closely associated with the morally relevant features. For example, 
the guard can sensorily imagine facial expressions signaling pain or screams 
of pain from the prisoner, and this will let her indirectly sensorily imagine the 
prisoner being in pain. Similarly, to sensorily imagine the prisoner being ade-
quately clothed may constitute a way for the guard to indirectly sensorily im-
agining the prisoner feeling well and comfortable, and may so increase the 
epistemic trustworthiness of the guard’s moral intuition. 
 Sixth, we may ask when the relevant sensory imagination has to take place, 
relative to the formation of the moral intuition, in order to increase the epis-
temic trustworthiness of that intuition. The sensory imagination clearly needs 
to be in the present or past – not in the future. But how far in the past does 
sensory imagination count? For example, suppose that the prison guard sen-
sorily imagined what solitary confinement is like ten years ago, and only now 
forms the intuition that confinement of a prisoner is wrong. Does that episode 
of sensory imagination increase the trustworthiness of her intuition? Some 
kind of causal criterion seems reasonable in this case. For example, we might 
say that the sensory imagination counts only if it is part of the (immediate or 
close) cause of the moral intuition.129 
6.3 Supporting the Theory 
A first piece of evidence that favors the sensory imagination theory consists 
of various epistemic intuitions, namely intuitions about how, in certain cir-
cumstances, the trustworthiness of our moral intuitions changes. For example, 
in cases like that of the prison guard, it seems very plausible that sensory im-
agination raises the trustworthiness of moral intuitions. Similarly, in the case 
of the animal activist, it seems plausible that her sensory imagination of the 
suffering of factory farm animals raises the trustworthiness of her moral intu-
itions. In general, we seem to think that imagining the inner lives of other 
people can help us learn about our moral obligations to them, beyond learning 
new non-moral facts – the sensory imagination theory explains why this is so. 
                               
129 Thanks to David Alm for this suggestion. 
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Finally, we may also have epistemic intuitions about what role sensory imag-
ination plays outside of thought experimenting. For example, it seems plausi-
ble that fictional works of literature can teach us about what is morally right 
or wrong. If sensory imagination can make moral intuitions about poverty, 
torture, charity, helping others, and so on more epistemically trustworthy, that 
could explain why reading fiction can teach us about what is right or wrong. 
The sensory imagination theory is also supported by a comparison to the 
importance of sensory perception in making our moral intuitions more trust-
worthy. To begin with, it seems plausible to think that: 
 
(1) Sensory perception makes our moral intuitions more epistemically 
trustworthy. 
 
For example, aid workers who have spent some time in poor countries will 
also in general have more epistemically trustworthy moral intuitions about 
whether, for example, it is morally obligatory to give more money to stop 
poverty. People who themselves have felt the effects of oppression are at least 
in some respects better at judging whether it is wrong to oppress others. More-
over, this is not merely because these people have greater knowledge of rele-
vant non-moral facts. Had they had the same non-moral knowledge, but lacked 
the relevant sensory perception, their moral intuitions would not have been as 
trustworthy. It is because they have seen the relevant acts performed up front 
that their intuitions are more trustworthy. Similarly, it seems plausible that 
seeing documentaries or playing certain computer games, both of which in-
volve sensory perception, can increase the trustworthiness of our moral intui-
tions beyond letting us learn non-moral facts. This too is explained by (1). 
Now, there are clear similarities between sensory perception and sensory 
imagination. To begin with, both are intentional states. Just as I see that some-
thing is the case, I sensorily imagine that something is the case. Moreover, 
both involve a phenomenal component, a sensory experience. But most im-
portantly, what makes sensory perception epistemically important is that 
things are presented to us in a sensory way. Since things are presented to us 
in a sensory way also in the case of sensory imagination, we should expect 
sensory imagination to be similarly epistemically important. That is, it seems 
plausible that: 
 
(2) If sensory perception makes our moral intuitions more epistemically 
trustworthy, then so does sensory imagination. 
 
Taken together, (1) and (2) support the sensory imagination theory. 
We can also argue for the sensory imagination theory by means of a second 
analogy – this time not to sensory perceptions, but to physical intuitions. For 
example, in arguing that thought experiments are mental models, Tamar Gen-
dler claims that sensory imagination in thought experiments allows various 
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non-moral intuitions about physical spaces to become more trustworthy (alt-
hough she does not use this piece of terminology to state her point, it seems to 
describe her position correctly).130 In her article, Gendler asks us to: 
 
Think about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the fol-
lowing questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash with 
the current carpet, or complement it? If you removed all its furniture, could 
four elephants fit comfortably inside? If you removed all but one of the ele-
phants, would there be enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as you 
turned?131 
 
Gendler points out that we typically use sensory imagination to answer these 
questions: 
 
Perhaps you believed (perhaps tacitly) that some indoor spaces are too small 
to ride a bike in (closets, for instance), and that others (banquet halls, for in-
stance) are certainly large enough – but did you have, even tacitly, beliefs about 
where the border between these lay, and, in particular, beliefs about where your 
neighbor’s living room stood with respect to that border? Didn’t you, instead, 
discover something about bikes and living rooms by imagining having a cer-
tain experience? Likewise with the color case. While you may have known 
beforehand that your neighbor’s rug looks like this, and that green looks like 
that, was it really a matter of deductive or inductive inference that led you to 
the conclusion that – were they adjacent – you would judge them to clash? 
Wasn’t it instead as if you performed an experiment-in-thought, on the basis 
of which you got some new information about your own judgments, which 
(perhaps because of tacit beliefs that you hold) you took to be relevant data in 
answering the question at hand?132 
 
Similar ideas can be found in the writings of Nancy Nersessian, who is another 
defender of thought experiments as mental models.133 From this picture of 
mental modelling and the importance of sensory imagination, it seems plausi-
ble to think that: 
 
(3) Sensory imagination makes our physical intuitions more epistemi-
cally trustworthy. 
 
Moreover, the way in which sensory imagination makes our physical intui-
tions more trustworthy in these cases seems analogous to how sensory imagi-
nation (according to the sensory imagination theory) makes our moral intui-
tions more trustworthy. For example, you can learn whether a bed fits through 
a door by sensorily imagining trying to move it past the doorway, forming a 
picture of it moving through, adding room for persons to lift it, and so on. 
                               
130 Gendler (2004). See especially pp. 1156-1161. 
131 Gendler (2004), p. 1156. 
132 Gendler (2004), p. 1159. 
133 Nersessian (2007). 
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Your physical intuition that the bed does or does not fit through the door will 
clearly be more trustworthy if you have in a detailed way visualized the widths 
and heights of the door and the bed. That is, your physical intuitions are more 
epistemically trustworthy if you have sensorily imagined the physically rele-
vant features of the door and bed. With this in mind, it seems reasonable to 
think that: 
 
(4) If sensory imagination makes our physical intuitions more epistemi-
cally trustworthy, then it makes our moral intuitions more trustwor-
thy as well. 
 
And taken together, (3) and (4) support the sensory imagination theory. 
6.4 Morally Relevant Features 
We can sensorily imagine morally relevant features not only directly and in-
directly, but also by means of different sensory moods. These moods include 
not only the visual, but also the olfactory, gastronomical, tactual, auditory, and 
proprioceptional moods. They include imagining sensations, such as unpleas-
ant sensations of sadness and anxiety, physical pains such as sharp and dull 
pain, and pleasant sensations such as elation and satisfaction. Just as we can 
visualize a mountainside, we can sensorily imagine hearing sounds, feeling 
pressure, tasting sweetness, fearing a wolf, feeling pain, and so on. In many 
of these non-visual cases, our language lacks imagination counterpart terms, 
as “visualizing” is the imagination counterpart term to seeing. Therefore, 
when applying the sensory imagination theory, we may want to invent new 
counterpart terms and speak of auditializing, tactializing, tastializing, and so 
on to refer to the relevant phenomena. 
Now, what are the (fundamentally and non-derivatively) morally relevant 
features of acts? On one view, they are the features that (fundamentally and 
non-derivatively) matter for the act’s moral evaluation. Accordingly, different 
moral theorists may have different opinions on the matter. But even so, there 
is a strong case to be made for pleasure and pain making up at least part of 
what is fundamentally and non-derivatively morally relevant. Even many non-
utilitarians agree that pleasure and pain is fundamentally morally relevant, in-
cluding Rossians and consequentialist pluralists, as well as object preferen-
tialist utilitarians. These theories disagree with utilitarianism about whether 
only pleasure and pain are fundamentally morally relevant, and how these 
morally relevant features affect the deontic status of acts. Moreover, if a moral 
theory cannot account for how pleasure and pain is fundamentally morally 
relevant, that seems to count strongly against such a view. So it seems reason-
ably to think that, at the very least, sensorily imagining the pleasure and pain 
resulting from an act will improve the epistemic trustworthiness of our moral 
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intuitions. This is so even if there are many additional morally relevant fea-
tures of acts that we may also sensorily imagine in order to improve the epis-
temic trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. 
6.5 Defending Utilitarianism 
Having granted that sensorily imagining the pleasure and pain resulting from 
acts will improve the trustworthiness of our moral intuitions, let us now return 
to Revised Transplant. In this case – the one where Sarah runs an autonomous 
hospital in a barren wasteland – we sensorily imagine that the five patients 
wake up and feel relief after a successful operation, knowing that their lives 
are saved. We then indirectly sensorily imagine them living pleasant lives 
many years afterwards, such as by visualizing them being transported out of 
the desert, settling down in a village, forming families, enjoying their voca-
tions, and so on. When contrasting this outcome with that of not killing patient 
Six and letting the five die, we sensorily imagine only patient Six walking out 
of the desert, settling down in a village, and so on. When I have imagined the 
case in these different ways, sensorily imagining the pleasure and pain result-
ing from performing the act or its alternative, I more strongly intuit that it 
would be obligatory for Sarah to kill patient Six in order to save the five other 
patients. 
Let us now approach Revised Experience Machine in the same way. We 
sensorily imagine that John is plugged into the experience machine, having a 
large number of pleasant sensations. We sensorily imagine that he sees won-
derful sunsets, experiences deep happiness, feels love and relaxation, and en-
joys focusing on the meaningful activities that he most loves doing. Finally, 
we sensorily imagine John instead living in the outside world. We imagine the 
same sensations, but as slightly less pleasurable. The sunset is less bright, the 
happiness less deep, the love is less intense, and so on. In this case, I more 
strongly intuit that it is obligatory for William to plug John into the machine, 
as compared to when I did not sensorily imagined these features of the case. 
In contrast to Revised Transplant and Revised Experience Machine, sen-
sory imagination makes less of a difference to the two utility monster cases 
that I have considered – both the revised and the original one. These cases 
involve the pleasures of many people, which is difficult for us to sensorily 
imagine.134 Moreover, the original case involves pleasures which are so intense 
that we cannot sensorily imagine them. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
sensory imagination theory can help us defend utilitarianism against the ob-
jections raised by these cases. That said, if the sensory imagination theory is 
                               
134 Several philosophers have pointed out the problem of imagining large number cases. See 
Tännsjö (2002), p. 344, Broome (2004), pp. 56-59, 210-214, and Huemer (2008), p. 908. For 
discussion, see Pummer (2012). 
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true, this means that we will also lack one way of increasing the trustworthi-
ness of our moral intuitions about such cases, because we cannot sensorily 
imagine some of their features. This suggests that cases which are more easily 
sensorily imagined should play a proportionally greater role in the evaluation 
of utilitarianism and other moral theories, as these cases can provide us with 
more trustworthy moral intuitions. 
Finally, note that in the above cases I considered how the strength of our 
moral intuitions may change when sensorily imagining the morally relevant 
features of cases. But that is not the only way in which the sensory imagination 
theory could aid utilitarianism. First, that moral intuitions become more trust-
worthy can itself make utilitarianism more plausible. Second, the relevant ep-
isodes of sensory imagination may cause us to change our moral intuitions in 
favor of utilitarianism. For example, after sensorily imagining Revised Trans-
plant, we might intuit that Sarah should kill patient Six; while before we im-
agined the case in this way, we intuited that she should let the five die. In that 
case, even if the new intuition is weaker than the original one, the result is still 
that utilitarianism becomes more plausible. 
6.6 Objections and Responses 
Finally, let me consider some potential objections to my arguments. 
Objection: “I do not share your intuitions. So I remain unconvinced by this 
defense of utilitarianism.” 
Response: Clearly, that I rely on only my own intuitions is a weakness in 
the above arguments. I would be happier if I had had access to systematic, 
empirical data on whether and how people’s moral intuitions change in re-
sponse to the relevant use of sensory imagination. Perhaps this is a matter for 
future research. But that said, I would be surprised if a significant number of 
people did not somewhat change their intuitive responses when sensorily im-
agining pleasures and pains in these ways, and for their responses to become 
more friendly to utilitarianism. 
Objection: “The view that sensory imagination yields intuitions with 
greater epistemic trustworthiness is question-begging. It is stacked in favor of 
those that put relatively much stock in facts about experiences, such as utili-
tarianism.” 
Response: The sensory imagination theory does indeed support utilitarian-
ism, but appealing to this theory in defense of utilitarianism is not question-
begging. To begin with, I have argued that the sensory imagination theory is 
independently plausible – I suggested several arguments for the sensory im-
agination theory in Section 6.3, and none of the arguments depended on utili-
tarianism being true. Moreover, for the sensory imagination theory to aid in 
the defense of utilitarianism, we need only assume that pleasures and pains 
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are fundamentally morally relevant. As I noted earlier in this chapter, many 
non-utilitarians will agree with this claim. 
Objection: “Is it not more reasonable to require that we imagine the poten-
tially morally relevant features of acts, rather than their actually morally rele-
vant features?” 
Response: As I have formulated the sensory imagination theory, it is com-
patible with us also increasing the epistemic trustworthiness of moral intui-
tions by sensorily imagining the potentially morally relevant features of acts. 
That is, the theory gives us one way in which sensory imagination can increase 
the epistemic trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. This might not be the 
only way, however. In any case, the potentially morally relevant features will 
even more obviously include pleasure and pain. So this only strengthens the 
case for utilitarianism. 
In philosophical practice, where we are uncertain about which features are 
morally relevant, we will want to construct thought experiments so that a large 
number of theorists can benefit from thinking about them. Conveniently, we 
can probably use one and the same episode of sensory imagination to let us 
indirectly sensorily imagine several different potentially morally relevant fea-
tures of an act. For example, we can indirectly sensorily imagine a person 
being in pain and having her rights violated by directly sensorily imagining an 
act of physical violence. 
Objection: “Using the above methodology, utilitarianism becomes less 
plausible. For example, consider the case of Transmission suggested by Tim 
Scanlon.135 Jones has suffered an accident in a TV transmitter room and is in 
incredible pain. To help him, we must interrupt the transmission. But doing so 
will cause millions of television viewers to receive slightly less pleasure, and 
so this alternative act produces less than maximal pleasure minus pain. There-
fore, utilitarianism tells us to continue the transmission and to leave Jones in 
pain. Intuitively, of course, we should interrupt the transmission. Moreover, 
sensorily imagining Jones’ pain will actually make us less inclined to have 
intuitions which accord with utilitarianism. Sensorily imagining Jones’ pain 
strengthens our moral intuition that it is obligatory to interrupt the transmis-
sion, and this moral intuition will also (per the sensory imagination theory) 
become more epistemically trustworthy.” 
Response: I admit that cases like these will continue to trouble utilitarian-
ism for the foreseeable future, and that in some such cases our anti-utilitarian 
intuitions become both stronger and more epistemically trustworthy. But that 
said, I would argue that cases like these are ultimately not optimal for testing 
moral theories, simply because we cannot sensorily imagine all of the morally 
relevant features in them, such as large numbers of people receiving a certain 
amount of pleasure and pain. Moreover, when I do try to sensorily imagine 
many sensations of, for example, slight disappointment (resulting from having 
                               
135 Scanlon (2000), p. 235. 
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the transmission turned off) and comparing that to the greatly lessened pain 
for Jones, the result is not that I become ever more certain that it is morally 
right to turn off the transmission the more disappointments that I imagine. 
Rather, I find it more and more difficult to elicit any intuitions about the case 
whatsoever. My intuitive faculties seem to have a hard time comparing the 
large decline in pain to the many small disappointments being imagined. It is 
like my brain just gives up trying to compare these sensations. In so far as 
others share my reactions to this case, the implications for utilitarianism are 
admittedly not fantastic – it would be better had we intuited that we should 
turn of the transmission. But neither are they any worse than before we used 
our sensory imagination to engage with the case. 
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7. Conclusions 
Almost 100 years ago, Ralph Blake wrote a defense of hedonistic act utilitar-
ianism, which he introduced with the following remarks: 
 
In current discussions of ethical theory it has become the tradition to treat [util-
itarianism] on the more or less definite assumption that its rejection is a fore-
gone conclusion. Its falsity is so thoroughly taken for granted that it is thought 
possible to dispose of its claims in very short order indeed. It is usually treated 
with ill-disguised contempt as an antiquated heresy that has so long since been 
definitely refuted that its truth can scarcely be contemplated as a genuine pos-
sibility at all. Its "fallacies" are summarily pointed out, in a few brief pages, 
and we are hurried on to a consideration of theories more worthy the attention 
of a mature mind.136 
 
I imagine that had Blake been alive today, he would have been glad to learn 
that, for the most part, we have left behind the objections that he complained 
of as “simply puerile.” Today’s objections to utilitarianism are more sophisti-
cated than they were a hundred years ago. That said, I suspect he would still 
be disappointed to learn that a century later the theory’s “falsity” is “so thor-
oughly taken for granted that it is thought possible to dispose of its claims in 
very short order.” I hope to have made some contribution to dispelling such 
pessimistic views. While utilitarianism may be false, it is not obviously false, 
and many objections that are directed against it become far less convincing 
upon closer examination. 
Let me sum up what has been achieved in this book. In the previous six 
chapters, I considered two types of objections to utilitarianism, and partially 
defended the theory against both. I first discussed objections to the effect that 
utilitarianism is not action guiding. In Chapter 2, I distinguished between two 
types of action guidance, which I called doxastic and evidential guidance. 
Roughly, for a theory to be doxastically guiding is for it to be able to teach us 
what to do, whereas for a theory to be evidentially guiding is for it to be prac-
tically relevant to us in decision making. I gave more precise definitions of 
these kinds of action guidance, and I also argued that while utilitarianism is 
not doxastically guiding, it is at least evidentially guiding. The distinction be-
tween doxastic and evidential guidance became useful in Chapter 3, where I 
considered several action guidance objections to utilitarianism. I identified 
                               
136 Blake (1926), p. 1. Note that in his article, Blake refers to hedonistic act utilitarianism as 
“hedonism.” 
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five such objections, and sometimes considered multiple interpretations of a 
given objection. An important difference between these objections lie in their 
conclusions, which include that utilitarianism is a bad moral theory, that it is 
not even a moral theory, that it is an uninteresting or unimportant moral the-
ory, and, most importantly, that it is a false moral theory. I concluded that 
none of these objections are promising upon closer examination. That said, 
my discussion did not give a complete defense against action guidance objec-
tions to utilitarianism, because I did not consider purely meta-ethical action 
guidance objections. Moreover, I admit, there might exist action guidance ob-
jections that we have not yet found, or that we have not formulated clearly 
enough. 
Next, I discussed objections to the effect that utilitarianism conflicts with 
our moral intuitions. In Chapter 4, I presented three thought experiments – 
Experience Machine, Transplant, and Utility Monster – together with corre-
sponding intuitive objections. I also evaluated and criticized three strategies 
for responding to these objections: scope restriction, debunking arguments, 
and non-conscious application. In Chapters 5 and 6, I moved on to consider 
two alternative defenses of utilitarianism against intuitive objections, which I 
considered more promising. In Chapter 5, I discussed the idea that we might 
fail to carry out the right thought experiments when we test utilitarianism 
against our moral intuitions – that we might misimagine these cases. I consid-
ered two ways in which we can revise thought experiments to avoid misimag-
ining cases, and I showed that on both approaches the intuitive objections to 
utilitarianism either fail or become weaker. In Chapter 6, I argued that when 
we sensorily imagine the morally relevant features of the cases being consid-
ered, our moral intuitions become friendlier to utilitarianism. 
Just as with the action guidance objections, my defense of utilitarianism 
against the intuitive objections was merely partial. That said, I think that once 
we consider the possibility of misimagining cases and the importance of sen-
sory imagination, and once we adjust our philosophical and methodological 
practices accordingly, utilitarianism looks like a more plausible view. It cer-
tainly does not deserve the peripheral place it has been given in recent discus-
sions of consequentialist theories. 
Let me end this book with a general observation. The idea that moral theo-
ries must be action guiding seems to require a meta-ethical picture on which 
morality is less “objective” and more “subjective.” If moral facts are like sci-
entific facts about atoms and molecules, then a moral theory that is perfectly 
action guiding would appear, for that very reason, suspect – because what is 
the chance that, of everything that could be morally relevant in the universe, 
it is precisely that which we can easily learn about and use for applying the 
true moral theory? Indeed, if morality is “objective,” one would suspect that 
an action guiding moral theory just reflects our ingrained prejudices. On the 
other hand, the intuitive objections seem most plausible on a meta-ethical pic-
ture where morality is more “subjective” and less “objective.” The intuitive 
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objections depend on our moral intuitions being epistemically trustworthy, 
and the best argument for their being so draws upon a comparison to our per-
ceptual faculties – i.e., how we by sight, smell, and hearing perceive an objec-
tive reality. Action guidance objections therefore seem to require a radically 
different view of moral reality than do intuitive objections – one on which 
moral facts are “up to us.” Intuitive objections, in contrast, seem to require a 
view on which moral facts are rather “up to us to find.” For these reasons, I 
suspect that irrespective of the ultimate fate of these two groups of objections 
against utilitarianism, it will be difficult to make both work. 
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